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ABSTRACT
In 2017, 6.7 million children received special education services and 1.2 million children
received Supplemental Security Income. Despite the reach of these two programs, little research
has examined how local, state, and federal policies interact with these two program. This disser-
tation is comprised of three essays examining local and federal policies affecting children with
disabilities. In Chapter 1, I use administrative student level records from the state of North Car-
olina and regression discontinuity methods, to corroborate earlier research suggesting that the
youngest children in the classroom are more likely to receive special education services relative
to their older peers. Children born the month before the school cutoff date are 1.75 percentage
points (16%) more likely to receive special education in grade 3 relative to their peers born the
month after the cutoff date. Importantly, I find that the gap in special education placement does
not diminish with school tenure. In grade 12, children born the month before the cutoff date are
still 3.84 percentage points (42%) more likely to receive special education services relative to
their peers born the month after the cutoff date. Thus, I find evidence of a negative feedback
loop in which the youngest children are placed on a lower track at the onset of their schooling,
from which they generally do not recover.
In Chapter 2, I document a direct pathway from receipt of special education to SSI using
a two-sample fuzzy regression discontinuity design. First, using administrative records from
North Carolina, I corroborate earlier findings that children born the month before the kinder-
garten entry eligibility cutoff date are more likely to receive special education services relative
to children born the month after the school cutoff date. Next, using National Health Interview
Survey respondents linked to Social Security Administration records, I document that the chil-
i
dren born just before the cutoff date are 0.78 percentage points (or 30%) more likely to apply
for and 0.55 percentage points (or 59%) more likely to receive an award for SSI between the
ages of 5 and 12 relative to children born just after the school cutoff date. I find no increase
in awards among groups unlikely to be affected by the relationship between school starting age
and special education; these include children with physical impairments or those too young for
school enrollment. Two-sample fuzzy RD estimates indicate that a 1 percentage point increase in
the fraction of children receiving special education services induces a 0.16 percentage point (or
10%) increase in the fraction of children with an SSI award. Back of the envelope calculations
suggest that approximately 18% of the growth in the SSI caseload can be attributed to rising
rates of special education and spillovers between these two programs.
In Chapter 3, I test how exposure to the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) affects the like-
lihood a child receives SSI payments between the ages of 15 and 18. Exogenous variation in
exposure to the EITC is derived from the maximum credit available to the child in his state of
residence each year between the ages of 0 and 18. Reduced-form estimates indicated that expo-
sure to an additional $1,000 each year reduces the likelihood that a child receives income from
SSI by 0.34 percentage points (26%). Exposure to a larger EITC between the ages of 13 and
18 has the largest impact on SSI receipt. I find no evidence that the primary channel through
which the EITC reduces SSI is improved health of the child. In particular I find that exposure
to a larger EITC does not reduce the likelihood a child reports a physical or cognitive impair-
ment. Nor do I find any evidence that the primary channel through which the EITC reduces SSI
participation is through increases in maternal labor supply, which may mechanically reduce the
child’s eligibility for SSI.
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CHAPTER 1
SCHOOL STARTING AGE AND CHILD DISABILITY:
EVIDENCE FROM NORTH CAROLINA
1.1 Introduction
Conventional wisdom holds that relatively older children are more mature and have garnered
additional necessary skills compared to their younger counterparts; this maturity likely affects
performance in the classroom. A positive association between student’s relative age and early
academic achievement has been document in the literature (Bedard and Dhuey, 2006; Elder and
Lubotsky, 2009; Black, Devereux and Salvanes, 2011; Cook and Kang, 2016, and Dhuey, Figlio,
Karbownik and Roth, 2017). Using administrative student level data and regression discontinuity
methods, I corroborate earlier research indicating that in primary school the relatively youngest
children in the classroom are more likely to be classified for special education compared to
their older peers; in particular, children born directly before a school entry cutoff date are more
likely to be classified with specific learnings disabilities, other health impairments, and speech
impairments. I further corroborate findings that the youngest children in the classroom score
below their older classmates on end of grade exams in both math and reading. Contrary to
previous findings, I find the impact of relative age does not diminish during a child’s academic
tenure. Rather test score gaps and special education placement gaps persist through high school
completion. Thus, I find evidence of a negative feedback loop in which the youngest children are
placed on a lower track at the onset of their schooling from which they generally do not recover.
In the 2015-16 school year, approximately 6.6 million children between the ages of three
and twenty-one received some form of special education services (NCES, 2016). While special
education students comprise only 13% of all students, they receive about 18% of all funding
for public schools (USDE, 2015). While advocates of special education view special education
as an avenue in which to improve the well-being of highly-disadvantaged children, labeling
a student as disabled may lower the expectations of teachers, parents, future employers, and
children themselves. These lower expectations may place the child on a lower trajectory. For
example, Carlana, 2018 finds that a teacher’s expectation has a large impact on test score gaps.
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This documented discrepancy in special education diagnoses at early ages for children born
around an arbitrary cutoff date elicits further research into the long-term impacts of school cutoff
dates on children’s academic experiences. I expand the growing literature by testing how school
cutoff dates affect the trajectory of children up through high school completion.
Beginning with Angrist and Krueger (1991) a series of articles have utilized the timing of
one’s birth to explore a myriad of outcomes including: academic achievement, graduation, earn-
ings, and fertility (Black, Devereux and Salvanes, 2011; Bedard and Dhuey, 2006; Dobkin and
Ferreira, 2010; McCrary and Royer, 2011). This burgeoning literature exploits state laws speci-
fying the minimum age at which a child is eligible for kindergarten entry. While the short-term
effects for relative youth, have been consistently documented as negative, the longer term effects
are noisier. Elder and Lubotsky (2009) document that despite large test score gaps present at the
beginning of kindergarten, the disparity in reading and math test scores dissipates between older
and younger students by the time students reach 8th grade. However, Bedard and Dhuey (2006)
find that test score gaps between older and younger classmates persist through 8th grade. I find
no evidence that test score gaps dissipate with absolute age corroborating the findings of Bedard
and Dhuey.
To test the effect of relative age in grade on special education in grades 3 through 12, I
implement a regression discontinuity design (RD). I leverage rich administrative data from the
state of North Carolina and document a long lasting negative impact of entering school as the
youngest in the classroom. I find that the youngest children in the classroom are 1.75 percent-
age points (16.5%) more likely to receive special education services in grade three relative to
their older classmates born directly after the school cutoff date. Importantly this effect does not
dissipate with time. By eighth grade, I find that the youngest children in the classroom are 4.3
percentage points (34%) more likely to receive special education services relative to their older
classmates. And by twelfth grade the youngest children are 3.8 percentage points (40%) more
likely to receive special education services relative to their older classmates.
I corroborate Dhuey and Lipscomb (2010), where I find that the youngest children in the
classroom are more likely to receive special education services for specific learning disabilities,
other health impairments, and speech impediments. These three special education classifications
tend to be more subjective than other classifications like vision or hearing impairments. I find
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that the youngest in the classroom are 1.2 percentage points (51%) more likely to be classified
with an “other health impairment,” relative to their classmates born the month after the cutoff
date.1 Similarly, the youngest are 0.3 percentage points (10%) more likely to be classified with a
speech impairment and 1.97 percentage points (34%) more likely to be classified with a specific
learning disability relative to their classmates born the month after the cutoff date. Importantly,
I find no discontinuity in classification of blindness/deafness or autism for children born around
the school cutoff date.
In addition to being placed in special education, I find that the youngest children in the
classroom are more likely to repeat a grade. Children born the month before the cutoff date are
2.3 percentage points (28%) more likely to ever repeat a grade between grades 3 and 12. But this
effect is even larger in early grades. For instance, children born the month before the cutoff date
are 1.16 percentage points (73%) more likely to repeat 3rd grade, relative to their classmates
born the month after the cutoff date.
Similar to Dhuey et al. (2017) I document that the youngest children perform worse on their
math and reading end of grade exams. I find that children born the month before the cutoff date
(the youngest in the classroom) score 0.12 standard deviations below their classmates born the
month after the cutoff date on their end of grade 3 reading exam, and 0.10 standard deviations
below their older counterparts on their end of grade 3 math exam. Similar to Bedard and Dhuey
(2006) and contrary to Elder and Lubotsky (2009) I find that this negative test score gap persists
through high school. On end of grade 8 exams, children born the month before the cutoff date
score 0.10 standard deviations lower on reading and 0.09 standard deviations lower on math
relative to their counterpart born the month after the cutoff date.
During high school children are tested on three subject exams: Algebra I, English II, and
Biology. I find that the children born the month before the cutoff date score 0.15 standard
deviations lower on their Algebra I test, 0.24 standard deviations lower on their English II test,
and 0.16 standard deviations lower on their Biology exam. In addition to lower high school exam
scores, I find that the youngest children tend to sit for their high school exams at a later grade;
children born the month before the cutoff date complete their exams 0.5 grade levels later than
1Other health impairment (OHI) includes Attention Deficient Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) and Attention De-
ficient Disorder (ADD).
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their classmates born the month after the cutoff date. These results suggest that children who
enter as the youngest in their grade take longer to be test ready.
My analysis leverages rich administrative data from the North Carolina public school system.
If individual characteristics associated with academic achievement are balanced at the cutoff
date, the differences in outcomes can be interpreted as the causal effect of school entry eligibility
on special education placement, test scores, and grade progression. I interpret these increases in
child special education placement for children born just before the school cutoff date as intent-
to-treat (ITT) effects of early eligibility to school entry for children on the margin of special
education placement. My approach follows other studies using school entry eligibility cutoff
dates to understand the intent-to-treat impact of relative age on school outcomes (e.g. Black,
Devereux and Salvanes, 2011; Bedard and Dhuey, 2006; Dobkin and Ferreira, 2010; McCrary
and Royer, 2011, Cook and Kang, 2016; Dhuey et al., 2017).
While Angrist and Krueger (1991) document a positive effect of being the youngest in the
grade—higher likelihood of high school graduation, many recent works have elucidated a nega-
tive effect of being the youngest in the classroom. The youngest children score lower on end of
grade exams (Dhuey et al., 2017), are more likely to be retained in grade (Elder and Lubotsky,
2009), and are more likely to be placed in special education for behavioral or learning disorders
(Elder and Lubotsky (2009); Dhuey and Lipscomb, 2010).
Further, children born before a school entry cutoff date are more likely to be diagnosed with
ADHD (Layton, Barnett, Hicks and Jena, 2018) and to be medicated with Ritalin for their ADHD
(Elder, 2010). This higher prevalence of ADHD diagnosis and medication for relatively young
children is troubling if these children are incorrectly diagnosed due to their relative immaturity
rather than an underlying biological disorder. Given the fact that the true prevalence of ADHD
remains unknown, these results likely reflect a combination of over-diagnoses for younger chil-
dren and under-diagnoses for older children.
While Elder and Lubotsky (2009) find that the early advantage for older children dissipates
over time, as evidenced by the diminished test score gap, the literature remains mixed on the
existence of a continued advantage of relative-age-in-grade. Older children who score higher
on standardized tests have been shown to enroll in college in higher rates (Bedard and Dhuey,
2006), to exhibit leadership characteristics in school (Dhuey and Lipscomb, 2010), and to earn
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higher adult wages (Fredriksoon and Ockert, 2005). However, more recent literature suggests
mixed long-term outcomes for relative age effects. Black, Devereux and Salvanes (2011) find
that the relatively oldest students perform worse on standardized test at age 18 and have lower
earnings at age 30. But these relatively older children are less likely to have a teen pregnancy
and less likely to suffer mental health problems. Cook and Kang (2016) find that the relatively
oldest students in the class are less likely to exhibit delinquent behavior when aged 13 to 15,
but they are substantially more likely to commit a felony by age 19. The attribute this increased
likelihood to high school dropout.
I contribute to the literature by replicating and extending findings on the effect of school
entry cutoff dates on academic performance, special education placement, and grade progression.
Unlike earlier studies which were limited by data constraints, I am able to leverage the rich
administrative data on individual students. This work was developed in parallel to Dhuey et
al. (2017). Importantly, the findings presented here and those presented by Dhuey et al. are
remarkably similar, suggesting that these findings generalizable outside the single state used
for analysis. I find that children born the month before the cutoff date score approximately
one-tenth to two-tenths of a standard deviation lower than their older counterparts on math and
reading exams. I, further, corroborate the works of Dhuey and Lipscomb (2010) and show
that relative-youth in the classroom affects special education primarily through classification of
subjective impairments. Contrary to Dhuey and Lipscomb (2010), I find that relative youth in
grade affects boys and girls equally. Whereas limited statistical power in studies by Dhuey and
Lipscomb (2010) and Elder and Lubotsky (2009) were unable to find a persistent negative impact
of relative youth in grade, I find these effects persist through 12th grade.
My estimates apply to children born directly around the school entry cutoff date, who may
differ from children born in months further away from the cutoff date. For example, Buckles
and Hungerman (2013) document maternal characteristics differ by child’s season of birth. In
particular, they find that children born in December and January are more likely to be born to
an unwed mother with lower educational attainment. Because I use month of birth, rather than
exact day of birth, seasonal differences may be a valid threat to the validity of this project if the
children born in September are systematically different from children born in November. I test
for differences in observable child characteristics for children born around the cutoff date and
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find quantitatively small differences in child characteristics for children born on either side of
the cutoff date. Further, Dickert-Conlin and Elder (2010) show that parental characteristics are
smooth through school cutoff dates. And to date, there is no evidence that parents are timing
births around school cutoff dates.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 provides background information on special ed-
ucation and school cutoff dates. Section 1.3 discusses the data and sample. Section 1.4 presents
the empirical strategy. Section 1.5 outlines the change in special education diagnoses and test
scores for children born around the cutoff date. And Section 1.6 concludes with a discussion.
1.2 Institutional Framework
1.2.1 Special Education in North Carolina
Under the Individual’s with Disabilities Act of 1975, districts are mandated to provide all stu-
dents with a free and appropriate education (FAPE). While IDEA provides general definitions
of disability, local state agencies create their own precise diagnostic guidelines. Schools are
charged with formally identifying children with disabilities and providing an individualized ed-
ucation program (IEP) (Cullen and Schmidt, 2011). Recent research has identified that teacher
identification of disability can be idiosyncratic--driven by fiscal incentives (Cullen, 2003), school
accountability incentives (Prenovitz, 2018), and subjective assessment of child maturity (Elder
and Lubotsky, 2009; Dhuey and Lipscomb, 2010).
Most often, a teacher orchestrates a child’s referral to special education. This occurs when
the teacher notices that a student is struggling within her classroom. The school then conducts
a disability evaluation, which assesses the student’s abilities and needs (Prenovitz, 2018). If the
child is found to need services in order to receive an appropriate education the child will have an
IEP drafted. This IEP is written by a group of stakeholders that often consist of the child’s parent,
teacher, school psychologist, and school principal. The IEP will detail the specific services and
support the child needs, as well as the setting these services will be delivered. A child’s IEP
is updated each year to reflect the expectations of the child, diagnoses of children are reviewed
at minimum every three years, and removal of an IEP must be approved by all stakeholders
(principal, psychologist, teacher, and parent).
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A child can be diagnosed with one of thirteen disability classifications (e.g. autism, specific
learning disability, visual impairment, etc.). In grade 3, the three most common disabilities are
specific learning disability, which accounts for 37.55% of special education placements, speech
impairments (35.6 %) and other health impairments (15.8 %). Autism makes up only 6.44%
of special education placements, and visual and hearing impairments combined make up 1% of
special education placements.
In North Carolina schools are allocated additional funds for each child with an IEP, up to a
cap at 12.5 percent of all students identified as special education. In 2017, each child with an IEP
would garner an additional $4,093 for the school regardless of which services and support the
child’s IEP identified as necessary to their education. However, once a school has identified 12.5
percent of the student body as special education, the school is ineligible to receive additional
funding per student ((North Carolina Department of Public Instruction, 2017)).
1.2.2 School Entry Cutoff Dates
North Carolina, like the majority of states, adheres to a minimum age of enrollment into public
kindergarten through its compulsory schooling law. Prior to the 2009-2010 school year, children
who achieved the age of five on or before October 16 were eligible to enter school in the fall
of the calendar year in which they turned five. In 2009 the law was amended, pushing the date
forward from October 16 to August 31, thereby increasing the average age of children within
each cohort. This statewide cutoff entry date creates a situation in which children born just
before the cutoff date are essentially one year younger than their classmate who was born just
after the statewide cutoff date.
For example, suppose there are three children: Child 1 is born on October 17, 2001; Child
2 is born on October 15, 2002; and Child 3 is born on October 17, 2002. Both Child 1 and
Child 2 are first eligible to enter kindergarten in the 2007-08 School Year (SY). Child 1 enters
school in September aged approximately 5 years and 11 months, whereas Child 2 enters school in
September aged approximately 4 years and 11 months. Thus, despite nearly a full year difference
in age, these children would be classmates. Children born just after the cutoff essentially wait an
additional year before entering kindergarten as emphasized by the relationship between Child 2
and Child 3 who are nearly identical in biological age but enter school in different cohorts.
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The actual distribution of students across grades is complicated by other features of the law.
First, students attending private kindergarten do not adhere to the law, children migrating from
other states are allowed to remain in the grade they transferred from, and children who choose not
to enroll prior to first grade can circumvent the age cutoff date. An additional concern arises from
parents choosing to "redshirt" their child by keeping them out of kindergarten for an additional
year. In my data, I am not able to distinguish between each of these mechanisms that would
leave a child in a different grade than the cutoff date would assign. Thus, my estimates will be
interpreted as intention-to-treat (ITT) effects. Specifically, I estimate the effect of being eligible
to enter school nearly a year earlier than a comparable control group on academic achievement,
special education placement, and grade retention. My research leverages the variation in the
relative-age of each child in their grade based on the school entry cutoff date, similar to prior
work in this literature (Dobkin and Ferreira, 2010; Dhuey and Lipscomb, 2010; Cook and Kang,
2016; Elder and Lubotsky, 2009; Dhuey et al., 2017).
1.3 Data
I use restricted-access student-level data from the North Carolina Department of Public Instruc-
tion (NCDPI), provided by the North Carolina Education Research Data Center (NCERDC). The
data covers all students in North Carolina’s public school system with detailed information on
children in grades 3 through 12. Since the 2004 school year, the data has included a summary
file for children between the ages of 3 and 21 who receive special education services. My sample
includes all individuals enrolled in North Carolina public schools between 2004 and 2014. There
are 2,284,675 unique child observations with 1,118,069 children appearing in third grade entry
and 804,995 appearing in 12th grade.
There are several limitations to this data: first, student date of birth is recorded as month of
birth, rather than exact date of birth; second, I cannot follow students who chose to leave the
public school system. If the group of students leaving the public school system were systemat-
ically different from those initially enrolled, and this difference was driven by the relative age
of the child, my estimates would be biased. To address the former concern, I drop all October
births facing an October 16 cutoff date. This is because October births represent both the oldest
and youngest students in their grade. To address the second concern, I look for differences in
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the likelihood a child leaves NC public schools prior to graduation for those born around the
cutoff date. I find that the youngest children are 1.7 percentage points (8%) more likely to leave
the public school system relative to the oldest in the classroom. As a robustness check, I limit
analysis to only the sample of individuals who remain enrolled in the NC public school system
through the last year of the data or until graduation. These results indicate that differential at-
trition does not drive my findings; my estimates are robust to excluding individuals who leave
the public school system. Despite the limitations, this administrative data provides more finely
detailed observations than previous research utilizing smaller national panel surveys.
To construct the main analysis sample, I combine the masterbuild file for years 2004 through
2014 with the exceptionality file. Data is constructed such that each observation represents a
unique child. I construct special education outcomes first as an indicator for whether child i
received special education services in grade g, where g ∈ [3,12], and second as indicators for
receiving services for each of the following disability classifications: autism, visual or hearing
impairments, learning disabilities, other health impairments, or speech impairments. Grade rep-
etition is first created as an indicator for ever repeating any grade. Similarly, to special education,
grade repetition is further disaggregated to indicators for whether the child repeated each grade
(grade 3 through 12) separately.2 End of Grade (EOG) and End of Course (EOC) test scores are
standardized to have mean of zero and a standard deviation of one for each test-grade-year cycle.
This means that effect sizes will be interpreted in standard deviation units.
Table 1.1 displays sample means for the main analysis sample of North Carolina public
school students. Column 1 includes the full sample of all children. This is disaggregated to
children born 6 months after the cutoff (the oldest in the classroom) in Column 2 and those
born 6 months before the cutoff date (the youngest in the classroom) in Column 3. Children
born within 6 months prior to the cutoff date are approximately age 9 at their end of third grade
exam, whereas children born within 6 months after the cutoff date are approximately age 9.5
at the time of their third grade exam. Approximately 13 percent of all students receive special
education services in grade three and this falls to 10 percent of all students by grade 12.
Seven percent of students receive special education services for a specific learning disability,
2Approximately 10 percent of children will repeat a grade between grades 1 and 12. Children are most often
retained in 9th grade, which accounts for 35% of all grade retentions. Third grade is the 3rd most common grade to
be retained in after grade 9 and grade 10.
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics
All Oldest Youngest
Variable Mean Mean Mean
Age at Grade 3 Test 9.31 9.46 9.14
Special Education
Grade 3 0.14 0.13 0.14
Grade 4 0.15 0.14 0.16
Grade 5 0.15 0.14 0.15
Grade 6 0.14 0.13 0.14
Grade 7 0.13 0.13 0.14
Grade 8 0.13 0.12 0.13
Grade 9 0.12 0.12 0.13
Grade 10 0.11 0.10 0.11
Grade 11 0.10 0.10 0.11
Grade 12 0.10 0.09 0.10
Type of Impairment
Other Health Impairment 0.03 0.03 0.03
Speech Impairment 0.03 0.03 0.03
Learning Disability 0.07 0.06 0.07
Blind or Deaf 0.00 0.00 0.00
Autism 0.01 0.01 0.01
Read Grade 3 0.01 0.03 -0.02
Read Grade 8 0.01 0.02 0.00
English II 0.00 0.03 -0.04
Math Grade 3 0.01 0.03 -0.01
Math Grade 8 0.01 0.02 0.00
Algebra I 0.00 0.02 -0.02
Biology 0.00 0.02 -0.03
Grade Algebra I Taken 10.20 10.19 10.21
Grade Biology Taken 10.76 10.76 10.77
Grade English II Taken 10.28 10.28 10.28
Repeated a Grade 0.09 0.09 0.10
Left Sample Early 0.24 0.24 0.24
Male 0.51 0.51 0.51
White 0.54 0.54 0.54
Black 0.27 0.28 0.27
Hispanic 0.11 0.11 0.11
Free/Reduced Lunch 0.53 0.53 0.52
English Language Program 0.15 0.15 0.16
N 1,117,538 601,118 516,420
Data source: North Carolina Department of Public Instruction, school years 2004-2014.
Notes: Sample includes all children who attended a North Carolina public school for any
number of grades in grades 3 through 12.
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three percent receive special education services for speech impediments and other health impair-
ments, respectively. Less than one percent of students receive special education for a hearing or
visual impairment, and one percent of students receive special education for autism. Most chil-
dren report completing their high school exams in Algebra I, English II, and Biology in grade
10. Approximately 9 percent of all students will repeat a grade at some point, and 24 percent of
the sample is flagged as departing the north Carolina public school system prior to graduation.
Approximately 50 percent of the sample is male, 54 percent identify as non-Hispanic white, 28
percent identify as non-Hispanic black, and 11 percent identify as Hispanic. Fifty-three percent
of the sample is classified as free or reduced price lunch for at least one year during the sample
period. And 15 percent are referred to the English Language Program at some point during their
academic career. Importantly, special education classification, test scores, and student character-
istics do not show any difference in means around the cutoff date.
This project relies on a data from a single state, North Carolina. In Appendix Figure A.2,
I show that North Carolina is not dissimilar from the US average. Approximately 13 percent
of children in North Carolina receive special education services, this is similar to the national
average. Further, North Carolina children are equally likely to live below the poverty level, iden-
tify as white, have a mother with a high school diploma or less or live with a single mother.
However, children in North Carolina are less likely to be non-Hispanic black and more likely
to be Hispanic, relative to the US average. In general, North Carolina is a large state, that de-
mographically resembles the national average; this makes North Carolina an appropriate setting
to examine school entry cutoff dates and special education placement. The similarity of my
estimates to those of Dhuey et al. (2017) using Florida student level data provides additional
evidence that North Carolina is not unique setting to study relative-age-in-grade effects.
1.4 Empirical Strategy
To estimate the effect of relative age on special education placement, grade retention, and test
scores I exploit the sharp discontinuity in eligibility to enter kindergarten between children born
just before and just after the school entry cutoff date in a regression discontinuity design (RD).
The variation in school entry eligibility and subsequent variation in relative-age-in-grade enables
an estimate of the causal effect of school entry eligibility on children’s special education and
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academic outcomes.
This strategy assumes that other characteristics associated with special education placement,
grade retention, and test scores evolve smoothly through the cutoff date. Restated, the underlying
assumption is that there are no other differences among children born just before and just after
the school entry cutoff date. Date of birth is essentially random, therefore, children born around
the cutoff date should not exhibit observable differences other than that one child was eligible to
enter kindergarten and one child was ineligible to enter until the following year.
This assumption relies on parents not manipulating the date of birth around the school entry
cutoff date. Dickert-Conlin and Elder (2010) find no systematic differences in maternal charac-
teristics or child infant health outcomes around school entry eligibility cutoff dates. Their results
suggest that in the neighborhood around a school entry eligibility cutoff date, date of birth is
essentially random. As is standard with regression discontinuity methods, I test this underlying
assumption by looking for discrete differences in characteristics of children born around the cut-
off date. If this underlying assumption holds, the outcomes of children born just after the cutoff
date (those ineligible to enter school) provide reasonable counterfactual outcomes to the children
born just before the cutoff date.
To implement this strategy, I define the running variable as the distance between an indi-
vidual’s month of birth and the statewide school entry cutoff month as shown in the following
equation:
relative monthi = month o f entry cuto f f −month o f birthi (1.1)
where month o f birthi is the child’s month of birth (with January= 1 and December =12) of
individual i, and month o f entry cuto f f is the statewide school entry cutoff month (October=10).
By this definition any child with relative month< 0 is among the oldest in the classroom and any
child with relative month > 0 is among the youngest in the classroom. Thus, an individual born
in September will have a relative month of 1 and an individual born in November will have a
relative month of negative 1.3 I then compare differences in the likelihood a child receives special
education services, the likelihood a child is retained in their grade, and end of grade test scores
3October births would take a relative month of 0 but have been dropped from analysis due to the October 16 cutoff
date.
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between the youngest and oldest within each grade and school. To quantify the discontinuity
more precisely, I estimate regressions of the following form:
Y gisc = α+δ1Youngesti+δ2relative monthi+
δ3Youngesti ∗ relative monthi+pic+θs+ γXi+ εisc (1.2)
where Y g is the outcome of interest (e.g. Special education placement in grade g ∈ [3,12],
retained in grade g, math/reading score in grade g) for individual i, in school s, born in year
c. Youngest is an indicator for having a birth month before the school cutoff month (having
a relative month > 0). I include birth year and school fixed effects represented by pic and θs,
respectively. Lastly, Xi represents a vector of individual characteristics which include the child’s
race, gender, and whether they are eligible for free and reduced price lunch. Equation 1.2 spec-
ifies the local linear regression, which allows the relationship between relative age and child
outcomes to vary on either side of the discontinuity.4 The coefficient of interest, δ1, is the size of
the discontinuity. That is, δ1, measures the weighted average treatment effect where the weights
are determined by the probability of being near the cutoff date or where relative month= 0 (Lee,
2008).
The RD estimate represents the difference in special education placement, grade retention,
and test scores for children who are essentially one year younger than their classmates who were
born the month after the cutoff date. The estimates reported in this project are derived from
the local linear specification using a bandwidth of 6 months. Standard errors are clustered at
the school. However, I show that my estimates are robust to bandwidth selection, specification
choice, and different assumptions about the correlation of standard errors.
1.5 Regression Discontinuity Estimates
To begin analysis, I corroborate earlier research that school entry cutoff dates affect the age of
children within the classroom. Figure 1.1 plots the average age of children at the time of their
end-of-grade 3 test by their month of birth relative to the school entry cutoff month. Children
4Estimates are not sensitive to using the local linear specification. Estimates using higher order polynomials are
qualitatively similar and presented in table A.1.
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born in September have a relative month of 1, whereas children born in November have a relative
month of -1. As can be seen, children born in November are about half a year older at the time
of their end-of-grade 3 exam. The fact that the difference in age at the time of test is not exactly
1 year reflects the fact that some children are retained in grade and/or parents choose to red-shirt
their child. However, there is a clear discontinuity in the average age of children around the
school cutoff date. I next test the underlying assumption of the model, that characteristics of
individuals evolve smoothly through the cutoff month.
Figure 1.1: Age of Child at End of Grade 3 Exam, By Month of Birth Relative to Statewide
Cutoff Date
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Month of Birth Relative to Statewide Cutoff Date
Data source: North Carolina Department of Public Instruction, school years 2004-2014.
Notes: Sample includes all children who attended third grade in a North Carolina public school.
All October births have been dropped from the sample. Age of child is calculated as the bio-
logical age of the child in months relative to a June test date. Children born in November have
a relative month of -1 and are the oldest in the classroom. Children born in September have a
relative month of 1 and are the youngest in the classroom.
1.5.1 Balance of Covariates
Previous work by Buckles and Hungerman (2013) argued that season of birth may be a poor in-
strument for educational attainment because women who give birth in winter are more likely to
be unmarried and/or teenage mothers. Thus, maternal characteristics may explain the differences
one finds in educational outcomes due to season of birth instrumental variables. In this setting,
in which I only observe month of birth, rather than exact day of birth, differences in child char-
acteristics is a valid concern. I first explore whether there is bunching around the October cutoff
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Figure 1.2: Total Births, By Month of Birth Relative to Statewide Cutoff Date
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Data source: North Carolina Department of Public Instruction, school years 2004-2014.
Notes: Sample includes all children who attended a North Carolina public school for any grade
3 through 12. All October births have been dropped from the sample.
month. Figure 1.2 plots the total number births by month of birth relative to the cutoff month.
While there are fewer births in November, relative to September, the difference in births does not
appear large. Further, the distributions of births by month closely follow the national distribution
of births, in which no other state uses an October school entry cutoff date (see Appendix Figure
A.1). Therefore, it does not appear that parents are timing births around the cutoff month.
I next present graphical and tabular evidence indicating that child characteristics are smooth
through the cutoff month. In Figure 1.3, I plot the fraction of persons who identify with the
following characteristics: male, non-Hispanic white, non-Hispanic black, Hispanic, free and
reduced price lunch eligible, English Language Program participants, and those who are flagged
as having left the public school system prior to graduation by their month of birth relative to the
school cutoff month. Panel (a) shows that there is no discontinuity in the fraction of children
who are male. Panel (b) shows that there are no discontinuities at the cutoff date by child race.
And Panel (c) shows that children on either side of the cutoff data do not appear any more likely
to qualify for free/reduced price lunch, be assigned to the English Language Program, or leave
the sample early.
Lastly, using each observable characteristic as the dependent variable, I estimate models
of Equation 1.2 to test for discontinuities in characteristics of children born around the cutoff
month. Table 1.2 presents estimates of δ1 from Equation 1.2, where I find small, yet statistically
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Figure 1.3: Fraction of Births by Relative Month, by Observable Characteristics
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Data source: North Carolina Department of Public Instruction, school years 2004-2014.
Notes: Sample includes all children who attended a North Carolina public school for any grade
3 through 12. All October births have been dropped from the sample. Male is an indicator that
the child is a biological male, white is an indicator for non-Hispanic white, black is an indicator
for non-Hispanic black, Hispanic is an indicator for Hispanic, Other has been omitted from the
graph. Leave Sample Early is an indicator for the child left the NC public school system prior
to graduation. English Language Learner is an indicator that the child participates in the English
Language Program at any time between grades 3 and 12. Free/Reduced Lunch is an indicator
for the child was eligible for free or reduced price lunch at any time between grades 3 through
12.
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significant, differences for children born around the cutoff month. Children born the month
before the cutoff date are 0.49 percentage points (1.8%) more likely to be black, 0.21 percentage
points (1.8%) more likely to be Hispanic, 0.49 percentage points (0.9%) less likely to be white,
and 0.29 percentage points (4%) less likely to identify as another race. These differences in child
ethnicity around the cutoff date, while statistically significant, are small in magnitude. I also find
that children born the month before the cutoff date are 1.1 percentage points (6.5%) more likely
to participate in the English Language Program.5
Table 1.2: Regression Discontinuity Estimates of Being Youngest in Classroom on Covariates
Black Hispanic White Other Race Ever FRL Ever ELP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Youngest -0.0049*** 0.0021* 0.0049*** -0.0029*** 0.0011 0.0112***
(0.0014) (0.0011) (0.0015) (0.0009) (0.0017) (0.0016)
Dep. Mean 0.2737 0.1114 0.5411 0.0702 0.5121 0.1669
N 1,782,480 1,782,480 1,782,480 1,782,480 1,782,480 1,782,480
Data source: North Carolina Department of Public Instruction, school years 2004-2014.
Notes: Sample includes all children who attended a North Carolina public school for any number
of grades in grades 3 through 12. FRL is Free/Reduced price lunch eligible. ELP is English
Language Program for students learning English as a second language. Each cell represents a
separate regression. Results reflect estimates of equation (1.2). All models include fixed effects
for birth year and school and are estimated separately by grade. Standard errors are clustered at
the school and are reported in parentheses. * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level,
** indicates statistical significance at the 5% level, and *** indicates statistical significance at
the 1% level.
Importantly, I find no evidence that children born the month before the cutoff date are more
likely to qualify as free and reduced price lunch. The point estimate is small and not statistically
significant. Therefore, family socioeconomic status does not appear to predict child month of
birth, in this setting. Taken together, the density plots, descriptive statistics, and regression
discontinuity estimates presented in Table 1.2 suggest that the underlying assumptions of the
model are satisfied. Month of birth is essentially random, and individuals born the month after
the cutoff date provide a valid counterfactual for the children born the month before the cutoff
date. Thus, differences in special education placement, grade retention, and test scores can be
attributed to the child’s immaturity in the classroom.
5English Language Program participation may be an outcome, rather than a characteristic. Similar to special
education, relatively immature students are more likely to be referred for ELP for additional support.
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1.5.2 Graphical Evidence
To graphically view the increase in special education placement for children born near the cutoff
date, I plot the fraction of individuals with a documented IEP by month of birth relative to the
statewide cutoff month. This is shown in Figure 1.4, where the running variable is month of birth
relative to the cutoff month. As can be seen in panel (a) there is a large increase in the fraction of
children receiving special education services at the cutoff month. Approximately 14.7 percent
of children born in September receive special education, whereas only 12.4 percent of children
born in November receive special education services. Panel (b) shows that the discontinuity
is driven by changes in special education placement for Learning Disabilities, Other Health
Impairments, and Speech impairments. There is no visual discontinuity in diagnoses for autism
or visual/hearing impairments. The fact that there are no discontinuities in these “non-malleable”
impairments provides validity for the underlying assumption that children born in September are
not systematically different from children born in November.
Turning to student test scores, Figure 1.5 plots the average math and reading z-score by
month of birth relative to the cutoff month. All six panels show that the youngest children in the
classroom perform worse on math and reading exams in grade 3 and grade 8. Further, I find large,
and statistically significant, discontinuities in Algebra I and English II exam scores. Children
born the month before the cutoff date perform approximately one-tenth of a standard deviation
worse on end-of-grade exams, regardless of grade level. Lastly, Figure 1.6 plots the fraction of
children who are ever retained in a grade between grades 3 and 12. While approximately 10
percent of all children are retained in a grade at some point during primary or secondary school,
the children born the month before the school cutoff date are more likely to repeat a grade than
their older counterparts born the month after the cutoff date.
1.5.3 Reduced-Form Estimates
To confirm the visual evidence of differences in special education placement, I present estimates
of equation (1.2) in Table 1.3. Each cell contains results from a separate regression. Each spec-
ification is a local linear regression with a bandwidth of 6 months, standard errors are clustered
at the school, and dependent means are presented below the standard error. These estimates are
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unweighted, and thus, represent the local average treatment effect for the sampled population. I
find that children born the month before the cutoff date are 0.59 years younger than their class-
mates born the month after the cutoff date at the time of their end-of-grade 3 exam. Thus, school
cutoff dates do affect the age of children within the classroom.
Table 1.3: Regression Discontinuity Estimates of Being Youngest in Classroom on Grade 3
Outcomes
Age at Grade Grade 3 Grade 3 Receives SpEd Repeated
3 Exam Math Z-Score Read Z-Score in Grade 3 Grade 3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Youngest -0.5952*** -0.1009*** -0.1244*** 0.0175*** 0.0116***
(0.0030) (0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0015) (0.0006)
Dep. Mean 9.4511 0.0596 0.0638 0.1062 0.0158
N 1,083,943 1,075,424 1,074,108 1,083,946 1,083,946
Data source: North Carolina Department of Public Instruction, school years 2004-2014.
Notes: Sample includes all children who attended a North Carolina public school for grade
3. Each cell represents a separate regression. Results reflect estimates of equation (1.2). All
models include fixed effects for birth year and school. Standard errors are clustered at the school
and are reported in parentheses. Special education includes thirteen separate classifications of
disabilities. Each test has been normalized within year, grade, and test subject to have a mean
zero and standard deviation of one. Repeated grade is an indicator that the child was recorded
in third grade in two consecutive years. * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, **
indicates statistical significance at the 5% level, and *** indicates statistical significance at the
1% level.
Further, children born the month before the school cutoff date perform 0.10 standard devia-
tions lower on math and 0.12 standard deviations lower on reading than their counterparts born
the month after the cutoff date. These estimates are slightly smaller than those found by Dhuey
et al. (2017), who estimate the youngest children score 0.2 standard deviations lower on math
and reading. One potential explanation for the discrepancy between these two sets of estimates
is the October 16 cutoff date in North Carolina. Dhuey et al. use Florida student-level data.
While they are similarly limited to child month of birth, the statewide cutoff date in Florida is
September 1. Therefore, Dhuey et al. have a clean break between August births and September
births. Whereas, in this setting, I have dropped both the oldest and youngest children from the
sample because I cannot distinguish between the two children as they share the same birth month
and face the same October 16 cutoff date. In addition to higher rates of special education, I find
that the children born the month before the school cutoff date are 1.16 percentage points (73%)
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more likely to repeat the third grade relative to their older classmates born the month after the
cutoff date (column 5).
Figure 1.4: Special Education by Month of Birth Relative to Cutoff, Grade 3
(a) Special Education for Any Reason
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Data source: North Carolina Department of Public Instruction, school years 2004-2014.
Notes: Sample includes all children who attended a North Carolina public school for grade
3. All October births have been dropped from the sample. Special education includes thirteen
separate classifications of disabilities. Panel (b) disaggregates all of special education diagnoses
by classifications. Not all learning disabilities are shown. Visual and Hearing impairments have
been aggregated and label as blind/deaf.
Turning to the main question of interest in this project, I find that the children born the month
before the school cutoff date are 1.75 percentage points (16%) more likely to receive special
education services relative to their classmates born one month after the school cutoff month.
Table 1.4 disaggregates special education placement by five types of impairments. The first three
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Figure 1.5: Math and Reading Z-Scores by Month of Birth Relative to State Cutoff, by Grade
READING MATH
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Data source: North Carolina Department of Public Instruction, school years 2004-2014.
Notes: Sample includes all children who attended a North Carolina public school for any number
of grades between grade 3 and 12. All October births have been dropped from the sample. Each
test has been normalized within year, grade, and test subject to have a mean zero and standard
deviation of one.
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Figure 1.6: Fraction of Children Retained in Any Grade, by Month of Birth Relative to State
Cutoff Date
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Data source: North Carolina Department of Public Instruction, school years 2004-2014.
Notes: Sample includes all children who attended a North Carolina public school for any number
of grades between grade 3 and 12. All October births have been dropped from the sample. Grade
repetition is defined as having ever been retained in a grade (grade 3 through 12). Most children
are retained in grade 9, grade 10, or grade 3.
(learning disability, other health impairment, and speech) are expected to be more malleable and
subjective to teacher identification of student impairment. Whereas the latter two (blind/deaf
and autism) are less malleable and should not depend on the child’s relative maturity within the
classroom. I find that children born the month before the cutoff date are 0.88 percentage points
(30%) more likely to be diagnosed with a learning disability relative to their older classmates
born the month after the cutoff date. The youngest children are also 0.65 percentage points (57%)
more likely to be diagnosed as other health impaired, which includes ADHD/ADD, relative to
their older classmates. And the youngest children are 0.49 percentage points (26%) more likely
to be diagnosed with a speech impairment relative to their older classmates born the month after
the cutoff date. Importantly, I find no discontinuity in the likelihood that children born the month
before the cutoff date are diagnosed with a visual or hearing impairment. However, in third grade
I find that the children born the month before the school cutoff date are 0.07 percentage points
(17%) more likely to be diagnosed with autism relative to their older peers. However, this may
be a false positive effect as I find that the positive coefficient on autism classifications does not
appear when I test whether a child has ever been diagnosed with autism.
Table 1.5 reports estimates of whether a child is ever diagnosed for special education by
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Table 1.4: Regression Discontinuity Estimates of Being Youngest in Classroom on Special Edu-
cation Classification in Grade 3
Learning Other Health Speech Blind/Deaf Autism
Disability Impairment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Youngest 0.0088*** 0.0065*** 0.0049*** 0.0001 0.0007**
(0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0001) (0.0003)
Dep. Mean 0.0296 0.0113 0.0185 0.0010 0.0040
N 1,083,946 1,083,946 1,083,946 1,083,946 1,083,946
Data source: North Carolina Department of Public Instruction, school years 2004-2014.
Notes: Sample includes all children who attended a North Carolina public school for grade
3. Each cell represents a separate regression. Results reflect estimates of equation (1.2). All
models include fixed effects for birth year and school. Standard errors are clustered at the school
and are reported in parentheses. Special education is disaggregated to some classifications, not
all classifications are included. Visual and hearing impairments have been aggregated together
in the variable Blind/Deaf. * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** indicates
statistical significance at the 5% level, and *** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level.
classification type. Outcomes are indicators for the individual was ever diagnosed between grade
3 and grade 12. I find that the children born the month before the school cutoff date are 1.97
percentage points (33%) more likely to be diagnosed with a learning disability, 1.2 percentage
points (52%) more likely to be diagnosed with OHI, and 0.3 percentage points (13%) more likely
to be classified as speech impaired relative to children born the month after the cutoff date. I find
no increase in the likelihood that a child is ever diagnosed with a visual/hearing impairment or
autism.
To test whether this relative age effect dissipates with time, I estimate the effect of relative
youth for each grade separately. Figure 1.7 plots the estimated coefficient of interest from equa-
tion 1.2 for receipt of special education services. As can be seen in the top left panel children
born the month before the cutoff date are more likely to receive special education services at all
grades, relative to their classmates born the month after the cutoff date. In grade 12, children
born the month before the cutoff date are 3.84 percentage points (42%) more likely to receive
special educations services relative to their peers born the month after the cutoff date. This
suggests that special education is an absorbing state, in which children do not leave the special
education program. Importantly, when special education services are disaggregated to the diag-
nosis classification, I find heterogeneity in the likelihood children leave special education prior
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Table 1.5: Regression Discontinuity Estimates of Being Youngest in Classroom on Ever being
Diagnosed in the Following Special Education Classification
Learning Other Health Speech Blind/Deaf Autism
Disability Impairment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Youngest 0.0197*** 0.0122*** 0.0038*** 0.0001 0.0001
(0.0009) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0001) (0.0003)
Dep. Mean 0.0585 0.0234 0.0280 0.0018 0.0059
N 1,782,480 1,782,480 1,782,480 1,782,480 1,782,480
Data source: North Carolina Department of Public Instruction, school years 2004-2014.
Notes: Sample includes all children who attended a North Carolina public school for any num-
ber of grades between grade 3 and grade 12. Each cell represents a separate regression. Results
reflect estimates of equation (1.2). All models include fixed effects for birth year and school.
Standard errors are clustered at the school and are reported in parentheses. Special education
is disaggregated to some classifications, not all classifications are included. Visual and hearing
impairments have been aggregated together in the variable Blind/Deaf. * indicates statistical sig-
nificance at the 10% level, ** indicates statistical significance at the 5% level, and *** indicates
statistical significance at the 1% level.
to grade 12.
Figure 1.7 shows that children diagnosed with a specific learning disability are unlikely to
leave special education by grade 12. In grade 12, children born the month before the cutoff
date are still 1.8 percentage points (55%) more likely to be diagnosed with a specific learning
disability relative to their counterparts born the month after the cutoff date. However, children
diagnosed with other health impairments or speech impediments do leave special education. By
grade 7, children born the month before the cutoff date are no more likely to be classified with a
speech impairment relative to their classmates born the month after the cutoff date.
Having shown that children perform worse on their end-of-grade 3 exams, I turn to testing
whether this test score gap diminishes with time, as suggested by the prior literature. Figure 1.8
plots the estimated coefficient from equation (1.2) for math and reading EOG scores between
grades 3 and 8. I find that the children born the month before the cutoff date consistently perform
approximately one-tenth of a standard deviation lower on math and reading tests relative to their
peers born the month after the cutoff date. While, these results contradict the findings of Elder
and Lubotsky (2009), who found that achievement gaps between the relatively old and relatively
young fade after school entry, they corroborate the findings by Dhuey et al. (2017).
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Figure 1.7: Regression Discontinuity Estimates of the Effect of School Cutoff Dates on Special
Education, by Grade and Type of Impairment
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Data source: North Carolina Department of Public Instruction, school years 2004-2014.
Notes: Sample includes all children who attended a North Carolina public school for any number
of grades in grades 3 through 12. Special education includes thirteen separate classifications of
disabilities. Special education has been disaggregated into three classifications that are subjec-
tive. These figures show the coefficient and 95 percent confidence interval for special education
by type of diagnosis at a given grade. The local linear regressions are estimated using robust
standard errors clustered at the school with a bandwidth of 6 months. The effect of the school
entry cutoff date persists through 12th grade for overall special education and specific learning
disabilities.
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Figure 1.8: Regression Discontinuity Estimates of the Effect of School Cutoff Dates on End-of-
Grade Math and Reading Scores, by Grade
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Data source: North Carolina Department of Public Instruction, school years 2004-2014.
Notes: Sample includes all children who attended a North Carolina public school for any number
of grades in grades 3 through 12. Each test has been normalized within year, grade, and test
subject to have a mean zero and standard deviation of one. These figures show the coefficient
and 95 percent confidence interval for math and reading end-of-grade exams at a given grade.
The local linear regressions are estimated using robust standard errors clustered at the school
with a bandwidth of 6 months. The effect of the school entry cutoff date persists through 8th
grade.
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Finally, Table 1.6 presents estimates of δ1 for End-of-Course (EOC) tests in Algebra I, En-
glish II, and Biology. These EOC exams are taken in high school typically between grades 9 and
11. I find that children born the month before the cutoff date perform one-sixth of a standard
deviation lower on Algebra and Biology and one-fourth of a standard deviation lower on English
relative to children born the month after the cutoff date. To some extent, students only sit for
an end-of-course exam when they have completed the course and are test-ready. The youngest
children who may progress more slowly through primary and secondary school may therefore
sit for their end of course exams at a later grade. I find that children born the month before the
school entry cutoff complete their end of course exam 0.5 grade levels later than their peers who
were born the month after the cutoff date.
Table 1.6: Regression Discontinuity Estimates of Being Youngest in Classroom on High School
Tests
Algebra English Biology
Z-Score Grade Taken Z-Score Grade Taken Z-Score Grade Taken
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Youngest -0.1533*** 0.4560*** -0.2461*** 0.5100*** -0.1680*** 0.4885***
(0.0080) (0.0079) (0.0078) (0.0061) (0.0097) (0.0064)
Dep. Mean 0.0223 10.1860 0.0332 10.2794 0.0231 10.7594
N 320,499 320,499 316,708 316,708 222,240 222,240
Data source: North Carolina Department of Public Instruction, school years 2004-2014.
Notes: Sample includes all children who attended a North Carolina public school for any grade
between grade 9 and 12. Each cell represents a separate regression. Results reflect estimates of
equation (1.2). All models include fixed effects for birth year and school. Standard errors are
clustered at the school and are reported in parentheses. Each test has been normalized within
year, grade, and test subject to have a mean zero and standard deviation of one. Grade taken is a
grade level between 9 and 12 in which the child completed their End of Course exam. * indicates
statistical significance at the 10% level, ** indicates statistical significance at the 5% level, and
*** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level.
1.5.4 Heterogeneity
To explore how relative youth in grade differentially affects various demographic groups, I dis-
aggregate by gender and race. Figure 1.9 plots the estimated coefficients by subsample. Panel
(a) shows that relative-youth-in-grade affects both boys and girls; prior to tenth grade I cannot
rule out the possibility that the point estimates for boys and girls are the same. While the point
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estimates between boys and girls are similar, given the base rate of diagnoses the effect sizes
are much larger for girls. For example, in grade 3, boys are 1.7 percentage points (12%) more
likely to receive special education relative to their older male peers, but girls are 1.8 percent-
age points (26%) more likely to receive special education services relative to their older female
counterparts. By 12th grade, the boys born just before the cutoff date are 4.4 percentage points
(35%) more likely to receive special education services relative to their older male peers; while
the youngest girls are 2.9 percentage points (47%) more likely to receive special education ser-
vices relative to their older female peers. These results corroborate the findings of Dhuey and
Lipscomb (2010) showing that after grade three boys and girls are both negatively affected by
relative youth in their classroom setting. Contrary to Dhuey and Lipscomb, effect sizes indicate
that the youngest girls face the largest immaturity penalty relative to their peers.
Panel (b) shows that relative youth differentially affects children of color. In third grade, the
youngest black students are 2.8 percentage points (24%) more likely to receive special education
relative to their older peers born the month after the cutoff date. Similarly, the youngest His-
panic students are 1.6 percentage points (19%) more likely to receive special education services
relative to their older counterparts born the month after the cutoff date. Whereas, the youngest
white students are only 1.3 percentage points (11%) more likely to receive special education ser-
vices relative to their older classmates born the month after the cutoff date. The black-white gap
identified here, does not persists through 12th grade. In grade 12 black students born the month
before the cutoff date are 5.2 percentage points (44%) more likely to receive special education
services relative to their older peers, while white students are 3.6 percentage points (45%) more
likely to receive special education services relative to their older peers born the month after the
cutoff date. This reflects the fact that black students make up a larger fraction of the special
education placements. Lastly, I find that by 11th grade Hispanic students born the month before
the cutoff date are no more likely to receive special education relative to their older counterparts
born the month after the cutoff date.
Figure 1.10 presents RD estimates of test scores disaggregated by gender and race. I find
that the youngest boys and girls are equally penalized during end-of-grade math and reading
exams. Point estimates between boys and girls are not statistically different from one another
after grade 3. However, I do find that black students face the largest test score penalty. Black
28
students born the month before the cutoff date score 0.15 standard deviations lower on their
end-of-grade 3 math exam relative to their peers born the month after the cutoff date. Compare
this to the youngest white students, who score 0.06 standard deviations below their peers, and
Hispanic students, who score 0.11 standard deviations below their older peers on their end-of-
grade 3 math exam. Test score gaps persist for black, Hispanic, and white students through 8th
grade. Results are similar for end-of-grade reading scores.
1.5.5 Robustness
I begin by assessing the robustness of estimates to different bandwidths. I focus the bandwidth
robustness exercise on my preferred specification, the local linear regression.6 Figure 1.11 shows
the estimated coefficient and 95% confidence interval for special education placement in grade 3
and end-of-grade 3 math and reading scores. The top figure indicates that for any bandwidth be-
tween 2 months and 5 months, the youngest children are more likely to receive special education
services in grade 3. The estimated coefficient remains positive and ranges from 2.6 percentage
points to 1.8 percentage points. These estimates are statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
In panel (b) estimates for math and reading scores remain consistent across bandwidths from 2
months to 5 months. Figure 1.12 shows that estimates for high school exam scores are similarly
robust to bandwidth choice; for any bandwidth between 2 months and 5 months, I find that chil-
dren born the month before the cutoff date perform between one-tenth and one-fifth of a standard
deviation lower on their end-of-course exams.
Next, I show that my estimates are robust to assumptions about the correlation of standard
errors. Table 1.7 presents estimates of δ1 from equation 1.2 for three specifications. The first
specification two-way clusters at the school and relative month, the second specification reports
heteroskedastic robust standard errors that are not clustered, and the final specification clusters
standard errors at the school (the preferred specification used throughout this project). As can
be seen, changing the level at which standard errors are clustered does not affect the statistical
significance of the estimates. Standard errors are similar across all three specifications.
My main sample includes some individuals who leave the North Carolina public school
6I show that estimates are robust to inclusion of higher order polynomials, results from those specifications are
shown in table A.1.
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Figure 1.9: Heterogeneity of RD Estimates of the Effect of Relative Age on Special Education,
by Gender and Race
(a) Gender
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Data source: North Carolina Department of Public Instruction, school years 2004-2014.
Notes: Sample includes all children who attended a North Carolina public school for any number
of grades in grades 3 through 12. Special education includes thirteen separate classifications of
disabilities. These figures show the coefficient and 95 percent confidence interval for special
education by type of diagnosis at a given grade by race and gender. The local linear regressions
are estimated using robust standard errors clustered at the school with a bandwidth of 6 months.
The effect of the school entry cutoff date persists through 12th grade for overall special education
for all subgroups, except Hispanics.
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Figure 1.10: End-of-Grade Reading and Math Z-Scores, by Gender and Race
(a) Reading, by Child Sex (b) Math, by Child Sex
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(c) Reading, by Child Race (d) Math, by Child Race
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Data source: North Carolina Department of Public Instruction, school years 2004-2014.
Notes: Sample includes all children who attended a North Carolina public school for any number
of grades in grades 3 through 12. Each test has been normalized within year, grade, and test
subject to have a mean zero and standard deviation of one. These figures show the coefficient
and 95 percent confidence interval for math and reading end-of-grade exams at a given grade by
race and gender. The local linear regressions are estimated using robust standard errors clustered
at the school with a bandwidth of 6 months. The effect of the school entry cutoff date persists
through 8th grade for all subgroups.
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Table 1.7: Regression Discontinuity Estimates of Being Youngest in Classroom on Grade 3
Outcomes, Clusters
Age at Grade Grade 3 Grade 3 Receives SpEd Repeated
3 Exam Math Z-Score Read Z-Score in Grade 3 Grade 3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
School, Relative Month
Youngest -0.5952*** -0.1009*** -0.1244*** 0.0175*** 0.0116***
(0.0024) (0.0037) (0.0037) (0.0014) (0.0006)
No Cluster
Youngest -0.5952*** -0.1009*** -0.1244*** 0.0175*** 0.0116***
(0.0018) (0.0038) (0.0038) (0.0014) (0.0006)
School (main specification)
Youngest -0.5952*** -0.1009*** -0.1244*** 0.0175*** 0.0116***
(0.0030) (0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0015) (0.0006)
Dep. Mean 9.4511 0.0596 0.0638 0.1062 0.0158
N 1,083,943 1,075,424 1,074,108 1,083,946 1,083,946
Data source: North Carolina Department of Public Instruction, school years 2004-2014.
Notes: Sample includes all children who attended a North Carolina public school for grade 3.
Each cell represents a separate regression. Results reflect estimates of equation (1.2). All
models include fixed effects for birth year and school. Standard errors are reported in
parentheses. Special education includes thirteen separate classifications of disabilities. Each
test has been normalized within year, grade, and test subject to have a mean zero and standard
deviation of one. Repeated grade is an indicator that the child was recorded in third grade in
two consecutive years. * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** indicates
statistical significance at the 5% level, and *** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level.
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system prior to high school graduation. However, children born the month before the cutoff date
are 1.7 percentage points (8%) more likely to leave the NC public school system relative to their
older classmates, and this estimate is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Thus, in Table
1.8 and Table 1.9 I report estimates of equation (1.2) for the sample of individuals who remain
in NC public schools through the last year of the data or high school graduation. I find that
inclusion of individuals who leave the public school system prior to graduation are not driving
my results.
Table 1.8: Regression Discontinuity Estimates of Being Youngest in Classroom on Grade 3
Outcomes, Non-Leavers
Age at Grade Math Reading Receives Repeated
3 Exam Z-Score Z-Score SpEd Grade
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Youngest -0.6250*** -0.0912*** -0.1147*** 0.0186*** 0.0106***
(0.0033) (0.0044) (0.0043) (0.0016) (0.0007)
Dep. Mean 9.4405 0.0785 0.0818 0.1041 0.0132
N 898,385 893,099 892,359 898,386 898,386
Data source: North Carolina Department of Public Instruction, school years 2004-2014.
Notes: Sample includes all children who attended a North Carolina public school for grade 3
and remained in the sample through 2014. Each cell represents a separate regression. Results
reflect estimates of equation (1.2). All models include fixed effects for birth year and school.
Standard errors are clustered at the school and are reported in parentheses. Special education
includes thirteen separate classifications of disabilities. Each test has been normalized within
year, grade, and test subject to have a mean zero and standard deviation of one. Repeated grade
is an indicator that the child was recorded in third grade in two consecutive years. * indicates
statistical significance at the 10% level, ** indicates statistical significance at the 5% level, and
*** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level.
For the sample of children who remain in NC public schools, I find that the children born
the month before the cutoff date are 0.625 years younger at the time of their third grade exam,
perform one-tenth of a standard deviation lower on math and reading end of grade 3 exams,
are 1.86 percentage points (17.8%) more likely to be placed in special education, and are 1
percentage point (80%) more likely to be retained in grade 3 relative to their peers born the
month after the cutoff date. Further, I find that the children born the month before the cutoff
date perform approximately one-fifth of a standard deviation lower on end-of-course exams in
Algebra, English, and Biology. Taken together, my estimates are remarkably robust to choice
of bandwidth, the level at which standard errors are clustered, and to restricting the sample
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Table 1.9: Regression Discontinuity Estimates of Being Youngest in Classroom on High School
Tests, non-leavers
Algebra English Biology
Z-Score Grade Taken Z-Score Grade Taken Z-Score Grade Taken
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Youngest -0.1722*** 0.4726*** -0.2730*** 0.5331*** -0.1839*** 0.4966***
(0.0086) (0.0078) (0.0087) (0.0062) (0.0106) (0.0064)
Dep. Mean 0.0800 10.2871 0.1212 10.4159 0.0691 10.8616
N 267,592 267,592 255,009 255,009 189,354 189,354
Data source: North Carolina Department of Public Instruction, school years 2004-2014.
Notes: Sample includes all children who attended a North Carolina public school who attended
any grade between 9 and 12 and remained until graduation or until 2014. Each cell represents
a separate regression. Results reflect estimates of equation (1.2). All models include fixed
effects for birth year and school. Standard errors are clustered at the school and are reported in
parentheses. Each test has been normalized within year, grade, and test subject to have a mean
zero and standard deviation of one. Grade taken is a grade level between 9 and 12 in which the
child completed their End-of-Course exam. * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level,
** indicates statistical significance at the 5% level, and *** indicates statistical significance at
the 1% level.
to individuals who remain in NC public schools. In other words, it does not appear that the
association between month of birth and special education placement, grade retention, or test
scores is spurious.
1.6 Conclusion
Recent work has shown that children born just before a school entry cutoff date are more likely
to be diagnosed with ADHD compared to their peers born just after the cutoff date (Layton et
al., 2018, Elder, 2010; Elder and Lubotsky, 2009). This higher prevalence of ADHD diagnosis
for relatively young children is troubling if these children are incorrectly diagnosed due to their
relative immaturity rather than an underlying biological disorder. These children would typically
be diagnosed by their teacher and receive special education services with their school.
In this project, I evaluate the short- and long-term impact of school entry cutoff dates on a
child’s special education placement and tenure. I use administrative student level records from
the state of North Carolina and regression discontinuity methods. Exogenous variation stems
from a child’s date of birth relative to the school entry cutoff date. I find that the youngest chil-
dren in the classroom are more likely to receive special education services relative to their older
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Figure 1.11: Robustness of RD Estimates to Bandwidth, Grade 3 Outcomes
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Data source: North Carolina Department of Public Instruction, school years 2004-2014.
Notes: Sample includes all children who attended a North Carolina public school for any number
of grades in grades 3 through 12. Special education includes thirteen separate classifications of
disabilities. Each test has been normalized within year, grade, and test subject to have a mean
zero and standard deviation of one. These figures show the coefficient and 95 percent confidence
interval for special education and EOG exams in math and reading by bandwidth. The local
linear regressions are estimated using robust standard errors clustered at the school. The effect
of the school entry cutoff date is robust to different bandwidths.
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Figure 1.12: Robustness of RD Estimates to Bandwidth, High School Outcomes
(a) Algebra Z-Score (b) English Z-Score
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Data source: North Carolina Department of Public Instruction, school years 2004-2014.
Notes: Sample includes all children who attended a North Carolina public school for any number
of grades in grades 9 through 12. Each test has been normalized within year, grade, and test
subject to have a mean zero and standard deviation of one. These figures show the coefficient
and 95 percent confidence interval for EOC exams in Algebra I, English II, and Biology by
bandwidth. The local linear regressions are estimated using robust standard errors clustered at
the school. The effect of the school entry cutoff date is robust to different bandwidths.
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peers. Children born the month before the school cutoff date are 1.75 percentage points (16%)
more likely to receive special education in grade 3 relative to their peers born the month after
the cutoff date. This increased likelihood of special education is entirely driven by increases in
the likelihood of being diagnosed with a subjective impairment. Importantly, I find no disconti-
nuity in the likelihood that children born the month before the cutoff date are diagnosed with a
visual/hearing impairment or autism.
I corroborate early work showing that the relatively youngest children perform worse on end-
of-grade exams. In particular, children born the month before the cutoff date score approximately
one-tenth of a standard deviation below their peers born the month after the cutoff date on both
math and reading exams. This finding is smaller in magnitude than that found by Dhuey et al.
(2017). This discrepancy may be caused by data limitations discussed in the text. Additionally,
I find that children born the month before the cutoff date are 2.3 percentage points (28%) more
likely to be retained in any grade between grades 3 and 12. Contrary to previous work, I find
that the gaps in special education placement and test scores among children born around school
entry cutoff dates persist through high school and are similar in magnitude across gender.
My results suggest that a negative feedback loop, in which the youngest children are placed
on a lower track at the onset of their school exists. Importantly, my estimates only identify that
a gap exists between the relatively oldest and relatively youngest within the classroom. This
discontinuity could be made up of over-diagnoses for the relatively youngest, under-diagnoses
for the relatively oldest, or more likely a combination of both. Overall, my results suggest that
parents, teachers, and policymakers should be more cognizant of relative maturity within the
classroom when determining a child’s need for special education.
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CHAPTER 2
IS SPECIAL EDUCATION A PATHWAY TO
SUPPLEMENTAL SECURITY INCOME FOR CHILDREN?
2.1 Introduction
In 2017, the Social Security Administration paid $9.6 billion to approximately 1.2 million dis-
abled children who receive Supplemental Security Income (SSI). The majority of these child re-
cipients have been diagnosed with a mental impairment including: attention deficit hyperactivity
disorder (ADHD), learning disability, and speech/language delays. These types of impairments
are often established by a child’s local school. I document a causal channel from receipt of spe-
cial education services to application for and award of SSI. Specifically, I test whether children
who are exogenously induced to have a higher predisposition of receiving special education ser-
vices have a higher likelihood of applying for and receiving disability payments. I make use of
the fact that otherwise identical children born around a kindergarten entrance eligibility cutoff
date enter school at different relative-ages, and thus have a differential likelihood of receiving
special education services (Elder and Lubotsky 2009, Dhuey and Lipscomb, 2010).
Several explanations for growth in the child SSI program have been posited. One hypothe-
sis for the persistent growth of the child SSI caseload is an increase in the fraction of children
receiving special education services (Aizer, Gordon and Kearney, 2013). This hypothesis stems
from two main facts: first, growth in SSI has been attributed to an increase in the number of chil-
dren diagnosed with mental impairments (Aizer, Gordon and Kearney, 2013), and presumably
these children with mental impairments are receiving services with their local school (Duggan,
Kearney and Rennane, 2015).1 Second, a 1990 Supreme Court decision (Sullivan v. Zebley)
liberalized the standard to evaluate child SSI applicants based on the child’s ability to behave in
an age-appropriate manner. This often meant that SSI judges were able to consider teacher and
school counselor reports. By 2012, approximately 63% of child SSI determinations involved the
use of teacher assessments (Government Accountability Office). Graphically, special education
and SSI show similar trends; figure 2.1 shows the number of child recipients and the fraction of
1 Currently, non-physical disabilities account for nearly 70% of all child SSI cases (Duggan, Kearney and Ren-
nane, 2015; Aizer, Gordon and Kearney, 2013)
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children receiving special education services between 1976 and 2015. Between 1976 and 2013
the fraction of children receiving special education services grew from 8.9% to 13%, while the
child SSI roll increased from 0.26 million in 1989 to 1.3 million in 2013.
Figure 2.1: SSI Recipients and Fraction of Children Receiving Special Education Services 1976-
2015
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Data Source: Supplemental Security Annual Statistical Supplement 1998-2017 and National
Center for Education Statistics Digest of Education Statistics 1995-2017.
To estimate the direct effect of special education on SSI, I implement a two-sample fuzzy
Regression Discontinuity (RD). The first-stage sample utilizes information on all children eligi-
ble for kindergarten cohorts 2006, 2007, and 2008 enrolled in public schools in North Carolina
from fall 2004 through fall 2014. Using a RD design, I estimate that children born the month
before the school cutoff date are 3.3 percentage points more likely to be receive special educa-
tion services at any time between the ages of 5 and 12 relative to their classmates born the month
after the school cutoff date.
Next, I document a discontinuous increase in the likelihood a child applies for and is awarded
SSI for children born just before the school cutoff date relative to children born just after the
cutoff date. I use restricted versions of the National Health Interview Survey (NHIS) linked to
Social Security Administration records. The data comprise a nationally representative sample
of households in the US between 1994 and 2005. I show that children born just before the
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school cutoff date are 0.78 percentage points more likely to apply for SSI relative to children
born just after the cutoff date. Further, children born directly before the cutoff date are 0.55
percentage points more likely to have an award for SSI relative to children born directly after
the cutoff date. Estimates are statistically significant at the 1% level, robust to a wide variety of
specification choices, and substantially greater than at nearby placebo cutoff dates. Importantly,
using earlier birth cohorts, I do not find any increase in SSI applications and awards at the school
cutoff date when it was not possible to use special education as documentation of child disability.
I obtain two-sample fuzzy RD estimates by combining the first-stage and reduced-form es-
timates. I find that a 1 percentage point increase in the fraction of children receiving special
education services induces a 0.23 percentage point increase in the fraction of children applying
for SSI and a 0.16 percentage point increase in the fraction of the children with an award for
SSI. Estimates are statistically significant at the 1% level. Since 1990, the fraction of children
receiving special education services increased 1.5 percentage points. Thus, my estimates suggest
that the growth in special education allowed approximately 175,000 more children access to SSI
payments. Back of the envelope calculations suggest that approximately 18% of the growth in
the child SSI caseload since 1990 can be attributed to rising special education rates and spillovers
between these two programs.
I interpret these increases in child SSI applications and awards for children born just before
the school cutoff date as intent-to-treat (ITT) effects of early eligibility to school entry for those
on the margin of being referred for special education services. My approach follows other studies
using school entry eligibility cutoff dates to understand the intent-to-treat impact of relative-age-
effects on child outcomes (e.g. Black, Devereux and Salvanes, 2011; Bedard and Dhuey, 2006;
Dobkin and Ferreira, 2010; McCrary and Royer, 2011, Dhuey, Figlio, Karbownik and Roth,
2017).
By disaggregating awards into mental and physical awards, I show that the increase in child
SSI awards for children born just before the school cutoff date are entirely driven by increases
in awards for mental impairments. Children born directly before the school cutoff date are 0.52
percentage points more likely to receive an award for a mental impairment relative to children
born directly after the cutoff date. I find no discontinuity in the likelihood a child is awarded SSI
for a physical impairment for children born around the cutoff date. This makes intuitive sense;
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unlike emotional and behavioral disorders, physical impairments can not be based on subjective
assessment of a child in relation to his peers.
In analyses disaggregated by child sex, I find that the point estimates are larger for boys than
for girls. Boys born directly before the school cutoff date are 1.08 percentage points more likely
to apply for SSI and 0.77 percentage points more likely to receive an award for SSI relative
to boys born directly after the cutoff date. On the other hand, girls born directly before the
cutoff date are 0.45 percentage points more likely to apply for SSI and 0.31 percentage points
more likely to have an award for SSI relative to girls born directly after the cutoff date. These
heterogeneous effects by child sex are consistent with the fact that boys account for two-thirds
of child SSI awards, make up the majority of special education placements, and tend to be more
responsive to adverse shocks than girls at earlier ages.2
I contribute to the literature on child disability in three ways. First, I causally identify an
interaction between special education and SSI. In doing so, I augment the sparse literature on
the interaction between special education and SSI, which I discuss below. Second, my estimates
indicate that a school district’s decisions on identification and classification of children for spe-
cial education services affects the federal SSI roll. This has policy implications for both local
schools identifying children in need of special education services as well as the Social Security
Administration (SSA) as it attempts to adequately address child disability needs. Third, I show
that an arbitrary date affects a child’s likelihood of applying for and receiving SSI. To the best
of my knowledge, these are the first causally identified estimates of the direct effect of receipt of
special education services on SSI.
There are several reasons special education may interact with SSI. First, special education
and SSI both require a child to exhibit a mental or physical disability which inhibits the ability
2For instance, Autor, Figlio, Karbownik, Roth and Wasserman (2016a) show that relative to their sisters, boys
born to disadvantaged families have higher rates of disciplinary problems, lower achievement scores, and fewer
high-school completions. Similarly, Autor, Figlio, Karbownik, Roth and Wasserman (2016b) show that cumulative
exposure to higher quality schools benefits boys more than their sisters. Bertrand and Pan (2013) show that non-
cognitive development differs by gender; specifically boys’ non-cognitive development is extremely responsive to
worse parental inputs while girls’ non-cognitive development is only weakly influenced by parental inputs. Campbell,
Conti, Heckman, Moon, Pinto, Pungello and Pan (2014) and Conti, Heckma and Pinto (2015) find that intensive early
educational programs differentially improved boys’ long term health. Chetty and Hendren (2018) find that growing
up in a low-mobility neighborhood has a larger adverse effect on a boy’s economic mobility than a girl’s economic
mobility. Finally, Fan, Fang and Markussen (2015) find that maternal employment during early childhood reduces
boys’ eventual educational attainment relative to that of girls’. Therefore, my estimates document an additional area
where boys are more responsive to a policy shock.
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of the child to perform in a manner appropriate for his age; this often means that children are
assessed based on school performance including test scores and classroom behavior (Cohen,
2007). Second, schools increasingly provide services beyond instruction including: informing
families about medicaid eligibility, providing children with school based health services, and
providing children with counseling services. In addition to providing children with resources to
aid and enhance their education, schools may provide parents with information concerning their
eligibility for SSI. Third, special education may reduce the cost of applying for SSI by providing
a family with documentation of a child’s impairment. Applying for SSI benefits is costly. Parents
must have clear documentation of the child’s disability and how the disability restricts the child’s
ability to function in an age appropriate manner. Submitting this documentation to an SSA judge
can create a financial burden. Once SSA allowed school counselor reports as documentation of
a child’s disability, that is after the 1900 Zebley decision, the cost for an SSI application was
significantly reduced if the child was receiving special education services. This reduction in cost
occurs because screenings for special education services are free to parents whose children are
in public schools.3 All three mechanisms may exist simultaneously. Available data do not allow
me to disentangle each mechanism separately.
Despite the potential connections between SSI and special education, little work has been
able to identify the effect of special education on SSI, nor the inverse, that of SSI on special
education. This is due to the difficulty of disentangling the causal relationship running from
SSI to special education from the causal pathway running from special education to SSI. Two
exceptions are Cohen (2007) and Cullen and Schmidt (2011) which both find a positive rela-
tionship between special education and SSI. Cohen (2007) explores the effect of SSI on special
education. Utilizing variation generated by the difference between the AFDC benefit schedule
and the SSI benefit a child would be eligible to receive, Cohen finds that after the 1990 Zebley
decision, states with less generous AFDC schedules had larger increases in special education
enrollments. However, local economic shocks may have endogenously affected both a state’s
AFDC benefit schedule and a child’s propensity to be screened for special education services.
My work complements that of Cohen, showing that special education and SSI simultaneously
3Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act of 1975 and the Disabilities Education Improvement Act
of 2004, schools have an obligation to identify, locate, and evaluate students who they suspect may have a disability.
Schools must also provide students identified with a disability a free and appropriate education (FAPE).
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interact.
Similar to this study, Cullen and Schmidt (2011) study the relationship from special educa-
tion to SSI. They implement a ordinary least squares estimation strategy to show that counties
faced with a school finance incentive to classify a greater number of students for special educa-
tion services also experienced larger gains in their SSI caseload. However, they were not able
to rule out that other differences within counties contributed to the differential growth in SSI
caseload. The benefit of this study is that I can directly identify a spillover using exogenous
variation in the likelihood a child receives special education services.
More recently, a descriptive report by Aizer, Gordon and Kearney (2013) finds a positive
correlation between the special education rate and the SSI award rate within a state, suggesting
a possible link between special education participation within the state and child SSI caseload.
Because they find no association between the special education rate and the SSI application rate,
they hypothesize that special education may simply increase the likelihood that a child is awarded
SSI because special education provides documentation of the child’s impairment. Contrary to
this hypothesis, my estimates suggest that receipt of special education does induce an increase
in the likelihood a child applies for SSI (at least among compliers).
My estimates apply to children born directly around the school cutoff date, who may differ
from children born in months further away from the school cutoff date. For example, Buckles
and Hungerman (2013) document that children born in December and January are more likely to
have teenage mother, more likely to have an unmarried mother, and more likely to have a mother
with only a high school degree. However, since I estimate effects using exact date of birth rather
than season of birth, my estimates are not contaminated by this seasonal variation. I confirm this
using tests for differences in observable child characteristics for children born around the cutoff
date. Further, Dickert-Conlin and Elder (2010) show that parental characteristics are smooth
through school cutoff dates; suggesting that there is no evidence that parents time births around
school cutoff dates.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 provides background information about SSI for
children and school cutoff dates. Section 2.3 discusses the data and sample. Section 2.4 presents
the empirical strategy. Section 2.5 outlines the change in child disability for children born around
the cutoff date. And Section 2.8 concludes with a discussion.
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2.2 Institutional Framework
2.2.1 Supplemental Security Income for Children
SSI is a federal means-tested program under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. To qualify
for child SSI the child must be under 18 and have a physical or mental condition that results in
“marked and severe functional limitations.” Since SSI is a means-tested program, SSI eligibility
and payment amounts depend on income and assets. In 2018 the federal benefit rate (FBR), or
maximum monthly benefit level was $750 for an eligible individual. Over 60% of SSI children
receive the maximum benefit (Coe and Rutledge, 2013), and in June 2018, the average monthly
payment for children was $662 (Social Security Administration, 2018a).
To determine a child’s income eligibility, the Social Security Administration (SSA) looks
at a child’s earnings plus a fraction of the income and assets of family members which have
been “deemed” to the child. The deeming rules are such that in 2018, an SSI eligible child in a
one-parent household could qualify for the maximum SSI payment if the family earned as much
$1,585 a month and there were no other children in the household or $1,960 if there was one
non-disabled sibling in the household.4 In 2016, only 16 percent of children have any income
deemed to them (Social Security Administration, 2017). Further, of SSI children living with a
single parent, 46% reported no parental income and those with reported incomes had average
monthly incomes of $1,477 (Social Security Administration, 2017).
Despite the generosity of the SSI program, take-up is incomplete (Currie, 2004). While there
are no estimates for the participation rate of eligible children, take-up rates of the eligible elderly
hover around 55%. Two main barriers to participation cited in the literature are, one, a lack
of information about program eligibility (Coe, 1985), and two, the cost to apply is prohibitive
(Bound, Kossoudji and Ricart-Moes, 1998). Interactions among local, state, and federal agencies
may reduce these barriers to SSI participation. For example, SSI often provides automatic en-
rollment in Medicaid, SSI recipients have particularly high participation in SNAP, and evidence
suggests fiscal spillovers between AFDC and SSI. Most recent work on child SSI recipients has
focused on the relationship between SSI and AFDC/TANF. Financial incentives induced both
states and families to switch beneficiaries from AFDC to SSI. Kubik (1999) and Garrett and
4Income levels were calculated using deeming eligibility for children and information provided by SSA. Available
at: https://www.ssa.gov/ssi/text-income-ussi.htm
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Glied (2000) show that SSI take-up after the 1990 Zebley decision is related to the financial gain
a family would garner from switching from AFDC to SSI. Further, Kubik (2003) finds that states
with higher fiscal deficits induced a greater number of AFDC recipients to switch to the SSI roll.
This is because AFDC benefits require the state to provide a match, while SSI benefits do not.
Descriptive works by Duggan, Kearney and Rennane (2015) and Aizer, Gordon and Kearney
(2013) note that child SSI program should interact with local education systems for establishing
disabilities. However, this interaction has been difficult to causally identify. Prior to 1990 a child
could be found disabled if his impairment met the criteria of a listed medical condition in the
program’s “Listing of Impairments.” An adult, however, could be found disabled if an assess-
ment of residual functional capacity showed that he could not engage in work in the national
economy. The February 1990 Sullivan v. Zebley case centered on the Supreme Court’s ruling
that SSA’s regulations for determining disability in children were in violation of the SSI statute,
because there was no functional assessment to determine if a child was disabled.5 The law af-
forded that a child would be found disabled if he or she had a medically determinable physical or
mental impairment of comparable severity to one that would disable an adult. Thus, new regula-
tions imposed that SSA conduct Individualized Functional Assessments (IFA) to determine if a
child’s impairment prohibited a child from functioning day-to-day in age-appropriate behaviors
at home, at school, and in their communities (Coe and Rutledge, 2013). Additionally, in De-
cember 1990, SSA expanded the list of childhood mental impairments. These changes to child
SSI eligibility in 1990 enabled SSI judges to consider school counselor and teacher evaluations
when determining child disability. Thus, the 1990 Zebley decision opened up a direct channel for
local agencies, schools, to provide information about eligibility to the family and significantly
reduced the cost of applying for SSI. This channel, addresses the two largest barriers to program
participation identified by (Currie, 2004), and should therefore increase the participation rate of
eligible children. In 2012, over half of all child SSI determinations utilize school and teacher
evaluations (Government Accountability Office, 2012).
Since 1990, the number of child applicants has quadrupled, and the allowance rate increased
from 30% to 50% (Coe and Rutledge, 2013). Most of the growth came from children suffer-
ing from mental impairments including ADHD, learning disabilities, and behavioral problems
5See Coe and Rutledge (2013) for a detailed overview of the Zebley changes.
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(Duggan, Kearney and Rennane, 2015). Currently, non-physical disabilities account for nearly
70% of all child SSI cases (Duggan, Kearney and Rennane, 2015; Aizer, Gordon and Kearney,
2013).6
2.2.2 School Entry Cutoff Dates and Special Education
Under the Individual’s with Disabilities Act of 1975, districts are mandated to provide all stu-
dents with a free and appropriate education (FAPE). While IDEA provides general definitions
of disability, local state agencies create their own precise diagnostic guidelines. Schools are
charged with formally identifying children with disabilities and providing services (Cullen and
Schmidt, 2011). Recent research has identified that teacher identification of disability can be
idiosyncratic--driven by fiscal incentives (Cullen, 2003), pressures by school accountability sys-
tems (Prenovitz, 2018), and subjective assessment of child maturity (Elder and Lubotsky, 2009;
Dhuey and Lipscomb, 2010).
Elder and Lubotsky (2009) show that there are two negative effects of being the youngest
child in the classroom. First, having older peers increases the likelihood of repeating kinder-
garten, first, or second grade by 13.1 percentage points. Second, having older peers increases
the likelihood that a child is diagnosed with ADHD before 3rd grade by 2.9 percentage points.
Given the base diagnosis rate of 4.3 percent in their sample, these estimates indicate that children
born just before a school entry cutoff date are 67% more likely to be diagnosed for ADHD than
their older classmates who were born just after the cutoff date. Further, children born before
the cutoff date are more likely to use prescription medications, such as Ritalin, to treat ADHD
(Elder, 2010). The higher prevalence of ADHD diagnosis and medication for relatively young
children is troubling if these children are incorrectly diagnosed due to their relative immatu-
rity rather than an underlying biological disorder. Elder (2010) notes that the true prevalence
of ADHD remains unknown, thus his estimates could indicate that younger children may be
over-diagnosed, older children may be under-diagnosed, or more likely a combination of both.
6It should be noted that the passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act (Welfare Reform)
in 1996 eliminated the “functional assessment” for children, as well as increased the likelihood that a child was
removed from SSI during a continuity disability review (CDR). As a result of Welfare Reform, the eligiblity criteria
for children became more stringent after 1996. As one would expect, I find the largest effect sizes for children eligible
for school entry between 1990 and 1996. Results disaggregated by birth cohort are imprecisely estimated and are not
presented.
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Dhuey and Lipscomb (2010) extend this work, finding that the effects of youth-in-grade on
disability persist through 10th grade. Using three national surveys they find that each additional
month of age relative to the cutoff date is associated with a 2 to 5 percent reduction in the
likelihood of ever receiving special education services for learning disabilities. They further
show that prior to grade 3, the effect of relative-age-in-grade primarily affects boys, where they
find no effect of relative-youth-in-grade for girls prior to grade 3.
2.2.3 Statewide School Entry Cutoff Dates
Like the prior work of Elder and Lubotsky (2009) and Dhuey and Lipscomb (2010), my research
design rests on institutional policies within each state that determine the age at which a child
is eligible to enter kindergarten. The majority of states require a child to turn 5 on or before a
statewide cutoff date for entry to kindergarten. Most states set this cutoff date in late August
or early September of the calendar year in which the child turns five. For instance, Minnesota
requires students to turn 5 on or before September 1 of the school year they enter kindergarten.
Thus, the kindergarten class of 2000 was made up of children born between September 2, 1994
and September 1, 1995.
Consider a child born on September 1, 1995 and a child born September 2, 1994. These
two students are classmates but are essentially one year apart in biological age when they enter
school. The child born on September 1, 1995 is 5 when entering kindergarten whereas the
child born on September 2, 1994 is nearly 6 when entering kindergarten. States vary their entry
cutoff dates and these dates have changed over time.7 My research leverages the variation in
the relative-age of each child in their grade based on these school entry cutoff dates. I utilized
the school entry cutoff dates for school years 1964-2005 as documented by Bedard and Dhuey
(2006). All dates were confirmed using state legislation statutes. Table 2.1 shows the statewide
cutoff dates for select cohorts. The main sample includes states that have a statewide cutoff date
for the entire sample period between 1964 and 2007.
7For example, between 1992 and 1996, Delaware phased in a school cutoff date moving the cutoff date from
December 31 to August 31.
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2.3 Data
2.3.1 First-Stage Sample
North Carolina, like the majority of states, adheres to a minimum age of enrollment into public
kindergarten through its compulsory schooling law. Prior to the 2009-2010 school year, children
who achieved the age of five on or before October 16 were eligible to enter school in the fall of
the calendar year in which they turned five.8 I use individual student level data from the North
Carolina Department of Public Instruction (NCDPI), provided by the North Carolina Education
Research Data Center (NCERDC). The data covers all students in North Carolina’s public school
system with detailed information on children in grades 3 through 12. Since 2005, the data
includes a summary file for children between the ages of 3 and 21 who receive special education
services.
There are several limitations to this data: first, student date of birth is recorded as month of
birth, rather than exact date of birth; second, I cannot follow students who chose to leave the
public school system.9 If the group of students leaving the public school system were systemat-
ically different from those initially enrolled, and this difference was driven by the relative age of
the child, my estimates would be biased. I address both concerns. First, I drop all October births
for cohorts facing the October 16th cutoff date. This is because October births represent both the
oldest and youngest students in their grade. Second, to determine if differential attrition occurs
in my sample, I look for differences in the likelihood a child leaves NC public schools prior to
graduation for those born at the cutoff date. I limit my sample to those eligible for kindergarten
cohorts 2006, 2007, and 2008 who remained enrolled in the NC public school system through
fall 2014.10
8In 2009 the law was amended, pushing the date forward from October 16 to August 31, thereby increasing
the average age of children within each cohort. There is no reason to expect the October 16 cutoff date to behave
differently than any other school cutoff date. Within North Carolina, the August 31 cutoff date generates similar
estimates for children eligible for kindergarten cohorts 2009-2012. Additionally, when I compare tests scores of
children born around the cutoff date, the estimates from North Carolina in which children face the October 16 cutoff
date, are remarkable similar to those found by Dhuey et al. (2017) for children enrolled in Florida public schools
facing a September 1 cutoff date. Appendix Figures B.5 and B.6 indicate that North Carolina is similar among
observables characteristics to the US in general.
9It should be noted that in the first-stage sample, I compare children born the month before the cutoff date to the
children born the month after the cutoff date. Whereas in the reduced-stage sample, discussed below, I am comparing
children born the day of the cutoff date to children born the day after the cutoff date. This is due to data limitations,
but should not affect the interpretation of results.
10In a secondary first-stage sample, I estimate the effect of receiving special education services between kinder-
garten and grade 6 including the individuals who leave the NC public school system prior to grade 6. These estimates
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Despite the limitations, this administrative data provides more finely detailed observations
than previous research utilizing smaller national panel surveys. Further, this data improves upon
survey data by providing administrative records of children receiving special education services.
For instance, while the NHIS does ask if a child receives special education services, only 7
percent of children report receipt of services when the national average is 13%.11 Administrative
records allow for more accurate analysis of the relationship between school entry age and special
education.
To construct the analysis sample, I combine the masterbuild file for years 2004-2014 with
the exceptionality file.12 Data is constructed such that each child appears as a single observation.
I then create an indicator for whether the child received special education services between
the ages of 5 and 12.13 This variable is constructed to match the format of the outcomes in
the reduced form sample discussed below. I restrict analysis to the kindergarten cohorts 2006 to
2008. These cohorts are the individuals for whom valid information exists for each year between
kindergarten and grade 6.14
Table 2.2 displays descriptive statistics for North Carolina public school students. As can be
seen, children born just before the cutoff date are approximately half of a year younger at the
time of their third grade End-of-Year test. Thus, school entry cutoff date does appear to affect
the age of children within the grade, as expected. In terms of covariate balance around the cutoff
date, I find no differences in the fraction of children who are male, free and reduced price lunch
eligible, or who leave the NC public school system early. Children born before the cutoff date
are more likely to repeat a grade and to be referred to the English Language Program.15
are available in appendix table B.10. Inclusion of students who leave the sample prior to 6th grade does not affect
the main findings. Of the two samples, I present the one that provides the most conservation estimate for the effect
of special education on SSI.
11Special education services are only asked if the individual is between the ages of 7 and 17 at the time of the
NHIS survey. My sample includes individuals outside this age range at the time of the survey. In this paper I do not
present any estimates of the increase in reported receipt of special education using the NHIS sample.
12School years are denoted by the fall calendar year, thus 2004 represents the 2004-2005 school year.
13North Carolina public school records contain the the grade a child was enrolled in during the year rather than
their age, I use grades kindergarten through grade 6 to mean the child was aged 5 to 12.
14Results are similar if I use information for a greater number of kindergarten cohorts who do not have information
on special education services prior to grade 3.
15Appendix Figure B.3 shows that characteristics of individuals evolve smoothly through the cutoff date. Appendix
figures B.4, B.5,and B.6 speak to the generalizability of North Carolina. North Carolina tends to have a larger
Hispanic population than the US average, and a smaller black population relative to the US average, but trends
similarly to the US average in terms of characteristics of children.
53
Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics For Children Born Within 6 Months of Statewide Cutoff Date,
North Carolina
All Boys Girls
Relative Relative Relative Relative Relative Relative
Age>0 Age <0 Age>0 Age <0 Age>0 Age <0
Youngest Oldest Youngest Oldest Youngest Oldest
Age-at-Test in Grade 3 9.08 9.45 9.13 9.46 9.04 9.43
Special Education (%) 12.4 11.4 15.6 14.5 9.3 8.5
Leave sample early 12.7 12.6 12.8 12.9 12.2 12.3
English LL 12.7 11.1 13 11.4 12.4 10.7
FRL Eligible 58.6 58.7 58 58.2 59.2 59.2
Ever Repeat Grade 4.1 3.3 4.7 3.9 3.4 2.7
Characteristics
White 52.3 51.3 52.6 51.8 51.9 50.7
Black 24.2 25.6 23.8 25.1 24.6 26.1
Hispanic 15.3 14.7 15.5 14.9 15.2 14.6
Male 48.8 49.3
N 133,254 126,533 65,741 61,725 67,540 64,808
Data Source: North Carolina Department of Public Instruction, school years 2004-2014.
Notes: Includes children in kindergarten cohorts 2006, 2007, and 2008. All October births are
dropped from the sample. English Language Learner (English LL) and Free and Reduced Price
Lunch (FRL Eligible) indicate the child was enrolled for the program at any time between
kindergarten and grade 6. Race categories are mutually exclusive, and other is the omitted
category.
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2.3.2 Reduced-Form Sample
I use National Health Interview Survey (NHIS) respondents in survey years 1994-2005 who were
link-eligible to Social Security Administrative records. Due to the nature of the Supplemental
Security Record (SSR) which spans the years 1974 to 2007, I construct my main sample popu-
lation to include all persons born between 1978 and 1995. I restrict to persons born after 1978 to
ensure that the individuals in my sample were exposed to the post-Zebley SSI rules. I restrict to
persons born before 1995 because this is the last birth cohort for whom I can identify a potential
record on the SSR at age 12.16
For each individual, I construct five main outcomes of interest which are indicators for
whether the individual: (i) applied for SSI between ages 5 and 12, (ii) was awarded SSI be-
tween ages 5 and 12, (iii) was awarded SSI between ages 5 and 12 for a mental impairment,
(iv) was awarded SSI between ages 5 and 12 for a physical impairment, and (v) was denied SSI
between ages 5 and 12.17 In supplemental analyses presented in the appendix, I disaggregate
mental awards into “malleable” mental awards and “nonmalleable” mental awards.18
I use applications and awards between ages 5 and 12 as my main outcomes of interest be-
cause these are the years in which I expect school-starting-age to affect special education place-
ment. Benson (2018) shows that school-starting-age has the largest effect on special education
placement prior to grade 8. If children are using their IEP as documentation of an impairment,
I would expect to see school starting age affect disability applications and awards between ages
5 and 12. Table 2.3 presents summary statistics for my main analysis sample: approximately
17.5% of the population identifies as black, non-Hispanic, approximately 60% of the population
identifies as White, non-Hispanic, 16% identifies as Hispanic, and 6% identifies as another race.
Boys make up 50% of the sample. It is important to note that a small fraction of the population
interacts with the SSI program; only 2.7% of the sample applies for SSI between ages 5 and 12
16Individuals born before 1978 would not have been exposed to the post-Zebley rules prior to age 12, while indi-
viduals born in 1996 would be 11 in 2007, the last year of the SSR. Lexus diagrams presented in appendix figures
B.1 and B.2 present graphical depictions of the samples.
17Regressions where the outcome is awards, awards for mental or physical impairments, and denials are uncondi-
tional on having applied for SSI.
18“Malleable” mental impairments include: affective disorders, anxiety disorders, personality disorders, conduct
disorders, defiant disorders, ADHD, speech impairments, and learning disabilities. “Nonmalleable” mental impair-
ments are as follows: organic mental disorder, schizophrenic disorders, autism, substance abuse, mental retardation,
and borderline mental retardation.
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Table 2.3: Descriptive Statistics for Persons Born +/- 60 Days of Statewide Cutoff Date
Fraction of Population +/- 60 Days 60 Days 60 Days
Around Cutoff Before Cutoff After Cutoff
Date (Youngest) (Oldest)
Applied for SSI Between Age 5 and 12 0.0278 0.0293 0.0263
Denied from SSI Between Age 5 and 12 0.0172 0.0181 0.0163
Awarded SSI for Any Reason 0.0099 0.0105 0.0092
Awarded SSI for Mental Impairment 0.0084 0.0091 0.0076
Awarded SSI for Physical Impairment 0.0012 0.0011 0.0013
Awarded SSI for a Malleable Mental
Impairment
0.0035 0.0042 0.0027
Black 0.1747 0.1745 0.1750
White 0.6000 0.6015 0.5985
Non-White, Non-Black Hispanic 0.1619 0.1598 0.1641
Other Race 0.0633 0.0642 0.0625
Male 0.4965 0.4989 0.4940
N 57,260 29,086 28,174
Boys
Applied for SSI Between Age 5 and 12 0.0373 0.0344
Denied from SSI Between Age 5 and 12 0.0220 0.0200
Awarded SSI for Any Reason 0.0140 0.0132
Awarded SSI for Mental Impairment 0.0123 0.0111
Awarded SSI for Physical Impairment 0.0012 0.0016
Awarded SSI for a Malleable Mental
Impairment
0.0065 0.0049
Black 0.1673 0.1740
White 0.6090 0.6017
Non-White, Non-Black Hispanic 0.1600 0.1640
Other Race 0.0636 0.0602
N 14,715 14,158
Girls
Applied for SSI Between Age 5 and 12 0.0214 0.0185
Denied from SSI Between Age 5 and 12 0.0143 0.0126
Awarded SSI for Any Reason 0.0071 0.0054
Awarded SSI for Mental Impairment 0.0059 0.0043
Awarded SSI for Physical Impairment 0.0009 0.0009
Awarded SSI for a Malleable Mental
Impairment
0.0020 0.0007
Black 0.1817 0.1760
White 0.5940 0.5953
Non-White, Non-Black Hispanic 0.1596 0.1641
Other Race 0.0647 0.0646
N 14,371 14,016
Data Source: Data Source: NHIS Surveys 1994-2005, birth cohorts 1978-1995.
Notes: The data includes all individuals born between 1978 and 1995 who were link-eligible to the Supplemental
Security Record. All SSI outcome variables are defined as indicator variables for the outcome occurred to the indi-
vidual between the ages of 5 and 12. Race categories as defined are mutually exclusive. These are weighted using
NHIS person weight adjusted for SSR link-eligibility. See text for details on the weight.
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and approximately 1% of the sample has an award for SSI.
2.4 Empirical Strategy
The main relationship of interest in this project is the effect of receiving special education ser-
vices on the likelihood that a child applies for and is subsequently awarded SSI. This relationship
can be described in the following structural equation:
SSIit = α+ρSpEdit + εit (2.1)
where SSIist is an indicator for whether child i born in year t applied for or is awarded SSI and
SpEd is an indicator for the child receives special education services with their school. The co-
efficient of interest is ρ . However, estimating the naive OLS would generate a biased estimate
of ρ . First, there may be reverse causality whereby individuals receiving SSI are encouraged to
seek out screening for special education services. Second, there is omitted variable bias since
children receiving special education services are, on average, more disadvantaged than their
regular education peers. For instance, the National Longitudinal Transition Survey conducted
in 1987, concluded that 35% of special education children lived with a single parent, 68% had
parents with only a high school diploma, and over 26% lived with a household head who was un-
employed (Rupp, Davies, Newcomb, Iams, Becker, Mulpuru, Ressler, Romig and Miller, 2006).
Further, many special education children live in households receiving federal assistance either
through SSI, SSDI, and Medicaid (Cohen, 2007). Thus, children receiving special education ser-
vices are, on average, more likely to qualify for and apply for SSI due to their higher prevalence
of economic disadvantage.
To circumvent the endogeneity of special education, I implement a two-sample fuzzy re-
gression discontinuity design.19 Using administrative school records from the state of North
Carolina, I estimate the increase in special education receipt induced by school entry cutoff
dates. This first stage is shown by equation 2.2, where Youngest is an indicator that the child
was born directly before the school entry cutoff date and relative age is the running variable, or
19The ideal data set to complete this project in the Instrumental Variables framework would provide a researcher
with a nationally representative sample, a child’s exact date of birth, his state, administrative records of receipt for
special education services, and administrative records for application and receipt of SSI. To the best of my knowledge,
no such data set exists.
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distance between an individual’s date of birth and the school entry cutoff date.20
SpEdit = α+βSpEdYoungestit + f (relative ageit)+ εist (2.2)
Next, using National Health Interview Survey (NHIS) linked to Social Security Adminis-
tration records I estimate the increase in SSI applications and awards induced by school cutoff
dates. In particular, I regress indicators for applying for and having an award for SSI on an
individual’s relative age to the cutoff date. This is shown by equation 2.3.
SSIit = α+βSSIYoungestit + f (relative ageit)+νist (2.3)
The ratio of the reduced form estimate to the first stage estimate will provide an estimate
of the effect of special education on SSI applications and awards as shown by the following
expression:
ρ =
βSSI
βSpEd
I return to the two-sample fuzzy RD estimates in section 2.7. First, I discuss the running
variable, a child’s relative-age-in-grade. Next, I present first-stage estimates of the increase in
special education for children born the month before the cutoff date. Then, I present reduced-
form estimates of the increase in disability for children born just before the cutoff date. Last, I
present the two-sample fuzzy RD estimates.
2.4.1 Regression Discontinuity Design
I exploit a kindergarten entry eligibility policy, which generates a fuzzy discontinuity in the like-
lihood a child receives special education services in grade school, to test for spillovers between
special education and SSI for children. First, I take as given that kindergarten school cutoff dates
generate a sharp discontinuity in the likelihood a child is enrolled in school at age 5, as shown
20It should be noted that there is no nationally representative data set that would provide a researcher with exact date
of birth and receipt of special education services. While the federal government requires states to report the number
of children receiving special education, they do not collect and collate individual level information that would include
a child’s date of birth and special education status. North Carolina is a large state that closely resembles the nation
more broadly as shown in appendix figures B.4, B.5, and B.6.
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in Dobkin and Ferreira (2010). The variation in school entry eligibility and subsequent variation
in relative-age-in-grade enables an estimate of the causal effect of school entry eligibility on
children’s subsequent disability applications and awards.
While the school entry cutoff date generates exogenous variation in the age a child is eligible
to enter school, the actual distribution of students across grades is complicated by several factors.
First, students attending private kindergarten do not adhere to the law and children migrating
between states are allowed to remain in the grade they transferred from. An additional concern
arises from parents choosing to "redshirt" their child by keeping them out of kindergarten for an
additional year. In my data, I am not able to distinguish between each of these mechanisms that
would leave a child in a different grade than the cutoff date would assign. Thus, my estimates will
be interpreted as intent-to-treat effects for those individuals on the margin of receiving special
education services. Specifically, I estimate the effect of being eligible to enter school nearly a
year earlier than a similar comparison group.
I utilize the fact that date of birth relative to the statewide cutoff date discontinuously affects
the probability that a child is enrolled in special education (Elder and Lubotsky, 2009; Dhuey and
Lipscomb, 2010). This strategy assumes that other characteristics associated with child disability
evolve continuously through the cutoff date. If this assumption holds, the outcomes of children
born just after the cutoff date (those ineligible to enter school) provide reasonable counterfactual
outcomes to the children born just before the cutoff date. To implement this strategy, I generate
the running variable, which is defined as the distance between the individual’s date of birth and
the statewide school entry cutoff date. This is shown by the following equation:
relative ageit = school entry cutoff datet−date f iveit (2.4)
where date five is the day a child turns 5, where January 1=1 and December 31=365, for in-
dividual i for birth cohort t, school entry cutoff date is the state-wide school entry cutoff date
(September 1=244) faced by individual i for birth cohorts t.21 Thus, an individual born on Au-
gust 27th in a state with a cutoff of September 1, would have a relative age defined as:
21I account for leap years.
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relative age = 244−239 = 5
By this definition any child with relative age < 0 is among the oldest in the classroom and
any child with relative age ≥ 0 is among the youngest in the classroom.22 As stated above, I
construct my outcomes of interest as indicators for whether the individual applied for and/or was
awarded SSI between age 5 and age 12. I then compare differences in the likelihood a child
participates in the SSI program between the youngest and oldest individuals within each state
and birth cohort. To quantify the discontinuity more precisely, I estimate regressions of the form:
SSIit = α+β1Youngestit +β2Youngestit ∗ relative ageit
+β3relative ageit +Controlsit +νit (2.5)
where SSI is the outcome of interest (i.e.: SSI application, SSI award) for individual i
born in year t; Youngest is an indicator for (being the youngest in in the classroom, having a
relative age ≥ 0); Controls include indicators for White, Black, and Hispanic, state, and birth
cohort. Equation (2.5) specifies a local linear regression, which allows the relationship between
relative age and child disability to vary on either side of the discontinuity.23 The coefficient of
interest, β1, is the size of the discontinuity. That is, β1 measures the weighted average treatment
effect where weights are determined by the probability of being near the state cutoff date or
where relative age = 0 (Lee, 2008).
The RD estimate represents the difference in likelihood of disability for children who are
essentially one year younger than their classmates who were born on the other side of the school
cutoff date. My main estimates are derived from a local linear specification with a bandwidth
of 60 days. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.24 In all specifications, I present
unweighted estimates. However, I show that my estimates are robust to bandwidth selection,
22For generality, the reader can think of the youngest in the classroom as those born in the late summer (August)
and the oldest in the classroom as those born in fall (September).
23Estimates are not sensitive to using the local linear specification. F-tests show that higher order interaction terms
do not add explanatory power to the model. Therefore, I present the local linear as the main specification.
24Appendix table B.8 shows that estimates are not sensitive to clustering standard errors at the state level.
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specification choice, using sample weights, and different assumptions about the correlation of
standard errors.
2.4.2 Difference-in-Discontinuity Design
To account for potential differences between children born before and after the cutoff date I
leverage the change in eligibility for child SSI due to the 1990 Sullivan v. Zebley court decision
by estimating a difference-in-discontinuity. The difference-in-discontinuity will estimate the
difference in SSI take-up for children born just before the cutoff date to those born just after the
cutoff date in years which Zebley was in effect and subtract off the difference in the likelihood
of an SSI application or award between children born just before and just after the cutoff date
for children who applied before the Zebley rules were in effect. Formally, I will estimate the
following equation:
SSIit = α+β1Youngestit ∗Zebleyt +β2Youngestit ∗ relative ageit ∗Post Zebleyt
+β3relative ageit ∗Post Zebleyt +Controlsit + εit
(2.6)
where PostZebley is an indicator for birth cohorts 1978 and later, Zebley is the fraction of school
years (between age 5 and age 18) an individual experienced after the 1990 Zebley decision.
Equation (2.7) shows how the Zebley measure is constructed. And all other variables are as
defined as above in equation (2.5).25
Zebleyt =

0 i f t ≤ 1971
Year 18−1990
13 i f 1972≤ t ≤ 1984
1 i f t ≥ 1985
(2.7)
The coefficient of interest is β1, which measures the effect of being the youngest in one’s
grade on the likelihood a child applies for SSI (or has an SSI award) after Zebley liberalized
the standard for documentation of child impairments relative to the likelihood a child born just
25In the difference-in-discontinuity specification, I have omitted an indicator for Post Zebley as it is picked up by
the birth cohort fixed effects. Relative age and the interaction of relative age and Youngest are assumed to be zero in
the pre-Zebley cohorts, thus they are not included in this specification. This assumption was confirmed by estimating
the fully saturated model. Similar estimates were obtained in specifications using the continuous measure of Zebley
in place of the Post Zebley indicator.
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before the cutoff date applied for SSI before Zebley liberalized the standard of documentation.
This analysis accounts for potential differences between children born before and after the cutoff
date by differencing off the effect of youth-in-grade of the earlier cohorts who did not experience
school years under Zebley.
2.5 Regression Discontinuity Estimates
2.5.1 First-Stage Estimates
To begin analysis, I corroborate the previous literature that relative-age affects the likelihood a
child is referred to special education services (Elder and Lubotsky, 2009; Dhuey and Lipscomb,
2010). First, in Figure 2.2, I plot the average age of children at the end of their third grade
exam by relative age, where relative age is measured as the distance of one’s month of birth
from the statewide cutoff date. As can be seen in Panel (a), children born the month before the
cutoff date are the youngest at the time of the test. In Panel (b), I plot the fraction of children
receiving special education services by relative age. A larger fraction of children born the month
before the cutoff date, those with relative ages greater than 0, are receiving special education
services. Next, I estimate the effect of relative age on special education placement using RD
methods analogous to those described in the previous section. Specifically, I estimate the change
in likelihood a child receives special education services for children born the month before the
cutoff relative to children born the month after the cutoff. I utilize a bandwidth of 5 months;
however, estimates are not sensitive to smaller bandwidths. I include child race, birth year, and
school fixed effects and cluster standard errors at the child’s 3rd grade school.
Table 2.4 presents the RD estimates for the estimated increase in special education placement
at the cutoff month. I find that children born the month before the cutoff date are 3.28 percentage
points more likely to receive special education services at any time between the ages of 5 and 12.
Given the base rate of receiving special education services between ages 5 and 12 (12 percentage
points), I find that children born the month before the cutoff date are 27% more likely to receive
special education services relative to their peers born the month after the cutoff date. Boys born
the month before the cutoff date are 3.94 percentage points (or 26%) more likely to be in special
education relative to their peers born the month after the cutoff date; while girls born the month
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Figure 2.2: Relative Age and Special Education Placement
(a) Age at Grade 3 Exam
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Data Source: North Carolina Department of Public Instruction, school years 2004-2014.
Notes: Includes children in kindergarten cohorts 2006, 2007, and 2008. All October births are
dropped from the sample. Panel (a) shows that cutoff date affects the age of children when they
take their end of grade 3 exam, or that the variation induced by school cutoff dates does affect
the relative age of a child. Panel (b) shows the fraction of children born in each relative month
who have received special education services at any time in grades K-6.
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before the cutoff date are 2.76 percentage points (or 30%) more likely to be in special education
relative to their peers born the month after the cutoff date.
Table 2.4: RD Estimates of the Increase in Special Education Services at the School Cutoff Date
Boys and Girls Boys Girls
Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3)
Special Education 3.28*** 3.94*** 2.76***
(0.37) (0.59) (0.46)
Dep. Mean 12.0 15.0 9.0
N 218,519 106,925 111,594
Notes: * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** indicates statistical significance at
the 5% level and *** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level. Data come from the North
Carolina Department of Public Instruction, school years 2004-2014. The outcome of interest is
receipt of special education services between the ages of 5 and 12 (grade K-grade 6). All October
births are dropped due to the October 16 cutoff date. This sample is restricted to children who
remained in the NC public school system for all years between grade 3 and grade 6.
One may be concerned that North Carolina is not generalizable to the United States. To
address this concern, in Figure B.4, I plot the fraction of children receiving special education
services in North Carolina against the fraction of children receiving special education services
in the remaining US states. North Carolina closely tracks the remaining US states between
1990 and 2000. Between 2000 and 2005 North Carolina places a larger fraction of children
in special education, while after 2005 North Carolina places a lower fraction of children into
special education. However, North Carolina only deviates from the national average by 0.5%.26
Further, my first stage estimates are similar to those of Elder and Lubotsky (2009) who utilize
the ECLS-K, a nationally representative sample of kindergartners, and find that the youngest in
the classroom are 2.5 percentage points more likely to be diagnosed with a learning disability
between the ages of 5 and 10. I now turn to the NHIS sample for reduced-form estimates.
2.5.2 Balance of Covariates/Testing the Identifying Assumptions
To present graphical evidence that the identifying assumptions of the model are satisfied, I test
for bunching around the statewide cutoff date. Figure 2.3 displays the average number of births
26Appendix Figures B.5 and B.6 further indicate that North Carolina trends similarly to the US average on observ-
able characteristics including the fraction of children on SSI.
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by date of birth relative to the statewide cutoff date. Using the NHIS data, births appear relatively
uniform. Looking around the cutoff date, there appears to be a slight dip around the cutoff. This
likely caused by the reduction in births due to Labor Day, not the statewide cutoff date (Dickert-
Conlin and Elder, 2010). Given this distribution of births, bunching around the cutoff date does
not appear to invalidate the identification strategy.
Figure 2.3: Count of Births by Relative Age
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Data Source: NHIS Surveys 1994-2005, birth cohorts 1978-1995.
Notes: The figure above plots the average number of births on each date relative to the statewide
cutoff date for individuals who were link-eligible in the NHIS. Each individual’s state is defined
by their state of birth. State of residence at time of the survey is used for individuals who do not
have a state of birth identified in the survey. Statewide cutoff dates vary between states and over
time within states. Individuals were matched to the statewide cutoff date in their state of birth
for the calendar year in which they turned 5.
Previous work by Buckles and Hungerman (2013) argued that season of birth may be a poor
instrument for educational attainment because women who give birth in winter are more likely to
be unmarried and/or teenage mothers. Thus, maternal characteristics may explain the differences
one finds in educational outcomes due to season of birth instrumental variables. In this setting,
use of exact date of birth will circumvent this potential problem. I present graphical and tabular
descriptive statistics which show that child characteristics are smooth through the cutoff date. In
Figure 2.4, I plot the fraction of persons identifying with each race and gender for each day of
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birth relative to the cutoff date. There does not appear to be bunching around the cutoff date for
any characteristic.27
Figure 2.4: Count of Births by Relative Age by Race and Sex
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Data Source: NHIS Surveys 1994-2005, birth cohorts 1978-1995.
Notes: Each individual’s state is defined by their state of birth. State of residence at time of the
survey is used for individuals who do not have a state of birth identified in the survey. Statewide
cutoff dates vary between states and over time within states. Individuals were matched to the
statewide cutoff date in their state of birth for the calendar year in which they turned 5.
Summary statistics, density plots, and regression discontinuity estimates together suggest
that the underlying assumptions of the model are satisfied. That is, date of birth within the 60
27In appendix table B.1 I separately estimate equation (2.5) using each characteristic as the dependent variable.
There is no estimated discontinuity in the likelihood of an individual identifying as White, Black, nor Hispanic at the
statewide cutoff date.
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day window around the cutoff date is essentially random and the individuals do not vary on
observed characteristics. Thus, any differences in application and award rates can be attributed
to the increased likelihood in receiving special education services.
2.5.3 Graphical Evidence
To graphically view the increase in applications and awards for children born near the cutoff
date, I plot the fraction of individuals who applied for or received an award for SSI by date of
birth relative to the statewide cutoff date. This is shown in Figure 2.5, where the running variable
is aggregated to 30 day bins.28 As can be seen in panel (a) there is a jump in the fraction of the
population applying for SSI at the cutoff date for the post-Zebley cohort. As expected, the pre-
Zebley cohorts do not show a similar discontinuity at the cutoff date. Panel (b) indicates that
there is an increase in the fraction of the post-Zebley population receiving an award for SSI at
the cutoff date.29 The increase in awards is driven by awards for mental impairments rather than
a change in physical impairments (figure 2.5 c).30
2.5.4 Reduced-Form Estimates
To confirm the visual evidence of differences in applications and awards, I present estimates of
equation (2.5) in Table 2.5 column (1). Each cell contains results from a separate regression.
Each specification is a local linear regression with a bandwidth of 60 days, standard errors are
clustered at the state level, and dependent means are presented below the the standard error.
These estimates are unweighted; thus, they represent the local average treatment effect for the
sampled population.
I find that that children born directly before the statewide cutoff date are 0.78 percentage
points more likely to apply for SSI relative to their counterparts born directly after the cutoff date.
Given the base rate of applications for SSI at 2.59 percentage points, this increased likelihood
28Due to disclosure limitations, data in the form of raw counts has been aggregated to 30 day bins.
29Appendix Figure B.7 shows that there is no clear jump in the fraction of the population who receives a denial
from SSA at the cutoff date.
30I have not included the following mental impairments in the disaggregated analysis: chronic brain disor-
der/syndrome; schizophrenic, paranoid, or psychotic disorders; autistic disorders; substance abuse disorders; eating
disorders; somatoform disorders; impairment established but no known list code. I do not include mental retardation
in the analysis below, however, those results are available upon request.
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Figure 2.5: Applications and Awards for SSI by Relative Age
(a) Applications, (b) Awards,
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Data Source: NHIS Surveys 1994-2005, birth cohorts 1957-1995.
Notes: Panel (a) displays the fraction of individuals who have applied to SSI between the ages
of 5 and 12 for the post-Zebley and pre-Zebley cohorts. The data have been aggregated to 30
day bins. Dates to the left of the cutoff represent individuals born after the statewide cutoff
date (or the Oldest in the classroom), while dates to the right of the cutoff represent individu-
als born before the statewide cutoff date (or the Youngest in the classroom). Individuals on the
right side of the cutoff date are expected to have a higher likelihood of placement into Special
Education; these special education placements are primarily for mental, emotional, and behav-
ioral impairments. Individuals born before Zebley are not expected to have a discontinuity at the
cutoff date. Panel (b) displays the fraction of individuals who have been awarded SSI between
the ages of 5 and 12 for any reason. And panel (c) disaggregates awards by physical and mental
impairments for the post-Zebley cohorts. The discontinuity in awards is only expected for mental
impairments.
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in applying for SSI represents a 30% increased likelihood of applying to SSI for those children
born directly before the cutoff date. This estimate is statistically significant at the 1% level.
Table 2.5: Regression Discontinuity and Difference-in-Discontinuity Estimates of the Increase
in Disability at Statewide Entry Cutoff Date
Post-Zebley Pre-Zebley Diff-in-Disc Age 0-4
Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Applied 0.78*** -0.03 0.66** -0.31*
(0.27) (0.19) (0.26) (0.18)
Dep. Mean 2.59 0.62 2.02 1.62
Award for Any Reason 0.55*** 0.01 0.50*** -0.16
(0.16) (0.13) (0.18) (0.14)
Dep. Mean 0.93 0.24 0.73 0.79
Award for Mental Impairment 0.52*** 0.10 0.48** 0.01
(0.18) (0.11) (0.19) (0.08)
Dep. Mean 0.76 0.16 0.59 0.34
Award for Physical Impairment 0.01 -0.08 0.03 -0.11
(0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.08)
Dep. Mean 0.14 0.06 0.11 0.41
Denied 0.26 -0.03 0.22 -0.14
(0.24) (0.14) (0.22) (0.12)
Dep. Mean 1.59 0.35 1.23 0.81
N 57,359 23,642 81,001 70,693
Notes: * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** indicates statistical significance at
the 5% level and *** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level. Data is from restricted-use
NHIS-SSA linked data and include birth cohorts 1969-2003. Each cell represents a separate
regression. Local linear regressions are specified with a bandwidth of 60 days. Robust standard
errors are reported in parenthesis and are clustered at the state. The mean of the individuals to
the left of the cutoff (the oldest in the classroom) is reported. Outcomes are defined as indicators
for the SSI event occurring between the ages of 5 and 12 for columns (1)-(3) and for the SSI
event occurring between the ages of 0 and 4 for column (4). There is no expected discontinuity
in columns (2) and (4).
Next, I test for differences in the likelihood of having ever been denied or awarded SSI
between the ages of 5 and 12 for the youngest and oldest children in a grade. I find that the
youngest children in the classroom are 0.55 percentage points (or 59%) more likely to receive
an award for SSI relative to the oldest children in the classroom. This effect is statistically
significant at the 1 percent level. I find no evidence that children born just before the school
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cutoff date are more likely to have been denied from SSI. The combination of the estimates thus
far suggests that the youngest children in a grade are more likely to apply for SSI and to be
awarded SSI relative to their older counterparts.
Next, I test whether the increase in awards is driven by mental impairments or physical im-
pairments. Given that physical impairments are difficult to manipulate, I expect that the increase
in awards around the cutoff date should be driven entirely by mental impairments. I find that
the youngest children are 0.52 percentage points (or 68%) more likely to receive an award for
a mental impairment compared to their older classmates. This 0.52 pp increased likelihood ac-
counts for 94% of the increased likelihood in any award.31 As expected, I find no increase in the
likelihood of receiving an award for a physical impairment at the cutoff date; point estimates are
zero and are not statistically significant.
2.5.5 Robustness to Bandwidth Choice
I next assess the robustness of the estimates to different bandwidths. Below, I show that the re-
sults are generally similar with and without higher order terms; therefore, I focus the bandwidth
robustness exercise on my preferred specification, the local linear regression. Figure 2.6 shows
the estimates and 95% confidence intervals for all applications and awards for the full sample. In
panel (a), the local linear estimates on the likelihood of applying for SSI remain positive between
0.005 and 0.01 for bandwidths less than 120 days. These estimates are statistically significant at
the 95% level. In the bottom panel, the estimates for all awards is robust to bandwidths less than
120 days. The estimates remain between 0.0025 and 0.01. In appendix figure 2.7 I show that
the estimates for awards for mental impairments is similarly stable across bandwidths between
5 and 180 days (panel a). Figure 2.7 panel (b) and Figure B.8 show that the estimates for phys-
ical awards and denials, respectively, are always close to zero and not statistically significantly
31I further disaggregate awards for mental impairments into “malleable” and “unmalleable.” Here, malleable is
meant to suggest that the impairment could be tied to the child’s maturity and personality. I present estimates of the
increase in “malleable” mental impairments in appendix table B.2. I find that children are 0.35 percentage points more
likely to receive an award for a “malleable” mental impairment relative to their older classmates and this estimate
is statistically significant at the 1% level. I find that the difference between all mental awards (0.54 pp) and the
malleable mental awards (0.35 pp) is captured by mental retardation, where I estimate a 0.17 pp increased likelihood
of having an award for mental retardation for the youngest children. This estimate is not statistically significant at the
10% level. One reason I might see an increased likelihood in awards for mental retardation could be that the test for
borderline intellectual functioning is more malleable than an IQ test, or that SSI judges may have been unsure which
category best described a child’s impairment.
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different from zero.
Figure 2.6: Robustness of Estimates to Bandwidth, Applications and Awards
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Data Source: NHIS Surveys 1994-2005, birth cohorts 1978-1995.
Notes: These figures show the coefficient estimates and 95 percent confidence intervals at dif-
ferent bandwidths ranging from 5 to 180 days. The local linear regressions are estimated using
robust standard errors clustered at the state. The estimates of the full sample are statistically
significant for awards and marginally significant for applications for bandwidths less than 120
days. A bandwidth of 60 days is utilized in this project. The bandwidth selected using the
method proposed by Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014) is also label on the figure (CCT).
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Figure 2.7: Robustness of Estimates to Bandwidth, Awards by Type
(a) Award for Mental Impairment
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(b) Award for Physical Impairment
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Data Source: NHIS Surveys 1994-2005, birth cohorts 1978-1995.
Notes: These figures show the coefficient estimates and 95 percent confidence intervals at dif-
ferent bandwidths ranging from 5 to 180 days. The local linear regressions are estimated using
robust standard errors clustered at the state. The estimates of the full sample are statistically
significant for awards and marginally significant for applications for bandwidths less than 120
days. A bandwidth of 60 days is utilized in this project. The bandwidth selected using the
method proposed by Calonico et al. (2014) is also label on the figure (CCT).
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2.5.6 Heterogeneity by Child Sex
To explore how the special education channel to SSI may differentially affect boys and girls,
I disaggregate to male and female subsamples. My estimates indicate that special education
channel to SSI is larger for boys. Table B.3 presents estimates of equation 2.5 for the sample of
boys in column (1) and the sample of girls in column (2). I find that the youngest boys are 1.08
percentage points (or 32.6%) more likely to apply for SSI than their older classmates (statistically
significant at the 5% level), while the youngest girls are 0.44 percentage points (or 23.7%) more
likely to apply than their older classmates (statistically significant at the 10% level).
Looking at awards, I find that the youngest boys are 0.77 percentage points (or 59.6%) more
likely to receive an award for SSI relative to their older classmates and the youngest girls are
0.31 percentage points (or 54%) more likely to receive an award for SSI relative to their older
classmates. In terms of mental impairments, I find larger point estimates for boys than for girls.
However, I find that given the base rate of awards for mental impairments the effect size is similar
for boys and girls. The youngest boys are 0.71 percentage points (or 66%) more likely to have
an award for a mental impairment relative to their older classmates, whereas the youngest girls
are 0.31 percentage points (or 70%) more likely to receive an award for a mental impairment
relative to their older classmates.
These finding makes intuitive sense, given the fact that boys account for the majority of
special education placements and make up two-thirds of the SSI child caseload. However, it
should be noted that when the sample is disaggregated between boys and girls, I lose statistical
power; and thus am unable to estimate effects that are statistically significant at the 5% level
for girls. I also cannot rule out the possibility that the effect for boys and girls are statistically
significantly different from one another. I focus the subsequent falsification tests and robustness
checks on the full sample of boys and girls.32
32Estimates by child sex subsamples are more sensitive to bandwidth choice. This may be due to decreased
statistical power, and thus larger confidence intervals. Despite the loss of precision, estimates are similar across
bandwidth choices, yet are not statistically significant at the 5% level. These figures can be seen in Figures B.9 and
B.10.
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2.6 Falsification Tests and Robustness Checks
One may be concerned that children born directly before the school cutoff date are more likely to
exhibit disability even before school starts or that children born before the cutoff date were more
likely to be on SSI prior to the 1990 Zebley decision. To test this I conduct two falsification tests:
first, I test whether children age 5-12 before Zebley were more likely to apply for and receive an
award for SSI and second, I test whether relative age affects SSI applications and awards prior
to age 4. The combination of results from these falsification tests support my assertion that the
mechanism through which school starting age affects child disability is through a judge’s use of
a child’s IEP as documentation of the child’s impairment. In other words, there is a spillover
between special education services and SSI.
2.6.1 Pre-Zebley Birth Cohorts
One may be concerned that children born directly before the cutoff date are more likely to be
disabled and this effect would have existed prior to Zebley. To test this, I use birth cohorts 1969
to 1977 to test whether children with no exposure to the Zebley rules during primary school were
more likely to apply for SSI by age 12. Importantly, these children were still more likely to be
placed into special education for learning disabilities.33 Therefore, this is a test of spillovers from
the special education program to SSI before Zebley opened a direct channel for those spillovers.
First, as shown in Figure 2.5 there are no visual discontinuities in the fraction of individuals
applying for and receiving awards for SSI by date of birth relative to the cutoff date for the
pre-Zebley cohorts (panels a and b). In fact, very few individuals received SSI between ages
5 and 12 prior to Zebley. Table 2.5 column (2) corroborates these raw counts by showing that
children born directly before the cutoff date were no more likely to apply for SSI nor were they
more likely to receive an award for SSI relative to their older counterparts. Point estimates for
applications and awards for any reason are essentially zero.
This falsification sample demonstrates that the interaction of special education and SSI drives
the relationship between age-in-grade and disability. To more formally test for a change in the
33Dhuey and Lipscomb (2010) use the NELS88, with 8th graders surveyed in 1988; this would represent birth
cohorts 1974. This sample shows that the youngest children in the grade were still more likely to receive special
education relative to their older peers.
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likelihood of applying for SSI and receiving an award after the Zebley rules come into effect,
I estimate a difference-in-discontinuity using the pre-Zebley cohorts as controls for the main
sample. Column (3) of Table 2.5 presents the coefficient of interest from Equation (2.6).
I find that the youngest children in the post-Zebley era are: 0.66 percentage points more
likely to apply for SSI, 0.5 percentage points more likely to receive an award for any reason,
and 0.48 percentage points more likely to receive an award for a mental impairment relative
to their older classmates. These estimates are very similar to the main RD estimates presented
in column (1). Thus, the difference-in-discontinuity specification, shows that the mechanism
through which relative-youth-in-grade affects disability applications and awards is driven by a
judge’s use of special education receipt as documentation of an impairment, rather than by a
change in the underlying prevalence of child disability for children born around the cutoff date.
Children who were young in their grade prior to Zebley were just as likely to be placed into
special education for mental impairments, however, they were no more likely to apply for or
receive an award for SSI.
2.6.2 Age 0 to 4
Next, I test whether relative age affects applications and awards for children prior to school
entry—those aged 0 to 4.34 It is important to note that children can receive special education
services prior to age 5. In 2015 of the 6.6 million children receiving special education services,
746,549 were between the ages of 3 and 5 (NCES, 2016). However, children receiving services
prior to kindergarten entrance should not be affected by the school starting age, and thus should
not have a discontinuous jump in the likelihood of receiving disability benefits at the cutoff
date.35 To test this, I estimate models where the dependent variable is the likelihood of applying
for and receiving benefits between the ages of 0 and 4.
As can be seen in Table 2.5 column (4) children born directly before the cutoff date are
not more likely to receive an award for SSI relative to their counterparts born directly after the
cutoff date. I find that children born directly before the cutoff date are 0.3 percentage points (or
34The sample expands to children born between 1978 and 2003, thus capturing all children who turn 4 in or before
2007. See a graphical representation of the sample in the Lexus diagram in figure B.2.
35It is possible that pre-schools use the same calendar entrance cutoff date as the public kindergartens. This would
suggest that I may find a positive effect in this sample.
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19%) less likely to apply for SSI relative to their counterpart born directly after the cutoff date;
further, this effect is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. This decreased likelihood in
applications is driven entirely by boys who exhibit a 0.63 percentage point decreased likelihood
of applying for SSI between ages 0 and 4. However, these decreased likelihoods in applying
does not result in any decreased likelihood of receiving an award between the ages of 0 and
4. Overall, I find little evidence that relative age affects the likelihood of a child applying for
and receiving disability benefits prior to age 5. This falsification sample provides evidence that
school starting age (and the school cutoff date) affects the population of children in school and
does not affect children prior to school entry.
Placebo Date Falsification Tests There could be concern that the increase in applications is
spurious and equally sized estimates could be found at other nearby dates. To see if this is the
case, I conduct two placebo tests. First, I generate “placebo” cutoff dates for weekly intervals 30
weeks before and after the true statewide cutoff date. For each placebo week, I estimate equation
(2.5) for the outcomes of interest. I then plot the empirical cumulative distribution function for
these placebo estimates using the local linear specification. Figure 2.8 show that the largest
estimate for applications and awards are estimated at the true cutoff date. Further, for physical
impairments the true cutoff date does not provide distinct estimates from the placebo dates.36
In the second set of placebo dates, I generate placebo cutoff dates that exist for each day
between June 1 and December 31. These results are presented in appendix figure B.11. Note that
this range includes dates at which there are eligibility thresholds that could affect applications
and awards, such as September 1. I find that despite the inclusion of non-placebo dates, the
largest estimate remains at the true cutoff date. These placebo tests indicate that the true cutoff
date presents an estimated discontinuity that is greater than any random date. Thus, these tests
provide additional validity to the instrument.
2.6.3 Model Specification
With RD one may be concerned that the functional form of the relationship between the run-
ning variable and the outcomes is misspecified by a local linear regression. Therefore, I esti-
36Placebo distributions for denials are presented in appendix Figure B.12.
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Figure 2.8: The Distribution of Disability Estimates for Placebo Cutoff Dates +/- 30 Weeks of
Actual Cutoff Date
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Data Source: NHIS Surveys 1994-2005, birth cohorts 1978-1995.
Notes: These figures show the conditional density functions of point estimates using each week
+/-30 weeks before and after the statewide cutoff date as placebos. The diamond represents the
regression discontinuity estimated at the true state cutoff date.
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mate analogous regressions using higher order polynomials of the running variable. Table B.4
presents estimates of the effect of relative-youth-in-grade on SSI applications and awards using
local quadratic (column 2), local cubic (column 3), and local quartic (column 4) specifications.
Looking across columns (2) through (4), the estimates are robust to higher order polynomials.
In fact, the local linear specification presents the most conservative estimate for the effect of
youth-in-grade on SSI applications and awards.37 F-tests using the R-squared from each model
suggest that higher order terms do not provide substantial additional information to improve the
fit of the model. Thus, I selected the local linear regression as the preferred specification.
2.6.4 Sample Weights
In my main results above, I have presented the unweighted estimates. To make my sample
nationally representative, I use two different weights. Table B.6 column 2, weights the sample
using the NHIS person weight, which does not account for link-eligibility to the SSR. To correct
for this, in column (3) I weight my regression models adjusting for a person’s link-eligibility to
the SSR. I implement a logistic regression to estimate the predicted probability that an individual
is link eligible by regressing an indicator for link-eligible on birth-year fixed effects, an indicator
for male, race fixed effects, and state fixed effects, as shown in equation 2.8.
Link Eligibleist = α+δt + γg+ωr +θs+ εist (2.8)
Then I multiply the predicted probability of an individual being link-eligible with the pre-
dicted probability of being in the NHIS sample.38 As can be seen, weights do not drastically
affect the estimates. Similar to the higher order specifications, the unweighted estimates tend to
provide the most conservative estimate.
2.6.5 Dissipation of Effects Between Ages 13 and 17
While my main specification focuses on the likelihood of applying for and receiving benefits
between ages 5 and 12, I examine the full trajectory of children’s application and award behavior
37Analogous robustness tables for gender subsamples can be found in appendix table B.5.
38In practice, I multiply the link-eligible weight with the NHIS person weight, and estimate my regressions using
pweights.
78
between ages 5 and 17. It is important to note that overall acceptances for SSI decline after age
13, similar to special education.39 Figure 2.9 plots the estimated increase in SSI applications and
awards at the cutoff date for each age between 12 and 17. As can be seen, the estimated effect
of school entry cutoff date on SSI peaks at age 13 and diminishes with each subsequent age. By
age 15, there is no statistically significant difference in application rates between children born
on either side of the statewide cutoff date. However, awards for any reason persists through age
16, where children born directly before the cutoff are more likely to have an award.40
Figure 2.9: Dissipation of RD Estimates for Ages 13 to 17
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Data Source: NHIS Surveys 1994-2005, birth cohorts included varies with age.
Notes: These figures show the coefficient estimates and 95 percent confidence intervals for ap-
plications and awards between ages 12 and 17. Each age represents the likelihood of applying or
receiving an award between age 5 and the given age. The local linear regressions are estimated
using robust standard errors clustered at the state with a bandwidth of 60 days. The effect of
the statewide school cutoff date dissipates after age 13. Reasons for why these effects dissipate
between ages 13 and 17 are discussed in the text.
There are two reasons why the effect of school entry cutoff date on SSI may dissipate over
time. First, sample construction necessarily reduces both the sample size and the fraction of
39See figure 1.7.
40Analogous figures for boy and girl subsamples are presented in appendix figures B.13 and B.14.
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children experiencing the Zebley SSA rules.41 As sample size declines, the statistical power at
each age falls, therefore, precision of estimates decreases. Second, the effect of school-starting-
age on special education placement diminishes for each grade after grade 8 (Benson, 2018).
Thus, one may expect that school-starting-age would not affect application and award decisions
for children at older ages. Given the limitations of the data, I cannot disentangle these two
hypotheses. Understanding this diminishing effect is an important area of future research, as it
has significant implications for the relationship between special education and SSI.
2.7 Two-Sample Fuzzy RD Estimates
I now return to estimating the direct effect of special education on SSI. Combining the first
stage and the reduced form estimates, I obtain the two-sample fuzzy RD estimate for ρ .42 There
are two assumptions required for validity: (1) there is a strong first stage and (2) the exclusion
restriction is not violated. First, as shown by the first-stage estimates, relative-age-in-grade
affects an individual’s likelihood of receiving special education. Thus, the first stage exists and
is strong. The exclusion restriction requires that the instrument, relative-age in grade, affects SSI
only through special education. This is fundamentally untestable. A violation of the exclusion
restriction would require that an individual’s relative age affects SSI eligibility through some
channel other than special education.
Examples of a violation might include that a child’s date of birth affects maternal labor
supply, subsequently affecting family income, and thereby affecting a child’s financial eligibility.
However, a violation of this manner would downward bias my estimates. Children born directly
after the cutoff date would have depressed maternal labor supply, lower family income, and thus
would be more likely to be financially eligible for SSI. A second violation may arise due to a
Buckles and Hungerman (2013) type argument where maternal characteristics vary by season a
birth. Buckles and Hungerman find that children born in July and August are more likely to have
better maternal characteristics and come from wealthier families. If a violation of this manner
41For each age, the sample includes one fewer birth cohort, because I restrict analysis to individuals who obtain
the oldest age in the sample by 2007 (see figure B.10 panel (a) for cohorts included for each age). Additionally, as
the sample is expanded to older ages, my sample contains earlier birth cohorts, who on average experienced fewer
years under the Zebley SSA rules.
42The two-sample fuzzy RD estimate is calculated as the ratio of the reduced-form and first stage coefficients.
Standard errors were calculated using the delta method under the assumption of zero covariance between the first-
stage and reduced form estimates as in Dee and Evans (2003).
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occurred it would bias my estimates downwards.
Table 2.6: Two-sample Fuzzy RD Estimates of Special Education on SSI
Boys and Girls Boys Girls
Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3)
Applied 23.48*** 27.44* 15.94*
(8.64) (14.07) (9.10)
Dep. Mean 2.59 3.31 1.85
Award for Any Reason 16.46*** 19.29** 11.23*
(5.22) (7.68) (5.80)
Dep. Mean 0.93 1.29 0.57
Notes: * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** indicates statistical significance
at the 5% level and *** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level. The two-sample fuzzy
RD estimate is calculated as the ratio of the reduced-form and first-stage coefficients. Standard
errors were calculated using the delta method under the assumption of zero covariance between
the first-stage and reduced-form estimates as in Dee and Evans (2003).
Table 2.6 presents two-sample fuzzy RD estimates. I find that special education induces a
23 percentage point increase in the likelihood of applying for and a 16 percentage point increase
in the likelihood of receiving an award for SSI. In this individual level regression, receipt of
special education services goes from zero to one. We can think about this as a change in the
fraction of the population receiving special education services as going from 0 to 100%. Thus,
a 1 percentage point increase in the fraction of children receiving special education services
induces a 0.23 percentage point increase in the fraction of children applying for SSI and a 0.16
percentage point increase in the fraction of the child population with an award for SSI. Given
that approximately 1.6 percent of children have an SSI award, this represents a 10% increase in
the SSI roll or an increase of 118,400 additional SSI awards. Taking the average SSI award of
$662, I estimate that a 1 percentage point increase in the fraction of children receiving special
education services will cost an additional $940 million annually in SSI payments.
I find that these effects are driven primarily by boys. A 1 percentage point increase in the
fraction of boys receiving special education services induces a 0.27 percentage point increase
in the fraction of boys who apply for SSI and a 0.19 percentage point increase in the fraction
of boys who have an SSI award. While a 1 percentage point increase in the fraction of girls
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receiving special education services induces a 0.16 percentage point increase in the fraction of
girls who apply for SSI and an 0.11 percentage point increase in the fraction of girls who have
an award for SSI.
To address the question posited by Aizer et al. (2013), how much have rising rates of special
education contributed to the rise in SSI?, I calculate the fraction of the total growth in SSI that
can be attributed to the special education channel. First, note that between 1990 and 2013, the
fraction of the child population enrolled in special education services increased from 11.4% to
12.9%, or 1.5 percentage points, and the fraction of the population with an SSI award increased
from 0.48% to 1.8%, or 1.3 percentage points. Thus, the fraction of growth in SSI that can be
attributed to rising rates of special education can be calculated as follows:
Fraction o f SSI Growth Explained by SpEd = ∆SpEd∗0.16∆SSI =
1.5∗0.16
1.3 = 0.18
Thus, approximately 18% of the increase in SSI can be attributed to rising special education
rates.
2.8 Discussion and Conclusion
The last 30 years have seen dramatic growth in the SSI program. A 1990 expansion to program
eligibility, which allowed children to qualify for SSI using school counselor and teacher iden-
tification of child disability, reduced the cost to apply and increased information on individual
eligibility. Eliminating these large barriers to program participation was expected to increase
program take-up. Despite the potential connection between special education and SSI, very little
evidence exists on how the two programs interact to provide services for disabled children. Aizer,
Gordon and Kearney (2013) find a positive correlation between the rate of special education in
a state and the child SSI caseload in the state. However, they found no correlation between the
rising rate of special education and applications to SSI, suggesting that special education would
affect the SSI roll only by reducing the likelihood that a child’s application is denied. Contrarily,
I find that receipt of special education induces an increase in both SSI applications and awards.
Using a fuzzy RD design, I estimate that children born just before the school cutoff date are
0.78 percentage points more likely to apply for SSI relative to children born just after the school
cutoff date. I find no evidence that children born just before the cutoff date are more likely to
have their application denied. Rather children born just before the cutoff date are 0.55 percentage
82
points more likely to have an award for SSI, and 0.52 percentage points more likely to have an
award for a mental impairment relative to children born directly after the school cutoff date.
I find no increase in awards among groups in which there is no expected interaction between
school-starting-age and disability: including physical impairments and children too young to
enroll in school. Further, I find no discontinuity in applications and awards for children in which
there is no expected special education to SSI channel, i.e.: those enrolled in primary school prior
to Zebley. My estimates are robust to a wide range of specification choices and are significantly
larger than nearby placebo dates.
Two-sample fuzzy RD estimates indicate that a 1 percentage point increase in the fraction
of children receiving special education services induces a 0.23 percentage point increase in the
fraction of children who apply for SSI and a 0.16 percentage point increase in the fraction of
children with an award for SSI. Given that only 1.6% of the child population has an SSI award,
my estimates indicate that a 1 percentage point increase in the fraction of children receiving
special education services induces a 10% increase in the SSI caseload. My estimates indicate
that approximately 18% of the growth in the child SSI caseload can be attributed to rising rates
of special education and spillovers between these two programs.
Identifying a causal channel between special education and SSI is important for three rea-
sons. First, SSI is indispensable for the families receiving payments. SSI for children has been
shown to significantly reduce the prevalence of poverty (Duggan and Kearney, 2007). This is, in
large part, due to the fact that SSI is means-tested, and children receiving SSI are significantly
more disadvantaged than the average child (Duggan, Kearney and Rennane, 2015; Rupp et al.,
2006; Deshpande, 2016b). On average, SSI payments account for nearly half the income of the
child’s family and provide important stabilization of income effects (Rupp et al., 2006; Desh-
pande, 2016a). Further, Coe and Rutledge (2013) show that children who received SSI due to the
Zebley expansion had greater labor force attachment in adulthood and were less likely to claim
welfare as an adult. Thus, the special education channel to SSI enables access to resources for
these highly disadvantaged youth.
Second, there are unintended consequences of local special education screening policies
which affect the federal disability roll. Since the true prevalence of child disability is unknown,
it’s possible that children born before the cutoff date are being over-diagnosed, children born just
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after the cutoff date are under-diagnosed, or more likely a combination of both. Regardless, de-
clining special education enrollment since 2005 will unintentionally affect the SSI roll. Schools
facing budget shortfalls are faced with increasing pressures to keep children out of special ed-
ucation services.43 Recent works suggest that children with mental impairments are the most
likely to be affected when a school faces financial incentives to change the population of stu-
dents receiving special education services (Cullen, 2003). Therefore, there may be unintended
consequences of declining special education enrollments for low-income children on the margin
of qualifying for SSI.
Third, it implies that special education provides a previously unaccounted for benefit to low-
income children eligible for SSI benefits. While special education students comprise 13% of all
students and receive about 18% of all funding for public schools (USDE, 2015), little evidence
exists on the effectiveness of special education due to the challenge of identifying a suitable
control group (Hanushek, Kain and Rivkin, 2002). Regardless of where the literature stands on
the costs and benefits of special education, this study identifies a benefit provided to low-income
children eligible for services. Future research examining the benefits of special education should
consider the option-value of applying for SSI benefits.
43In 2004, Texas implemented a rule limiting special education services to 8.5% of the population (Rosenthal,
2018). Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Utah, and Wisconsin
now offer vouchers for children with disabilities to attend private schools, which are not bound to uphold the require-
ments of IDEA (EdChoice, 2018, The Wrightslaw Way, 2010). Further, Winters and Greene (2007) argue that the
advent of special education voucher programs will disincentivize schools from diagnosing children with disabilities
since each student identified as needing special education services will become a voucher-eligible student who is able
to take their public-education dollars away from the public school.
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CHAPTER 3
THE IMPACT OF THE EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT ON CHILD DISABILITY1
3.1 Introduction
In 2017, approximately 1.2 million children between the ages of 0 and 18 received Supplemental
Security Income (SSI) for a childhood disability (Social Security Administration, 2017a). De-
spite the generous cash benefits, the youth on SSI tend to be particularly disadvantaged with high
rates of school dropout, low employment rates in early adulthood, and high arrest rates (Desh-
pande, 2016b; Deshpande, 2016a). A recent literature has shown that the Earned Income Tax
Credit (EITC) reduces the prevalence of child poverty, increases child health, and increases chil-
dren’s academic achievement (Hoynes and Patel, 2014; Short, 2014; Dahl and Lochner, 2012).
I test whether exposure to a larger EITC payment as a child affects the likelihood that a child
receives disability payments between the ages of 15 and 18. Using a difference-in-differences
analysis, I show that exposure to a larger EITC benefit as a child reduces the likelihood of re-
ceiving SSI payments between the ages of 15 and 18. I find no evidence that the channel through
which SSI diminishes is through improvements in child health.
Growth in the child SSI caseload has been linked to the 1990 liberalization of medical el-
igibility criteria for children; state incentives, which encouraged states to shift children from
traditional welfare to SSI (Kubik, 1999; Kubik, 2003), and rising rates of special education
(Benson, 2019). Various aspects of the SSI program raise the possibility of interactions with
state, local, and other federal programs. For example, SSI often provides automatic enrollment
in Medicaid, SSI recipients have particularly high participation in SNAP, and evidence suggests
fiscal spillovers between AFDC and SSI (Duggan, Kearney and Rennane, 2015). However, few
studies have examined how aspects of the current social safety net interact with the SSI pro-
gram. Since its introduction in 1975, the EITC has grown to be one of the biggest and least
1The research reported herein was performed pursuant to a grant from the U.S. Social Security Administration
(SSA) funded as part of the Disability Research Consortium. The opinions and conclusions expressed are solely those
of the author(s) and do not represent the opinions or policy of SSA or any agency of the Federal Government. Neither
the United States Government nor any agency thereof, nor any of their employees, makes any warranty, expressed or
implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of the contents
of this report. Reference herein to any specific commercial product, process, or service by trade name, trademark,
manufacturer, or otherwise does not necessarily constitute or imply endorsement, recommendation or favoring by the
United States Government or any agency thereof.
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controversial elements of the US safety net (Nichols and Rothstein, 2015).
To estimate the effect of the EITC on SSI participation, I utilize individual level data from
the American Community Survey (ACS) and implement a difference-in-differences strategy. I
follow Bastian and Michelmore (2018) and generate a measure of EITC exposure which reflects
the cumulative maximum credit available to that individual based on their year of birth, state of
residence, and the number of qualifying children within the household. This strategy leverages
three sources of variation: first, federal expansions in the EITC for various family structures in
1990, 1994, and 2009; second, the introduction of state EITCs; and third, changes in family
structures across ages.
There are several reasons why the EITC may interact with the SSI program. The EITC is
one of the largest cash transfer programs in the United States. It has been shown to reduce
child poverty (Nichols and Rothstein, 2015) and improve child health (Hoynes, Miller and Si-
mon, 2015). Both improved child health and reduced child poverty should decrease a child’s
likelihood of being awarded SSI. However, receipt of the EITC may increase information about
safety net programs more generally and the SSI program in particular. Further, an increase in
cash-on-hand from the EITC may increase the likelihood that a child visits a doctor and has a
disability identified and treated. Therefore, the theoretical predictions between EITC and SSI
are ambiguous.
I find that exposure to an additional $1000 from the EITC each year between the ages of 0 and
18 reduces SSI participation by 0.34 percentage points (26%). Consistent with the hypothesis
that cash- on-hand affects children’s disability claims, I find that children are most responsive to
additional financial support at older ages; exposure to a larger EITC between the ages of 13 and
18 leads to the largest reduction in SSI claiming between the ages of 15 and 18. An additional
$1000 each year between 0 and 5 has no effect on SSI, exposure to an additional $1000 each
year between 6 and 12 reduces the likelihood of receiving SSI by 0.10 percentage point, and
exposure to an additional $1000 each year between the ages of 13 and 18 reduces the likelihood
of receiving SSI by 0.25 percentage points. As a robustness to the potential endogeneity of state
EITCs , I restrict cumulative exposure to the federal EITCs and I find qualitatively similar results.
However, point estimates are slightly larger, where I find that exposure to an additional $1000
each year between 0 and 18 in the federal EITCs reduces SSI participation by 0.45 percentage
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points (35%). Again, exposure to the EITC at older ages has a largest impact on reducing SSI
participation between ages 15 and 18.
I examine two potential channels through which exposure to the EITC reduces participation
with the SSI program. First, the EITC provides additional resources to low-income households.
This “income effect” could lead to improvements in long-run outcomes through improved health
of the child. Second, mothers may increase their labor supply along either the intensive or ex-
tensive margin as a response to the EITC. This increase in a family’s earned income may make
families ineligible for the SSI program due to the assets and earnings tests. I find no evidence
that the channel through which exposure to the EITC reduces SSI participation is through im-
proved health. I find that exposure to an additional $1000 in EITC each year does not reduce the
likelihood a child reports a cognitive impairment, has a small and insignificant effect on the like-
lihood a child reports a vision impairment, and increases the likelihood a child reports a physical
impairment by 0.12 percentage points (12%).
I similarly find no evidence supporting the second hypothesis, that the EITC increases fam-
ily income through increased labor supply of the mother. Exposure to a larger EITC does not
increase the likelihood that a mother is employed. Ninety-five percent confidence intervals rule
out increases in maternal labor supply greater than 0.2 percentage points (0.3%). Given that
exposure in the later years has the largest effect of disability recipiency, these estimates seem
to suggest that additional cash-on-hand affects a family’s decision to apply for child disability,
despite no change in the child’s eligibility for SSI. This means that families may use the EITC
and SSI as substitutes.
I contribute to the literature in three ways. First, I expand the nascent literature examining
spillovers among social safety net policies (Elwell, 2019; Levere, Orzol, Leininger and Early,
2019). Importantly, I identify how a federal policy like the EITC can reduce the child disability
roll. This finding is particular important to policymakers and the Social Security Administration.
Second, I augment the growing literature on how the EITC affects children (Dahl and Lochner,
2012 and Bastian and Michelmore, 2018). Similar to Bastian and Michelmore (2018) these
results indicate that the EITC has long-lasting impacts on children growing up in low-income
households, with declines in child disability at older ages. The ability of the EITC to reduce
child SSI participation suggests that anti-poverty programs are an effective avenue to reduce the
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SSI disability roll. Third, I expand the literature on the child SSI program. In particular, I find
that antipoverty programs, like the EITC, have the ability to reduce the child disability roll. This
finding is important because previous literature has found little empirical evidence that other
safety net programs interact with the child SSI program2
A persistent concern of policymakers and the Social Security Administration has been the
rapid growth of the child SSI program (Aizer, Gordon and Kearney, 2013). A descriptive report
by Aizer, Gordon and Kearney (2013) highlight five factors that may contribute to the growing
SSI caseload. First, there may be a broader set of diagnoses in the population at large; second,
there may be spillovers between health insurance and SSI; third, there may be spillovers between
special education and SSI; fourth, there may be an increase in child poverty leading more chil-
dren to turn to disability; and lastly, there may be a reduction of SSI terminations. Research on
these five hypotheses are ongoing, and this project tangentially speaks to the fourth hypothesis.3
In 2015 the EITC disbursed over $68.5 billion to 28.1 million tax filers (Faulk and Crandall-
Hollick, 2018), making it one of the largest safety net programs in the US. Research unequivo-
cally finds substantial positive impacts of the EITC on low-income families. For example, the
EITC has been shown to increase labor force participation of single mothers (Eissa and Liebman,
1996), increase family income (Dahl, DeLeire and Schwabish, 2011), and reduce the likelihood
a child lives in poverty (Hoynes and Patel, 2014). To the extent that the EITC reduces the preva-
lence of child poverty it may be associated with decreases in child disability.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 provides background information about the
SSI program and the EITC. Section 3.3 discusses the data and sample. Section 3.4 presents
the empirical strategy. Section 3.5 outlines the change in disability for children differentially
exposed to the EITC. And Section 3.6 concludes with a discussion.
2 For example, see Levere et al. (2019).
3Aizer et al. (2013) find no evidence that increased diagnoses in the population at large has contributed to increases
in the SSI caseload. Levere et al. (2019) find that Medicaid expansions did not induce an increase in SSI applications
or awards. Benson (2019) finds that rising rates of special education substantially contributed to the rising SSI
caseload.
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3.2 Institutional Framework
3.2.1 Supplemental Security Income for Children
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) is a federally funded program designed to support blind
and disabled individuals who have limited financial resources (SSA, 2014). Originally SSI was
a small program primarily serving the elderly population. However, in 2017, the federal gov-
ernment spent approximately $9.6 billion on SSI cash benefits to 1.2 million children (Social
Security Administration, 2018a). In terms of total spending, SSI is now second only to Medicaid
among means-tested programs (Duggan and Kearney, 2007). Growth in child SSI was facilitated
by the 1990 Sullivan v. Zebley Supreme Court decision, which liberalized the standards for a
child to qualify for SSI based on mental or emotional disorders (Kubik, 1999; Duggan, Kearney
and Rennane, 2015).
To qualify for SSI the child must be under 18 (or have developed the disability prior to
turning 18), not be working or earning more than $1070 a month, have a physical or mental
condition that results in “marked and severe functional limitations,” and the child’s conditions
must be expected to be disabling for a minimum of 12 months or result in death. In the child
SSI program, income and assets of the parent, referred to as “deemed income,” are used to
determine both financial eligibility and the monthly benefit amount.4 In 2015, the federal benefit
rate (FBR), or the maximum monthly benefit level, was $733 for individuals and $1100 for
couples. While, the average monthly payment varies greatly by age group, children receive the
most generous payments (Duggan, Kearney and Rennane, 2015).5
SSI for children has been shown to significantly reduce the prevalence of poverty. Using
an event study design Duggan and Kearney (2007) show that enrolling a child in SSI increases
household income by $400 per month without a significant offset from other transfer programs
or earnings. This is, in large part, due to the fact that SSI is means-tested, and children receiving
SSI are significantly more disadvantaged than the average child. Most children receiving SSI
4Deductions for parents and other children living in the home are subtracted from the deemed income. In 2017, a
single parent family with one disabled child and one non-disabled child could earn approximately $3000 in monthly
income and still qualify for a small child SSI payment (Social Security Administration, 2018d).
5An SSI recipient’s monthly benefit falls below the FBR if a family member has income (either earned or un-
earned). Child eligibility is based on the same asset limit and income eligibility as adults and includes both the
child’s and parent’s assets.
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payments live in single mother households, and fewer than 1/3 live with both parents (Duggan,
Kearney and Rennane, 2015; Rupp, Davies, Newcomb, Iams, Becker, Mulpuru, Ressler, Romig
and Miller, 2006; Deshpande, 2016a). Further, half of SSI children reported living in a house-
hold with at least one other individual with a disability (Rupp et al., 2006). On average, SSI
payments accounted for nearly half the family’s income and provide important stabilization of
income effects (Rupp et al., 2006; Deshpande, 2016a). Despite the benefits of SSI, youth on
SSI remain particularly disadvantaged. According to Deshpande (2016b) SSI youth with mental
impairments have high school dropout rates around 45% and arrest rates around 28%.6 Fur-
ther, former SSI youth have employment rates between 30 and 50 % when they reach adulthood
(Deshpande, 2016b). Thus, understanding ways in which government programs may reduce the
prevalence of child disability is important.
Similar to this study, Levere et al. (2019) examine an interaction between the child SSI pro-
gram and a large social safety net program, Medicaid. They find that expansions in children’s
health insurance, through Medicaid and SCHIP, neither increased nor decreased the SSI roll.
However, for the subset of states that did not automatically grant Medicaid to SSI child recip-
ients, expansions to Medicaid reduced SSI applications. They find that a 10% increase in the
share of children covered by Medicaid reduced SSI applications by 5%. My work builds on the
literature of spillovers between social safety net programs for low-income and disabled children,
where I find that expansions to the EITC significantly reduced the likelihood that a child reports
income from SSI.
3.2.2 The Earned Income Tax Credit
The EITC is a refundable tax credit that provides an annual earnings subsidy to low-income
working parents. Eligibility for the EITC is based on family structure and family earned income.
A primary feature of the EITC is presence of a “qualifying child” in the household. A child
qualifies if the child is under the age of 19 and resides in the household for at least half of the tax
year.7 The second eligibility criteria is earned income. To qualify for the EITC earnings must
be positive yet remain below a threshold that varies with family size. In 2014, this maximum
6Importantly, mental conditions including ADHD, speech delay, and autism spectrum disorder have accounted for
nearly all the expansion in the SSI caseload since 1998 (Aizer, Gordon and Kearney, 2013; Deshpande, 2016b).
7A child can also qualify if they are under 24 and a full-time student or permanently disabled.
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threshold was $48,378 per year for a family with two children. Take-up of EITC is high: between
80 to 86% of eligible families take-up the EITC, and take-up is highest among families with
children (Scholz, 1994; Jones, 2014).
Since its inception in 1975 the EITC has received bipartisan support with expansions au-
thorized by both democratic and republican congresses. The EITC structure features a phase-in
range, in which benefits increase as a function of earnings, a plateau region in which benefits are
constant with respect to earnings, and a phase-out region, in which benefits decrease as a func-
tion of earned income (see Figure 3.1 for the 2018 EITC benefit schedule). For a comprehensive
history of the EITC see Nichols and Rothstein (2015), here I provide a brief summary of the
relevant changes to the EITC. In 1975 the EITC provided a 10% subsidy rate with a maximum
credit of $400 and a 10% phase-out rate for incomes over $6000; this credit was only eligible to
families with children. In 1990, a more generous schedule for families with two or more children
was introduced. The largest expansion of the EITC occurred in the mid-1990s.
Figure 3.1: 2017 Earned Income Tax Credit Schedule by Number of Children
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Data source: Authors calculations based on data provided by the Tax Policy Center, Urban
Institute and Brookings Institution.
In 1994, the EITC was increased sharply particularly for families with two or more chil-
dren for whom the credit was roughly doubled. In 2002, a separate schedule was introduced for
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married couples and single parents, however these schedules were not vastly different from one
another. The latest change in the EITC schedule occurred in 2009 with the American Recovery
and Reinvestment Act (ARRA). The 2009 expansion increased maximum credits and introduced
a more generous schedule for families with three or more children. Figure 3.2 presents a graph-
ical representation of the changes in the maximum EITC for different family sizes by tax year.
In addition to federal expansion of the EITC, 29 states and the District of Columbia have intro-
duced their own EITCs. Typically these refundable credits (although some are non-refundable)
are a percentage of the federal EITC. In 2017, state credits ranged from 4% of the federal EITC
for a one child family in Wisconsin to 85% of the federal EITC in California. Table 3.1 presents
a summary of state EITCs, which were introduced prior to 2017.
Figure 3.2: EITC Maximum Benefit, By Tax Year and Number of Children ($2013)
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Data Source: Author’s calculations based on the maximum credit reported in Table 1 by
Nichols and Rothstein (2015).
The EITC has been shown to have large impacts on low income families, primarily through
increased labor supply of single mothers (Eissa and Liebman, 1996). Further, expansions of the
EITC in the mid-1990s were associated with a large decline in child poverty rates. See Nichols
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Table 3.1: State Earned Income Tax Credit
State
Year EITC Generosity
Introduced (as fraction of Federal EITC)
(1) (2)
California 2015 85∗
Colorado 2015 10
Connecticut 2011 30
District of Columbia 2000 40
Delaware 2005 20
Iowa 1989 17
Illinois 2000 10
Indiana 1999 9
Kansas 1998 17
Louisiana 2007 3.5
Massachusetts 1997 23
Maryland 1987 26
Maine 2000 5
Michigan 2006 6
Minnesota 1991 24
Nebraska 2006 10
New jersey 2000 30
New Mexico 2007 10
New York 1994 30
Ohio 2013 10
Oklahoma 2002 5
Oregon 1997 8
Rhode Island 1986 15
Virginia 2004 20
Vermont 1988 32
Wisconsin 1989 34
Data source: National Conference of State Legislatures.
Notes: States not listed in the table do not have a state EITC, these include the following: Alaska,
Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Kentucky, Missouri, Missis-
sippi, Montana, North Carolina, North Dakota, New Hampshire, Nevada, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming.
∗California provides a state EITC of 85% the federal EITC for families earning up to ½ the
phase-in region, approximately $7000.
97
and Rothstein (2015) for a comprehensive summary on the literature linking EITC expansions
and child poverty. Further, introduction of state EITCs have been associated with increases in the
likelihood that families below the poverty line in one year have earnings above the poverty line
in the subsequent year (Neumark and Wascher, 2001). Overall, the US Census Bureau estimates
that the EITC has lifted 4.7 million children out of poverty (Nichols and Rothstein, 2015).
The literature consistently finds that children benefit greatly from the EITC. Hoynes, Miller
and Simon (2015) find that the EITC led to a reduction in low birth weight children, Dahl and
Lochner (2012) find that additional income from the EITC increases child test scores by 6 per-
cent of a standard deviation, and Bastian and Michelmore (2018) find the EITC increases the
likelihood of high school graduation, the likelihood of college enrollment, and early career earn-
ings. Due to the anti-poverty capabilities of the EITC and its ability to improve the health and
academic outcomes of children, it is likely that the EITC may diminish the likelihood a child
participates in the SSI disability program.
Owing to the EITC’s administration through the tax code, EITC eligibility does not directly
impact participation in other social programs such as SNAP, TANF, or SSI. Further, SSI pay-
ments do not count towards earned income, nor does the EITC refund count towards the SSI
income limit. Therefore, there is no mechanical relationship between the EITC benefit amount
and individual eligibility for SSI. However, Nichols and Rothstein (2015) note that there may
be important interactions between EITC take-up with participation in other programs. Impor-
tantly, Caputo (2006) finds that food stamp receipt tripled the odds of filing for the EITC, but
finds no statistically significant correlation with SSI or TANF. In contrast, Jones (2014) finds
that EITC receipt conditional on eligibility is negatively associated with adult SSI participation.
I contribute to this literature by testing whether exposure to a larger EITC as a child reduces
the likelihood a child participates in the SSI program between the ages of 15 and 18. Similar to
Jones (2012), I find that exposure to a larger EITC reduces participation with the SSI program.
3.3 Data
The main source of data utilized comes from the IPUMS-American Community Survey (ACS).
The ACS is the largest household survey in the United States. Conducted by the Census Bureau,
the ACS surveys approximately 3 million households annually. The ACS is a mandatory survey
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with responses collected via mail or through an online portal. Of particular benefit, the ACS
collects information on all members within the residence and includes questions pertaining to
income sources including SSI for all household members over the age of 15.
I use survey years 2001 through 2017, and each survey year represents approximately 1%
of the US population.8 To construct the main sample, I first generate a measure for whether
the individual is a dependent child. Dependent children are defined as being younger that 19,
or under age 25 and attending college. I further restrict to individuals who are listed as the
child, stepchild, or grandchild of the head of household. The ACS is a repeated cross-section;
therefore, I use an individual’s family composition at the time of the survey to back out the
number of qualifying children within the household for each year of the child between the ages
of 0 and 18. I then use information on the maximum federal and state EITC from the Tax
Policy Center and the National Conference of State Legislatures to generate the main treatment
measure, EITC exposure. EITC exposure is the sum of all maximum federal and state credits
an individual was eligible to receive starting at age 0 through the survey year. Credit amounts
are indexed to 2013 dollars and annualized by dividing by the child’s age. Figure 3.3 depicts the
variation in cumulative EITC for the sampled population.
Because information on SSI is only available for individuals over the age of 15, I restrict the
final analysis sample to be all dependent children aged 15-18. This leaves me with 2,131,221
observations. These individuals experience various levels of the EITC, depending on their year
of birth, state of residence, and family size at each age. The main benefit of the ACS is its large
sample size as well as its high response rate. However, due to the survey time frame, 2001-2017,
a major limitation of the ACS is the inability to view the contemporaneous change in disability
claims during the large federal expansion in the early-1990s. Thus, I supplement my analysis
using the IPUMS-Current Population Survey (CPS). I construct the CPS sample in an analogous
fashion to the ACS. Using survey years 1970-2017, I limit the sample to dependent children born
between 1952 and 2002. The final sample includes 463,361 individuals.
Table 3.2 presents descriptive statistics for the main analysis sample. Approximately 1.3%
of all children report income from SSI, 4.4% report a cognitive impairment, 1.4% report a visual
8In years 2001-2004 only 0.4% of the US population is represented. Results are robust to limiting analysis to
survey years 2005-2017.
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Figure 3.3: Cumulative Exposure to Federal EITC, by Year and Number of Children in House-
hold
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Data source: American Community Survey years 2001-2017 (panel a) and Current Population
Survey years 1975-2017 (panel b).
Notes: Cumulative exposure to the maximum state and federal EITC is constructed as the sum
of maximum federal and state credits available to a child’s family based on year of birth,
number of qualifying children within the household, and state of residence.
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impairment, and 1% report a physical impairment. Approximately 14% live in a household
with a reported income that falls below 100% of the federal poverty level (FPL). And 65%
have a mother that is currently in the labor force. Race has been defined as mutually exclusive
indicators, thus Hispanic represents an individual who reported they are non-white, non-black
and Hispanic. The majority of the sample is white (70%), 14% are black, and 19% are Hispanic.
Table 3.2: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev
(Fraction) (1) (2)
SSI Income 0.013 0.114
Cognitive Impairment 0.044 0.204
Visual Impairment 0.014 0.116
Physical Impairment 0.010 0.100
Below FPL 0.143 0.350
Mom Employed 0.654 0.476
Adult Population Disabled 0.024 0.008
Adult Population Unemployed 0.050 0.014
Black 0.145 0.352
Hispanic 0.189 0.392
White 0.706 0.456
Female 0.483 0.500
Low Educated Mother 0.437 0.496
Single Mother 0.333 0.471
Number of Children in Household 2.045 0.789
Cumulative Exposure to Federal EITC (Annualized in $1000) 3.287 0.964
Cumulative Exposure to Federal and State EITC (Annualized in $1000) 3.478 1.098
Contemporary Maximum Federal EITC ($1000) 4.443 1.141
Contemporary Maximum Federal and State EITC ($1000) 4.755 1.328
N 2,131,221
Data source: American Community Survey 2001-2017.
Notes: Data include children born between 1983 and 2002 who were between the ages of 15 and
18 at the time of the survey and are classified as the child, stepchild, or grandchild of the head of
household.
Children in my sample typically have a sibling. Approximately 30% of the sample has no
sibling, 40% have one sibling, and 30% have more than one sibling; the average household thus
has 2 children. The average child is exposed to a federal EITC of $3,870 each year, during
the survey year the average EITC maximum credit is $4,086 indicating that the EITC is more
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generous in later years. Summary statistics for the CPS sample are similar and are reported in
Appendix Table A1.
3.4 Empirical Strategy
The ideal experiment to determine how receipt of EITC affects child SSI awards would be to
randomly assign some children to families that receive the EITC and some children to families
that do not receive the EITC and comparing SSI awards among those from the treated to those
in the control group. This is not feasible for financial and political reasons. Therefore, I use
exogenously induced changes to the EITC schedule that differentially affect children in differ-
ent states, born in different years, with greater or fewer qualifying dependent children in the
household to identify the effect of the EITC on SSI recipiency.
To test whether the EITC affects the likelihood of claiming child SSI, I follow Bastian and
Michelmore (2018) by defining exposure to the EITC as the maximum federal and state credit
a child’s family could potentially receive given their state of residence, family size, and the tax
year. This measure is independent of actual family income and parental marital status. For each
individual in the sample, EITC is cumulated from the year an individual is age 0 to the year an
individual appears in the ACS at age 15 to 18. The value of EITC exposure varies over time for
an individual based on federal and state policy changes to the EITC as well as changes in family
size. For instance, a first born child will receive the federal and state maximum credit for a one
child family until the year a second child is born. Once a second child enters the family, both
children will be assigned the maximum federal and state credit of a two child family for that year
and state. Once the oldest child turns 19, the second child will be assigned the maximum federal
and state credit for a one child household until he turns 19.
Variation in EITC exposure stems from three primary source: (1) the year the individual was
born, (2) the state an individual resides, and (3) the number of children in the household in each
year. I leverage the exogenous variation in federal and state expansions for children residing in
various family structures in a difference-in-differences framework. Specifically, I estimate the
following equation:
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SSIits = α+ω1Cumulative EITC(0−18)+ γXi+ τt +θs+
A
∑
a=0
piait +ρc+ εits (3.1)
where SSIits is an indicator for whether individual i, residing in state s receives income from
the SSI program in year t. Cumulative EITC(0−18) is the treatment measure, which is the annual
cumulative maximum state and federal EITC the individual was eligible to receive based on year
of birth, state of birth, and number of siblings for each year since age 0 (in thousands of dollars).
Year, state, and birth-year fixed effects are included and denoted as τt , ϑs, and ρc, respectively. I
further control for number of children in the household each year for ages a ∈ (0,A), denoted by
piaits. Individual characteristics including gender, race, an indicator for whether the mother has a
high school diploma or less, and an indicator for a single mother are included in the vector Xi. I
further control for the statewide unemployment rate and statewide adult SSI disability rate.9
The coefficient of interest in equation (3.1) is ω1, which represents the impact of an addi-
tional $1000 each year since age 0 on subsequent child disability. In the fully specified model
variation in the maximum EITC is driven by differences in EITC generosity across and within
states over time, family size, and year of birth. Inclusion of year, state, and age-by-siblings fixed
effects will control for any fixed differences across states, years, or family size. Thus, identifica-
tion primarily comes from three sources: (1) federal expansions to the EITC schedule for larger
families in 1990, 1994, and 2009, (2) introduction of state EITC across years, and (3) changes
within a family structure across ages.
The main identifying assumption in equation (3.1) is the following: absent the expansions of
the maximum credit in the EITC, children with varying family sizes across all states would have
the same trends in disability, ceteris paribus. That is, conditional on state and year fixed effects,
trends in child disability among children in single child households is an accurate counterfactual
for trends among children with siblings. I test the validity of this assumption using event-study
analysis. Further, specifications in which state variation is removed and exogenous variation is
limited to changes in the federal EITC schedule and family composition show qualitatively and
quantitatively similar results.
To test the hypothesis that early childhood investment in health drives the reduction in child
9The unemployment and disability rate are calculated from the ACS or CPS as the fraction of adults aged 19-64
in each state and year who are unemployed or claim SSI income, respectively.
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disability, I disaggregate the cumulative exposure measure to three age ranges (0 to 5, 6 to 12,
and 13 to 18). If the main mechanism through which EITC affects child disability is through
improved health at younger ages, I would expect to find the largest decreases in SSI claiming
from exposure at earlier ages. If however, cash-on-hand affects disability decisions, I may expect
that exposure to a larger EITC at older ages has the largest impact on disability claims. To
disentangle these two hypotheses, I estimate the following model:
SSIits = α+β1EITC(0−15)+β2EITC(6−12)+β3EITC(13−A)
+γXi+ τt +θs+
A
∑
a=0
piait +ρc+ εits (3.2)
where EITCi(0−5), EITCi(6−12), EITCi(13−A) represents the annual cumulative maximum
EITC the individual was eligible to receive when the child was between the ages 0 to 5, 6 to 12,
and 13 to age at time of survey, respectively. All other variables are as shown in equation 3.1.
The coefficients of interest are β1, β2, and β3 which represents the impact of an additional $1000
each year when the child was 0 to 5, 6 to 12, and after 13 on subsequent disability income. As in
equation 3.1 exogenous variation stems from differences in EITC generosity across and within
states, family size, and year of birth.
While the ACS does not allow a difference-in-differences analysis of the 1994 EITC expan-
sion, it does allow a difference-in-differences analysis using the 2009 ARRA expansion to the
EITC which increased generosity for families with three qualifying children relative to families
with 2 qualifying children. I estimate the following difference-in-differences specification:
SSIits = α+δ1Post 2009t ∗ (3+ kids)its+δ2(3+ kids)its+ γXi+ τt +θS+ρc+ξits (3.3)
where SSIits is an indicator that individual i, residing in state s, reports receipt of SSI in year
t. The indicator 3+ kid takes the value of 1 if the child resides in a household with 3 or more
qualifying dependents (the child has 2 or more siblings). Post2009 is an indicator that the survey
year is after 2009. Similar to equation (3.1) I include year, state, and birth year fixed effects, and
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a vector of individual controls. The coefficient of interest is δ1, which measures the difference-
in-differences estimate for children with two or more siblings after the small federal expansion in
2009. This model is restricted to families with 2 or more qualifying children, thereby dropping
all one child families.
The model is identified by comparing changes in SSI receipt when the federal expansion in
2009 is introduced across families with three or more children compared to families with two
children. Inclusion of year, state, and number of qualifying children fixed effects picks up any
fixed differences in SSI claims by state, year, or household size. The underlying assumption is
that absent the expansion to the EITC children with two or more siblings and children with one
sibling would trend similarly in disability claims after 2009. I test this assumption using an event
study.
Next, I follow Hoynes, Miller and Simon (2015) where I utilize the contemporaneous maxi-
mum federal and state credit available to an individual given the year, their family size, and their
state of residence. Specifically, I estimate the following equation:
SSIitsk = α+λ1maximum credittsk +δk + γXi+ τt +θS+ρc+ εitsk (3.4)
where SSIitsk is an indicator for whether individual i, living in state s, with k qualifying
children in the household reports income from SSI in year t. Maximum Credit is the dollar
value (in thousands) of the maximum federal and state EITC available to an individual based on
the federal schedule (in which generosity is determined by the year), the number of qualifying
children in the household, and the individual’s state. I include number of qualifying children
fixed effects which are denoted by δk. The coefficient of interest is λ1, which measures the effect
of an additional $1000 increase in EITC benefit for someone with k qualifying children in the
household. Similar to my main analysis, identification comes from multiple sources, (1) federal
expansions to the EITC based on the year and (2) introduction of state ETICs.
The largest expansion to the EITC occurred between 1993 and 1994. Data limitations in the
ACS do not allow me to examine the immediate effect of the EITC expansion on children in
1994. Therefore, I supplement analyses using the CPS. I implement an analogous difference-
in-differences strategy to equation (3.3) using the large federal expansion in 1994 on child SSI.
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Specifically, I estimate the following equation:
SSIits = α+δ1Post 1994t ∗ siblingis+δ2siblingis+ γXi+ τt +θS+ρc+ξits (3.5)
where SSIits is an indicator that individual i, residing in state s, reports receipt of SSI in year
t. Sibling is an indicator for the individual lives in a household with two or more dependent
children (the child has one or more siblings), Post1994 is an indicator that the survey year is
after 1994. Again, I include year, state, and birth-year fixed effects, and a vector of individual
controls. The coefficient of interest is δ1, which measures the difference-in-differences estimate
for children with one or more siblings after the large federal expansion in 1994.
The model is identified by comparing changes in SSI receipt when the federal expansion in
1994 is introduced across families with two or more children compared to families with only
one child. Inclusion of year, state, and number of qualifying children fixed effects picks up any
fixed differences in SSI claims by state, year, or household size. The underlying assumption
is that absent the expansion to the EITC children with siblings and children without siblings
would trend similarly in disability claims after 1994. I test this assumption using an event study.
Finally, I estimate models analogous to equations 3.3 and 3.4 using the CPS data.
3.5 Results
To begin analysis, I first test the underlying assumptions of the model. Figure 3.4 plots the
fraction of children on SSI by family size and year. As can be seen in panel (a) there was a
large change in the fraction of children reporting SSI income in ACS survey year 2010 relative
to year 2009. However, it is not differentially reported for one child, two child or three plus child
families. The difference-in-differences analysis using the 2009 ARRA expansion in the EITC
will difference off the change in reporting for those years. As can be seen, children living in one
child families report the highest rates of receiving SSI, and children living in a three child family
are more slightly likely to claim SSI income than children in two child families. After the 2009
expansion in the EITC, the gap between two child families and three child families diminishes,
and the fraction of one child households that report SSI income falls.
Panel (b) plots the fraction of SSI recipients using the CPS. As can be seen the change in
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Figure 3.4: Supplemental Security Income, by Year and Number of Children in Household
(a) ACS (b) CPS 1995-2017
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Data source: American Community Survey years 2001-2017 (panel a), Current Population
Survey years 2001-2017 (panel b), and Current Population Survey 1975-2010 (panel c).
Notes: SSI is measured as whether the individual (aged 15-18) claims income from
Supplemental Security Income. In 2009, the EITC was expanded for families with 3 or more
qualifying children relative to families with 2 qualifying children. It is important to note that
there appears to be a change in the fraction of families reporting SSI income in 2010 for ACS
respondents. This does not appear in the CPS. There was no change in the ACS questionnaire
in 2010, this creates a data challenge for analysis using the ACS.
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SSI reporting in 2010 does not appear in the CPS. Again, in the years immediately following
ARRA, the gap between three child families and two child families diminishes slightly. Panel
C compares one child families to two plus child families from 1975 through 2005. As in the
ACS, one child families report the highest rates of claiming SSI income. Importantly, disability
rates between one child and two plus child families trend similarly prior to 1994. After 1994,
the gap between one child families and two child families increases slightly, indicating that a
larger EITC to two child families may reduce their disability take-up even lower. However, these
series are noisy given the smaller sample size and how few children are on the disability roll. To
concretely explore the validity of the design, I estimate event study models.
3.5.1 Event Time Estimates
I begin with event study models of the two largest expansions to the EITC, OBRA 93 and ARRA
2009. In practice, I estimate equation (3.3) with a full set of year effects interacted with the
indicator for sibling (for OBRA93) and an indicator for multiple siblings (ARRA 2009). I then
plot the year by sibling(s) interactions. This allows examination of the pre-trends. Event study
models for ARRA 2009 are of the following form:
SSIits = α+
2017
∑
t=2001,t 6=2009
φt ∗ (3+ kids)is+δ2(3+ kids)is+ γXi+ τt +θs+ρc+ξits (3.6)
where 3+ kid is an indicator for the child lives in a 3 or more child family. The model is re-
stricted to children living in 2 or more child families. And all other variables are specified above.
The coefficients of interest are φt . I estimate an analogous specification using the OBRA93 ex-
pansion in which the variables of interest are a child living in 2+ kid family interacted with year
indicators.
Figure 3.5 plots the event study estimates for ARRA 2009 and OBRA93. In panel (a) there
are no estimated differences between children living in two-child families from those living in
three-child families prior to the policy change. After the 2009 policy change, children living
in three child families are no more or less likely than children in two child families to report
SSI income. Point estimates for years 2010 through 2012 are negative, but not statistically
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significant. Panel (b) shows that prior to the 1994 expansion to the EITC children in two plus
child families were no more likely to report SSI income relative to one child families. After the
policy in 1995, children in 2 child families were less likely to report SSI income, but this point
estimate is not statistically significant. These event study analyses while noisy provide evidence
that the underlying assumptions of the model hold.
3.5.2 Main Estimates
Table 3.3 presents estimates of ω1 from equation (3.1) and β1, β2, and β3 from equation (3.2).
Each column represents a separate regression and results are weighted using the person ACS
person weights.10 Columns (1) and (2) present estimates utilizing variation from changes in the
federal EITC, year of birth, and family composition, whereas columns (3) and (4) also include
information from state EITCs. I find that exposure to an additional $1000 each year from the
federal EITC reduces the likelihood that an individual receives SSI payments by 0.45 percentage
points. Given the base rate of SSI is 1.3 percentage points, this represents a 35% decline in the
likelihood an individual reports income from the SSI program. When variation from state EITC
credits are included, I find that exposure to an additional $1000 each year from the EITC reduces
the likelihood that a child reports income from the SSI program by 0.34 percentage points (26%).
While exposure to a larger EITC at all ages reduces disability receipt between ages 15 and
18, columns (2) and (4) both suggest that exposure to a larger EITC after age 13 has the greatest
impact on reducing child disability. Focusing on column 4, I find that exposure to an additional
$1000 each year between the ages of 0 and 5 reduces the likelihood that a child receives SSI
by 0.03 percentage points (but this is not statistically significant), an additional $1000 each year
between the ages of 6 and 12 reduces the likelihood that a child receives SSI by 0.10 percentage
points, and that exposure to an additional $1000 each year after age 13 reduces the likelihood
that a child receives SSI by 0.25 percentage points (19%). Estimates relying solely on variation
in the maximum federal EITC (column 2) are quantitatively similarly to estimates including the
state variation for exposure between ages 0 and 12. However, using information solely from the
federal EITC indicates that exposure to an additional $1000 each year from the federal EITC
reduces the likelihood that a child receives SSI by 0.43 percentage points (34%).
10Estimates are quantitatively similar when person weights are not used. See tables C.8 and C.9.
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Figure 3.5: Event Time Estimates of ARRA 2009 and OBRA93 on SSI Income, Children Age
15-18
(a) ARRA 2009
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Data source: American Community Survey years 2001-2017 (panel a) and Current Population
Survey years 1980-2005 (panel b).
Notes: Each figure plots coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from an event study analysis
where the coefficients are year dummies interacted with the treatment indicator (e.g. two
siblings versus one sibling in panel (a) or any sibling versus no siblings in panel (b)). See
equation (3.6) in the text for details. The specification includes the following controls: year
fixed effects, birth year fixed effects, state fixed effects, number of siblings fixed effects, child
gender, child race, the fraction of the adult population unemployed, the fraction of the adult
population on SSI, whether the child has a single mother, and whether the child has a low
educated mother. Panel (a) shows the effect of ARRA 2009 for three child families relative to
two child families. Panel (b) uses CPS data to estimate the impact of OBRA93 on families with
two children relative to families with one child.
110
Table 3.3: Cumulative Maximum Credit Estimates of EITC on SSI Award, Children Age 15-18
Federal EITC State & Federal EITC
Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Cumulative EITC (0-18) -0.0045*** -0.0034***
(0.0004) (0.0004)
Cumulative EITC (0-5) -0.0002 -0.0003
(0.0004) (0.0004)
Cumulative EITC (6-12) -0.0011* -0.0010**
(0.0006) (0.0004)
Cumulative EITC (13-18) -0.0043*** -0.0025***
(0.0007) (0.0004)
Dep. Mean 0.0130 0.0130 0.0130 0.0130
N 1,892,085 1,892,085 1,892,085 1,892,085
State FE YES YES YES YES
Birth Year FE YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Age x Nkids FE YES YES YES YES
Date source: American Community Survey years 2001-2017.
Notes: Each column is a separate regression of equation (3.1) or (3.2). Heteroskedasticity ro-
bust standard errors are clustered at the state level and reported in parentheses. Observations
are at the individual level and regressions are weighted using the survey person weight. The
specification includes the following controls: child gender, child race, the fraction of the adult
population unemployed, the fraction of the adult population on SSI, whether the child has a sin-
gle mother, and whether the child has a low educated mother. Cumulative EITC is annualized
across all years within the stated age range (e.g. 0-5, 6-12, 13-18, 0-18). EITC is measured in
thousands of 2013 real dollars. SSI is an indicator for the child reporting positive income from
the Supplemental Security Income program. * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level,
** indicates statistical significance at the 5% level, and *** indicates statistical significance at
the 1% level.
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Having shown that the EITC affects SSI receipt of children, I turn to the conventional
difference-in-differences strategy using the expansion in the EITC for children in 3 plus child
families relative to children in 2 child families. Column 1 of Table 3.4 presents the difference-
in-differences estimate, δ1, from Equation 3.3. I find that the expansion of the EITC in 2009
reduced SSI participation by 0.04 percentage points, however, this estimate is not statistically
different from zero. While the difference-in-differences estimate is not statistically significant,
this result does provide suggestive evidence that the EITC may affect SSI recipiency. There
are two reasons this difference-in-differences may be noisy. First, the expansion to the EITC in
2009 provided only a modest increase in EITC to families with three children versus two chil-
dren, therefore, it may not have been enough money to move families away from SSI. Second,
children may not immediately respond to expansions in the EITC as disability is an absorbing
state.
Using the contemporaneous maximum federal and state EITC I test how exposure to a larger
EITC affects contemporary SSI participation. Columns 2 and 3 of Table 3.4 present estimates
of λ1 from equation 3.4 using the maximum federal and combined maximum state and federal
EITC in each year as the treatment measure. I find that exposure to an additional $1000 from the
federal EITC in year t reduces the likelihood that the child claims SSI by 0.35 percentage points
(27%) and exposure to an additional $1000 in state and federal EITC reduces the likelihood that
a child reports income from SSI by 0.25 percentage points (19%). These estimates suggest that
children are benefiting from a larger EITC and are less likely to claim SSI when they are exposed
to a larger EITC.
To corroborate these findings, I supplement analyses using the Current Population Survey.
Importantly, the CPS allows for a difference-in-differences analysis of the largest expansion
to the EITC implemented in 1994. OBRA93 expanded the EITC for families with 2 or more
qualifying children relative to families with only 1 qualifying child. Column 1 of Table 3.5
reports the difference-in-differences estimate of OBRA93 on child SSI participation. I find that
OBRA reduced the likelihood that a child reports SSI income by 0.13 percentage points (16%).
However, this estimate is not statistically significant. It should be noted that estimates derived
from the CPS are expected to be noisier than estimates from the ACS due to sample size. The
CPS, derived from a much smaller samples size, is unlikely to identify an effect on an outcome
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Table 3.4: Difference-in-Differences and Maximum Credit Estimates of EITC on SSI Awards
ARRA 2009 Contemporary Contemporary State
Diff-in-Diff Federal EITC & Federal EITC
Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3)
Treatment Coef. -0.0004 -0.0035*** -0.0025***
(0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0003)
(0.0003) 0.0120 0.0130 0.0130
N 1,503,112 2,114,608 2,114,608
State FE YES YES YES
Birth Year FE YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES
Nkids FE NO YES YES
Date source: American Community Survey years 2001-2017.
Notes: Each column is a separate regression of equations (3.3) and (3.4). Heteroskedasticity
robust standard errors are clustered at the state level and reported in parentheses. Observations
are at the individual level and regressions are weighted using the survey person weight. The
specification includes the following controls: child gender, child race, the fraction of the adult
population unemployed, the fraction of the adult population on SSI, whether the child has a sin-
gle mother, and whether the child has a low educated mother. Contemporary EITC is measured
in thousands of 2013 real dollars. SSI is an indicator for the child reporting positive income from
the Supplemental Security Income program. * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level,
** indicates statistical significance at the 5% level, and *** indicates statistical significance at
the 1% level.
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that only affects 1% of the child population. Columns 3 through 6 report point estimates from
analogous regression as those reported in Table 3.3. Effects, while qualitatively similar, are not
statistically different from zero. Taken together, these estimates provide suggestive evidence
that the exposure to a larger EITC does reduce SSI take-up. I next turn to potential mechanisms
through which a larger EITC may affect child disability.
Table 3.5: Difference-in-Differences and Cumulative Maximum Credit Estimates of EITC on
SSI Awards, Current Population Survey
OBRA 93 Federal EITC State & Federal EITC
Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sibling*Post -0.0013
(0.0012)
Cumulative EITC (0-18) -0.0004 -0.0004
(0.0007) (0.0006)
Cumulative EITC (0-5) 0.0016 0.0017
(0.0014) (0.0012)
Cumulative EITC (6-12) -0.0025* -0.0018
(0.0015) (0.0011)
Cumulative EITC (13-18) 0.0011 0.0005
(0.0013) (0.0010)
Dep. Mean 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008
N 284,843 446,502 446,502 446,502 446,502
State FE YES YES YES YES YES
Birth Year FE YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES
Age x Nkids FE NO YES YES YES YES
Date source: Current Population Survey years 1975-2017.
Notes: Each column is a separate regression. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are clus-
tered at the state level and reported in parentheses. Observations are at the individual level and
regressions are weighted using the survey person weight. The specification includes the fol-
lowing controls: child gender, child race, the fraction of the adult population unemployed, the
fraction of the adult population on SSI, whether the child has a single mother, and whether the
child has a low educated mother. Cumulative EITC is annualized across all years within the
stated age range (e.g. 0-5, 6-12, 13-18, 0-18). EITC is measured in thousands of 2013 real
dollars. SSI is an indicator for the child reporting positive income from the Supplemental Secu-
rity Income program. * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** indicates statistical
significance at the 5% level, and *** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level.
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3.5.3 Mechanisms
The EITC may reduce a child’s participation with the SSI program through several channels.
First, the EITC has been shown to improve child birth weight (Hoynes, Miller and Simon, 2015)
and improve child test scores (Dahl and Lochner, 2012); therefore, the EITC may reduce the
likelihood a child presents with a physical or mental disability through improved health. Second,
the EITC has been shown to reduce the likelihood a child lives in poverty (Hoynes and Patel,
2014) and to increase the labor force participation of single mothers (Eissa and Liebman, 1996).
Therefore, the EITC may reduce a child’s eligibility for SSI through increases in family income
and increases in cash-on-hand. Each of these mechanisms could be at play simultaneously. I
test whether exposure to a larger EITC reduces the likelihood that a child reports a physical or
mental impairment and whether the child’s mother is employed.
Table 3.6 presents estimated coefficients from equations 3.1 and 3.2 using variation derived
from the maximum state and federal EITC.11 Columns (1) and (2) indicate that exposure to
a larger cumulative EITC does not reduce the likelihood that a child reports a cognitive work
impairment. However, I find suggestive evidence that the EITC may increase the likelihood that
a family has their child screened for physical impairments. Exposure to an additional $1000
each year between age 0 and 18 increases the likelihood that a child reports a physical work
impairment by 0.12 percentage points (12%), and this appears to be driven by exposure to a
larger EITC between the ages of 0 and 5. Lastly, I find no evidence that exposure to a larger
EITC affects the likelihood that the child reports a visual impairment. Point estimates are small
in magnitude and not statistically significant.
In Columns (7) and (8) I report estimates of equation (3.1) and (3.2) on whether a child’s
mother is currently in the labor force. I find no evidence that exposure to a larger EITC increases
a mother’s labor force participation in this sample. Exposure to an additional $1000 each year
between age 0 and 18 reduces a mother’s labor force participation by 0.33 percentage points
(0.48%). However, given the confidence interval, this point estimate appears to be a precise zero.
The 95% confidence interval rules out an increase in labor supply greater than 0.2 percentage
points (0.3%) or a reduction of labor supply greater than 0.87 percentage points (1.3%).
11Estimates derived solely from variation in the federal EITC are qualitatively and quantitatively similar. They are
reported in the Appendix.
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Taken together, these results indicate that the EITC reduces SSI participation through chan-
nels other than improvements in child health or increases in maternal labor supply. Rather, the
most likely remaining channel is that additional cash-on-hand reduces the likelihood of the fam-
ily seeking additional income from disability programs. This remains an open question to be
tested.
3.5.4 Heterogeneity and Subpopulation Estimates
While exposure to a larger EITC reduces the likelihood that a child participates in the SSI pro-
gram, effects may vary by child race or gender. In particular, because boys make up the majority
of the child SSI caseload, one may expect larger decreases in SSI participation for boys than for
girls. Table 3.7 presents estimates from equations 3.1 and 3.2 for girls and boys separately. I
find that exposure to an additional $1000 each year since age 0 reduces the likelihood that a girl
reports income from SSI by 0.30 percentage points (30%) while an additional $1000 each year
since age 0 reduces the likelihood that a boy reports income from SSI by 0.37 percentage points
(25%). While point estimates for boys are larger, the effect sizes-given the base rate of SSI in
the population-is similar. When disaggregating exposure to the EITC by age at time of exposure,
I find that girls are more responsive to a larger EITC between the ages of 6 and 12. In partic-
ular, I find that an annual $1000 increase in EITC exposure between ages 6 and 12 reduces the
likelihood that a girl reports SSI income by 0.17 percentage point (17%). Similar to aggregate
estimates, exposure after age 13 has the largest impact on current SSI participation. Exposure to
an additional $1000 each year since age 13 reduces the likelihood of SSI participation by 0.29
percentage points (19%) for boys and 0.21 percentage points (21%) for girls.
Columns 5-10 presents estimates disaggregated by child race. I find that non-Hispanic white
children receive the largest impact from exposure to a larger EITC; an additional $1,000 each
year since age 0 reduces the likelihood that a non-Hispanic white child reports income from the
SSI program by 0.35 percentage points (32%). Whereas exposure to an additional $1000 each
year since age 0 reduces the likelihood of SSI for a non-Hispanic black child by 0.43 percentage
points (18%) and reduces the likelihood of SSI for an Hispanic child by 0.26 percentage points
(24%).
Analysis have thus far included children in all families, regardless of parental characteristics
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or income. Because only low-income families are eligible to receive the EITC, we may expect
larger effects for children living in lower income families. However, family income may be
endogenous to the EITC, therefore, I stratify the sample by the educational attainment of the
mother. Children living with a mother who has completed a high school diploma or less are
classified as children with a low educated mother. Table 3.8 presents estimates of equations (3.1)
and (3.2) for the subsample of the population with a low-educated mother. I find that children
living with a mother with a high school diploma or less are less responsive to a larger EITC.
Column (3) indicates that exposure to an additional $1000 each year since age 0 reduces the
likelihood that a child receives SSI by 0.23 percentage points (14%). Again, I find that exposure
to a larger EITC at later ages have the largest impact on SSI participation. I find that exposure
to an additional $1000 each year since age 13 reduces the likelihood that a child receives SSI
income by 0.34 percentage points (21%). When variation is restricted to the federal EITC, I find
a much larger estimate between ages 13 and 18; exposure to an additional $1000 each year after
13 reduces the likelihood that a child reports income from SSI by 0.64 percentage points (40%).
Table 3.9 presents difference-in-differences estimates of ARRA 2009 on SSI for children
with low educated mothers. I find that ARRA 2009, which expanded the EITC for families with
three or more children relative to families with 2 children, decreased the likelihood that a child
reported SSI income by 0.13 percentage points (8.6%) and this effect is statistically significant
at the 10% level. Similar to Table 3.9, I find that exposure to a larger maximum EITC reduces
concurrent SSI 0.22 percentage points (when variation induced by state EITCs is included).
These estimates are consistent with the hypothesis that cash-on-hand affects a family’s decision
to apply for disability.
Table 3.6 reports estimates of ω1, β1, β2, and β3 from equations 3.1 and 3.2 for the subpop-
ulation of children with low education mothers on additional outcomes. As with the full sample
of all children, I find no evidence that the primary mechanism through which the EITC affects
child disability is through improved child health or increased maternal labor supply. I find that
for the subpopulation of children with a low educated mother, exposure to a larger cumulative
EITC increases the likelihood of reporting a physical impairment and reduces the likelihood of
having a working mother. Lastly, Table C.6 presents estimates for children with low education
mothers disaggregated by race and gender. Results in Table C.6 are qualitatively similar to those
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Table 3.8: Estimates of Cumulative Maximum EITC on SSI Award, Children with Low Educated
Mother
Federal EITC State & Federal EITC
Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Cumulative EITC (0-18) -0.0033*** -0.0023***
(0.0007) (0.0008)
Cumulative EITC (0-5) 0.0005 0.0003
(0.0006) (0.0006)
Cumulative EITC (6-12) 0.0007 -0.0000
(0.0009) (0.0007)
Cumulative EITC (13-18) -0.0064*** -0.0034***
(0.0013) (0.0010)
Dep. Mean 0.0160 0.0160 0.0160 0.0160
N 797,043 797,043 797,043 797,043
State FE YES YES YES YES
Birth Year FE YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Age x Nkids FE YES YES YES YES
Date source: American Community Survey years 2001-2017.
Notes: Each column is a separate regression of equation (3.1) or (3.2). Sample is restricted to
only individuals living with a mother who has attained a high school diploma or less education.
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are clustered at the state level and reported in parenthe-
ses. Observations are at the individual level and regressions are weighted using the survey person
weight. The specification includes the following controls: child gender, child race, the fraction
of the adult population unemployed, the fraction of the adult population on SSI, and whether the
child has a single mother. Cumulative EITC is annualized across all years within the stated age
range (e.g. 0-5, 6-12, 13-18, 0-18). EITC is measured in thousands of 2013 real dollars. SSI
is an indicator for the child reporting positive income from the Supplemental Security Income
program. * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** indicates statistical significance
at the 5% level, and *** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level.
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Table 3.9: Difference-in-Differences and Cumulative Maximum Credit Estimates of EITC on
SSI Award, Children with Low Educated Mother
ARRA 2009 Contemporary Contemporary State
Diff-in-Diff Federal EITC & Federal EITC
Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3)
Treatment Coef. -0.0013* -0.0035*** -0.0022***
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0006)
Dep. Mean 0.0150 0.0160 0.0160
N 641,603 875,557 875,557
State FE YES YES YES
Birth Year FE YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES
Nkids FE NO YES YES
Date source: American Community Survey years 2001-2017.
Notes: Each column is a separate regression of equations (3.3) and (3.4). Sample is restricted to
only individuals living with a mother who has attained a high school diploma or less education.
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are clustered at the state level and reported in paren-
theses. Observations are at the individual level and regressions are weighted using the survey
person weight. The specification includes the following controls: child gender, child race, the
fraction of the adult population unemployed, the fraction of the adult population on SSI, and
whether the child has a single mother. Contemporary EITC is measured in thousands of 2013
real dollars. SSI is an indicator for the child reporting positive income from the Supplemen-
tal Security Income program. * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** indicates
statistical significance at the 5% level, and *** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level.
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presented in Table 3.7 for the full population sample.
3.5.5 Robustness
The main estimates shown previously relied on variation induced by combined federal and state
EITCs. However, if the introduction of a state EITC is endogenous, meaning that they are
correlated with other state level changes that are also affecting child disability, then relying
on this variation may bias my estimates. Appendix tables C.2 through C.7 present analogous
estimates using variation solely from the maximum federal EITC. Estimates are similar to those
presented above, however, all estimates derived from the maximum federal EITC are larger
in magnitude. Overall, I find that exposure to a more generous federal EITC reduces child
disability, but there is no evidence that the underlying mechanism is through improved health of
the child or increases in maternal labor supply.
All estimates presented thus far, were estimated using individual person weights. As a ro-
bustness, I show that my estimates are robust to unweighted specifications. Unweighted esti-
mates represent the average treatment effect for the sampled population. Table C.8 presents
estimates of equations (3.1) and (3.2). I find that exposure to an additional $1000 each year from
the state and federal EITC reduces the likelihood a child reports income from the SSI program
by 0.42 percentage points (32%). Again, exposure at later ages has the largest impact on child
disability. In particular, I find that exposure to an additional $1000 each year between age 0 and
age 5 reduces the likelihood a child reports income from the SSI program by 0.07 percentage
points, exposure to an additional $1000 each year between age 6 and age 12 reduces the likeli-
hood a child reports income from the SSI program by 0.09 percentage points, and exposure to
an additional $1000 each year since age 13 reduces the likelihood a child reports income from
the SSI program by 0.28 percentage points.
Table C.9 reports unweighted estimates analogous to those presented in Table 3.4. The
difference-in-differences estimate of ARRA indicates that for the sampled population, ARRA
2009 reduced the likelihood that a child participates in the SSI program by 0.08 percentage
points (6%) and this effect is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. Exposure to a larger
contemporary maximum EITC similarly reduces the likelihood that a child participates in the
SSI program.
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3.6 Conclusion
This paper evaluates the interaction of two large US safety net programs for families with dis-
abled children: the Earned Income Tax Credit and the Supplemental Security Income program
for children. Using tax-reform induced variation in the federal EITC and the introduction of
state EITCs, I examine the impact of the credit on child SSI program participation. I find that
expansions to the EITC are associated with decreases in child disability between the ages of 15
and 18. This is true for several identification strategies: comparing children in 3 child families to
children in 2 child families; comparing children in 2 child families to children in 1 child families,
and using variation induced by state and federal EITC maximum credits.
Children exposed to a policy-induced $1000 annual increase in the EITC are 26 percent less
likely to participate in the SSI disability program. These impacts are evident using variation
induced by both state and federal EITC or solely from federal expansions. When I examine
impacts by subgroup, I find that boys and girls equally benefit from expansions to the EITC,
but white children experience the largest reduction in the likelihood they participate in the SSI
program.
A key limitation from this analysis is the maintained assumption that counterfactual dis-
ability outcomes within state and across family size would be constant over time. However,
event study analysis show that preexisting trends are flat (they also show no effect in the post
period) for both comparison groups (three child families to two child families in ACS, and two
child families to one child families in the CPS). This provides reassurance that the underlying
assumptions of the model are met and I am estimating the causal impact of the EITC expansions.
My results suggest that there are non-trivial benefits of the EITC on child disability. How-
ever, I find no evidence that the mechanism through which the EITC reduces child disability is
through improved child health. I find no reduction in the likelihood a child reports a cognitive
work impairment; and I find evidence that expansions of the EITC increased the likelihood a
child reports a physical work impairment. I find no evidence that the mechanism through which
the EITC reduces child disability is mechanical--through increases in maternal labor supply and
subsequent increases in pre-tax income. A remaining hypothesis posits that additional “cash-
on-hand” from the EITC reduces the likelihood that a family seeks disability income. This is
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supported by the finding that exposure to a larger contemporary EITC and exposure to a larger
annual cumulative EITC between the ages of 13 and 18 have the largest impacts on child dis-
ability. This hypothesis remains an open question to be examined.
This remains an active project. Important to note are the following: first, the change in SSI
reporting in 2010 may be biasing results reported using the ACS data, and second, Zebley v.
Sullivan in 1990 and Welfare Reform in 1996 may bias estimates of OBRA93. Therefore, as
future steps on this project I am exploring use of additional data sources including the Synthetic
SIPP data. In sum, the impact of the Earned Income Tax Credit on child disability remains an
open question for future work.
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Appendix
A Chapter 1 Appendix
A.1 Figures
Figure A.1: Distribution of Births by Month of Birth, US Total and NC Public School Data
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Data source: North Carolina Department of Public Instruction, school years 2004-2014 and
National Vital Statistics Reports, Vol 66. No. 1 January, 2017. Notes: US includes North
Carolina.
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Figure A.2: Characteristics of North Carolina Compared to US Average
(a) Special Education in North Carolina and United States
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(b) Characteristics of Children in North Carolina and United States
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Data source: National Center for Education Statistics Digest of Education Statistics 1995-2017
(panel a) and American Community Survey, 2002-2015 (panel b). Notes: United States does
not include North Carolina. No College is an indicator for the child lives with a mother with a
high school diploma or less. Single Mother is an indicator for a child living with a single
mother.
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A.2 Tables
Table A.1: Regression Discontinuity Estimates of Being Youngest in Classroom on Grade 3
Outcomes Various Model Specifications
Age at Grade Grade 3 Grade 3 Receives SpEd Repeated
3 Exam Math Z-Score Read Z-Score in Grade 3 Grade 3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Local Linear -0.5952*** -0.1009*** -0.1244*** 0.0175*** 0.0116***
(0.0030) (0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0015) (0.0006)
Local Quadratic -0.4495*** -0.1128*** -0.1388*** 0.0205*** 0.0081***
(0.0046) (0.0077) (0.0078) (0.0029) (0.0012)
Local Cubic -0.4021*** -0.01154*** -0.1415*** 0.0332*** 0.0025
(0.0085) (0.0168) (0.0166) (0.0061) (0.0026)
Local Quartic -0.5530*** -0.0259 -0.0279 0.0556*** -0.0077
(0.0231) (0.0484) (0.0488) (0.0183) (0.0079)
Dep. Mean 9.4511 0.0596 0.0638 0.1062 0.0158
N 1,083,943 1,075,424 1,074,108 1,083,946 1,083,946
Data source: North Carolina Department of Public Instruction, school years 2004-2014.
Notes: Sample includes all children who attended a North Carolina public school for grade
3. Each cell represents a separate regression. Results reflect estimates of equation (1.2). All
models include fixed effects for birth year and school. Standard errors are clustered at the school
and are reported in parentheses. Special education includes thirteen separate classifications of
disabilities. Each test has been normalized within year, grade, and test to have a mean zero and
standard deviation of one. Repeated grade is an indicator that the child was recorded in third
grade in two consecutive years. * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** indicates
statistical significance at the 5% level, and *** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level.
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B Chapter 2 Appendix
B.1 Figures
Figure B.1: Lexus Diagram of Sample
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(B) Main Analysis Sample
Notes: The data utilized comes from NHIS Survey years 1994-2005. Respondents in these
surveys have been linked to the Supplemental Security Record (SSR) of all SSI applications
and awards between 1974 and 2007. For each NHIS survey respondent in survey years 1994-
2005, I construct indicators for whether that individual applied for and/or received an award
between the ages of 0 and 17. Thus, the sample includes individuals born between 1957 and
2005. Each line in the graph represents a birth cohort. Looking across age horizontally will
reflect the potential birth cohorts included in the analysis.The main analysis considers disability
outcomes that occurred between the ages of 5 and 12 for individuals who experienced Zebley
SSI rules. Therefore, the main sample includes cohorts who turn 12 between 1990 and 2007.
This is represented by birth cohorts 1978-1995.
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Figure B.2: Lexus Diagram of Falsification Samples
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Notes: I utilize two falsification samples. Panel (A) represents the 0 to 4 falsification sample,
which includes birth cohorts 1978-2003. The individuals in this sample should not be affected
by a school entry cutoff date, since the disability claims during this age range are prior to school
entry. Panel (B) shows the pre-Zebley sample which considers disability outcomes that occurred
between the ages of 5 and 12, for individuals who turn 12 before 1989, that is birth cohorts
1969-1977. These individuals in this sample should not be affected by the school entry cutoff
date because there should be no interaction between special education and SSI for children.
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Figure B.3: Count of Births by Relative Age by Observable Characteristics, North Carolina
Sample
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Data Source: North Carolina Department of Public Instruction, school years 2004-2014.
Notes: Includes children in kindergarten cohorts 2006, 2007, and 2008. All October births are
dropped from the sample.
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Figure B.4: Fraction of Children Receiving Special Education Services in North Carolina and
US 1990-2015
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Data Source: National Center for Education Statistics Digest of Education Statistics 1995-2017.
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Figure B.5: Characteristics of Children in North Carolina and US 2000-2015
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Data Source: American Community Survey, 2002-2015. North Carolina tends to trend similarly
to the US (without North Carolina).
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Figure B.6: Characteristics of Children in North Carolina and US Averaged between 2000-2015
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Data Source: American Community Survey, 2002-2015. No college and Single Mother indicate
the fraction of children with a parent with a high school education or less or a single mother.
Overall, North Carolina has a larger Hispanic population and a smaller black population than the
combined US without NC.
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Figure B.7: Denied Applications for SSI by Relative Age, Pre-Zebley and Post-Zebley Cohorts
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Data Source: NHIS Surveys 1994-2005, birth cohorts 1957-1995.
Notes: The above graphs plot the fraction of individuals who have been denied SSI between the
ages of 5 and 12 for the post-Zebley and pre-Zebley cohorts.The data have been aggregated to 30
day bins. Dates to the left of the cutoff represent individuals born after the statewide cutoff date
(or the Oldest in the classroom), while dates to the right of the cutoff represent individuals born
before the statewide cutoff date (or the Youngest in the classroom).
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Figure B.8: Robustness of Estimates to Bandwidth
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Data Source: NHIS Surveys 1994-2005, birth cohorts 1978-1995.
Notes: These figures show the coefficient estimates and 95 percent confidence intervals at dif-
ferent bandwidths ranging from 5 to 180 days. The local linear regressions are estimated using
robust standard errors clustered at the state.
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Figure B.9: Robustness of Estimates to Bandwidth, Boys
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Data Source: NHIS Surveys 1994-2005, males born in birth cohorts 1978-1995.
Notes: These figures show the coefficient estimates and 95 percent confidence intervals at dif-
ferent bandwidths ranging from 5 to 180 days. The local linear regressions are estimated using
robust standard errors clustered at the state.
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Figure B.10: Robustness of Estimates to Bandwidth, Girls
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Data Source: NHIS Surveys 1994-2005, females born in birth cohorts 1978-1995.
Notes: These figures show the coefficient estimates and 95 percent confidence intervals at dif-
ferent bandwidths ranging from 5 to 180 days. The local linear regressions are estimated using
robust standard errors clustered at the state.
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Figure B.11: The Distribution of Disability Estimates for Placebo Cutoff Dates June 1 through
December 31
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Data Source: NHIS Surveys 1994-2005, birth cohorts 1978-1995.
Notes: These figures show the conditional density functions of point estimates using each day
between June 1 and December 31 as placebos. The diamond represents the regression disconti-
nuity estimated at the true state cutoff date. All models are specified as a local linear regression
with a bandwidth of 60 days.
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Figure B.12: The Distribution of Disability Estimates for Denied Applications
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Data Source: NHIS Surveys 1994-2005, birth cohorts 1978-1995.
Notes: These figures show the conditional density functions of point estimates using each day
between June 1 and December 31 as placebos. The diamond represents the regression disconti-
nuity estimated at the true state cutoff date. All models are specified as a local linear regression
with a bandwidth of 60 days.
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Figure B.13: Dissipation of RD Estimates for Ages 13 to 17, Boys
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Data Source: NHIS Surveys 1994-2005, Boys born in birth cohorts which vary with age.
Notes: These figures show the coefficient estimates and 95 percent confidence intervals for ap-
plications and awards between ages 12 and 17. Each age represents the likelihood of applying or
receiving an award between age 5 and the given age. The local linear regressions are estimated
using robust standard errors clustered at the state with a bandwidth of 60 days. The effect of
the statewide school cutoff date dissipates after age 13. Reasons for why these effects dissipate
between ages 13 and 17 are discussed in the text.
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Figure B.14: Dissipation of RD Estimates for Ages 13 to 17, Girls
-0.5
0.5
1.5
E
st
im
at
ed
 C
oe
ffi
ci
en
t
12 13 14 15 16 17
Age
Applied
-0.5
0.5
1.5
E
st
im
at
ed
 C
oe
ffi
ci
en
t
12 13 14 15 16 17
Age
Award for Any Reason
-0.5
0.5
1.5
E
st
im
at
ed
 C
oe
ffi
ci
en
t
12 13 14 15 16 17
Age
Award for Mental Impairment
-0.5
0.5
1.5
E
st
im
at
ed
 C
oe
ffi
ci
en
t
12 13 14 15 16 17
Age
Award for Physical Impairment
Data Source: NHIS Surveys 1994-2005, Girls born in birth cohorts which vary with age.
Notes: These figures show the coefficient estimates and 95 percent confidence intervals for ap-
plications and awards between ages 12 and 17. Each age represents the likelihood of applying or
receiving an award between age 5 and the given age. The local linear regressions are estimated
using robust standard errors clustered at the state with a bandwidth of 60 days. The effect of
the statewide school cutoff date dissipates after age 13. Reasons for why these effects dissipate
between ages 13 and 17 are discussed in the text.
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B.2 Tables
Table B.1: Regression Discontinuity Estimates on Observable Characteristics
Boys and Girls Boys Girls
Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3)
White 1.06 1.07 1.01
(0.76) (1.02) (0.78)
Dep. Mean 46.89 47.10 46.67
Black -0.43 -0.44 -0.41
(0.58) (0.61) (0.81)
Dep. Mean 15.23 15.12 15.34
Hispanic -1.18 -1.61* -0.69
(0.91) (0.95) (1.00)
Dep. Mean 32.55 32.61 32.48
Male 1.33*
(0.72)
Dep. Mean 50.58
N 71,089 36,119 34,970
Notes: * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** indicates statistical significance at
the 5% level and *** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level. Data is from restricted-use
NHIS-SSA linked data and include birth cohorts 1978-1995. Each cell represents a separate
regression. Local linear regressions are specified with a bandwidth of 60 days. Robust standard
errors are reported in parenthesis and are clustered at the state. The mean of the individuals to
the left of the cutoff (the oldest in the classroom) is reported. Estimates on the race and sex
controls variables show that these characteristics are smooth through the cutoff date.
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Table B.2: Regression Discontinuity Estimates of the Increase in Disability by Type of Mental
Impairment at Statewide Entry Cutoff Date
Boys and Girls Boys Girls
Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3)
Award for Mental Impairment 0.0052*** 0.0072** 0.0031*
(0.0018) (0.0029) (0.0017)
Dep. Mean 0.0076 0.0107 0.0044
Award for Malleable Mental Impairment 0.0035*** 0.0045** 0.0023**
(0.0011) (0.0020) (0.0010)
Dep. Mean 0.0029 0.0049 0.0009
Award for Mental Retardation 0.0017 0.0021 0.0013
(0.0010) (0.0016) (0.0013)
Dep. Mean 0.0039 0.0047 0.0032
Notes: * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** indicates statistical significance at
the 5% level and *** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level. Data is from restricted-use
NHIS-SSA linked data and include birth cohorts 1978-1995. Each cell represents a separate
regression. Local linear regressions are specified with a bandwidth of 60 days. Robust standard
errors are reported in parenthesis and are clustered at the state. The mean of the individuals to the
left of the cutoff (the oldest in the classroom) is reported. “Malleable” mental awards include:
affective disorders, anxiety disorders, personality disorders, conduct disorders, defiant disorders,
ADHD, speech impairments, and learning disabilities. Mental retardation is composed of two
classifications: mental retardation and borderline mental retardation. Omitted mental impair-
ments that are not included as malleable impairments are as follows: organic mental disorder,
schizophrenic disorders, autism, and substance abuse. Malleable mental impairments account
for the majority of the increase in all awards at the cutoff date.
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Table B.3: Regression Discontinuity Estimates of the Increase in Disability at Statewide Entry
Cutoff Date, By Child Sex
Boys Girls
Dependent Variable (1) (2)
Applied 0.0108** 0.0045*
(0.0054) (0.0024)
Dep. Mean 0.0331 0.0185
Award for Any Reason 0.0077*** 0.0031*
(0.0029) (0.0017)
Dep. Mean 0.0129 0.0057
Award for Mental Impairment 0.0072** 0.0031*
(0.0029) (0.0017)
Dep. Mean 0.0107 0.0044
Award for Physical Impairment 0.0002 -0.0000
(0.0008) (0.0006)
Dep. Mean 0.0017 0.0010
Denied 0.0026 0.0026
(0.0041) (0.0020)
Dep. Mean 0.0194 0.0123
N 28,952 28,407
Notes: * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** indicates statistical significance at
the 5% level and *** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level. Data is from restricted-use
NHIS-SSA linked data and include birth cohorts 1969-1995. Each cell represents a separate
regression. Local linear regressions are specified with a bandwidth of 60 days. Robust standard
errors are reported in parenthesis and are clustered at the state. The mean of the individuals to
the left of the cutoff (the oldest in the classroom) is reported. Outcomes are defined as indicators
for the SSI event occurring between the ages of 5 and 12.
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Table B.4: Robustness of RD Estimates to Local Polynomial Choice
Linear Quadratic Cubic Quartic
Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Applied 0.0078*** 0.0076** 0.0109** 0.0158**
(0.0027) (0.0038) (0.0050) (0.0071)
Award for Any Reason 0.0055*** 0.0070*** 0.0100*** 0.0122**
(0.0016) (0.0027) (0.0028) (0.0048)
Award for Mental Impairment 0.0052*** 0.0071** 0.0090*** 0.0108**
(0.0018) (0.0027) (0.0028) (0.0044)
Award for Physical Impairment 0.0001 -0.0007 -0.0002 0.0006
(0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0010) (0.0012)
Denied 0.0026 0.0008 0.0013 0.0044
(0.0024) (0.0034) (0.0038) (0.0049)
N 57,359
Notes: * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** indicates statistical significance at
the 5% level and *** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level. Data is from restricted-use
NHIS-SSA linked data and include birth cohorts 1978-1995. Each cell represents a separate
regression. All specifications use a bandwidth of 60 days. Robust standard errors are reported
in parenthesis and are clustered at the state. The mean of the individuals to the left of the cutoff
(the oldest in the classroom) is reported. Outcomes are defined as indicators for the SSI event
occurring between the ages of 5 and 12.
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Table B.5: Robustness of RD Estimates to Local Polynomial Choice by Child Sex
Linear Quadratic Cubic Quartic
Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Boys
Applied 0.0108** 0.0062 0.0041 0.0107
(0.0054) (0.0070) (0.0080) (0.0105)
Award for Any Reason 0.0077*** 0.0092** 0.0119*** 0.0169***
(0.0029) (0.0041) (0.0045) (0.0061)
Award for Mental Impairment 0.0072** 0.0095** 0.0114*** 0.0157***
(0.0029) (0.0040) (0.0037) (0.0056)
Award for Physical Impairment 0.0002 -0.0010 -0.0005 0.0014
(0.0008) (0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0020)
Denied 0.0026 -0.0033 -0.0072 -0.0050
(0.0041) (0.0056) (0.0059) (0.0087)
N 28,952
Girls
Applied 0.0045* 0.0089** 0.0172*** 0.0200**
(0.0024) (0.0036) (0.0055) (0.0080)
Award for Any Reason 0.0031* 0.0049 0.0081** 0.0073
(0.0017) (0.0031) (0.0039) (0.0060)
Award for Mental Impairment 0.0031* 0.0048* 0.0066* 0.0060
(0.0017) (0.0028) (0.0037) (0.0053)
Award for Physical Impairment -0.0000 -0.0004 -0.0000 -0.0003
(0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0019) (0.0022)
Denied 0.0026 0.0048* 0.0094** 0.0130***
(0.0020) (0.0028) (0.0041) (0.0048)
N 28,407
Notes: * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** indicates statistical significance at
the 5% level and *** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level. Data is from restricted-use
NHIS-SSA linked data and include birth cohorts 1978-1995. Each cell represents a separate
regression. All specifications use a bandwidth of 60 days. Robust standard errors are reported
in parenthesis and are clustered at the state. The mean of the individuals to the left of the cutoff
(the oldest in the classroom) is reported. Outcomes are defined as indicators for the SSI event
occurring between the ages of 5 and 12.
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Table B.6: Robustness of RD Estimates to Sample Weights
Unweighted
NHIS Person Weight Adjusted
Weight for Link-Eligibility
Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3)
Applied 0.0078*** 0.0094*** 0.0082***
(0.0027) (0.0029) (0.0031)
Award for Any Reason 0.0055*** 0.0058*** 0.0059***
(0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0018)
Award for Mental Impairment 0.0052*** 0.0054*** 0.0054***
(0.0018) (0.0017) (0.0020)
Award for Physical Impairment 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002
(0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0007)
Denied 0.0026 0.0041* 0.0028
(0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0022)
N 57,359 57,260 57,260
Notes: * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** indicates statistical significance at
the 5% level and *** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level. Data is from restricted-use
NHIS-SSA linked data and include birth cohorts 1978-1995. Each cell represents a separate
regression. All specifications use a bandwidth of 60 days. Robust standard errors are reported
in parenthesis and are clustered at the state. The mean of the individuals to the left of the cutoff
(the oldest in the classroom) is reported. Outcomes are defined as indicators for the SSI event
occurring between the ages of 5 and 12. See text for details on the weights.
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Table B.7: Robustness of RD Estimates to Sample Weights by Child Sex
Unweighted
NHIS Person Weight Adjusted
Weight for Link-Eligibility
Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3)
Boys
Applied 0.0108** 0.0125** 0.0105*
(0.0054) (0.0053) (0.0058)
Award for Any Reason 0.0077*** 0.0070** 0.0069**
(0.0029) (0.0031) (0.0035)
Award for Mental Impairment 0.0072** 0.0065** 0.0063*
(0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0033)
Award for Physical Impairment 0.0002 0.0002 0.0005
(0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0011)
Denied 0.0026 0.0050 0.0030
(0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0039)
N 28,952
Girls
Applied 0.0045* 0.0059** 0.0057**
(0.0024) (0.0027) (0.0027)
Award for Any Reason 0.0031* 0.0043** 0.0047***
(0.0017) (0.0019) (0.0017)
Award for Mental Impairment 0.0031* 0.0040** 0.0043**
(0.0017) (0.0018) (0.0017)
Award for Physical Impairment -0.0000 0.0002 -0.0000
(0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0007)
Denied 0.0026 0.0030 0.0026
(0.0020) (0.0024) (0.0024)
N 28,407
Notes: * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** indicates statistical significance at
the 5% level and *** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level. Data is from restricted-use
NHIS-SSA linked data and include birth cohorts 1978-1995. Each cell represents a separate
regression. All specifications use a bandwidth of 60 days. Robust standard errors are reported
in parenthesis and are clustered at the state. The mean of the individuals to the left of the cutoff
(the oldest in the classroom) is reported. Outcomes are defined as indicators for the SSI event
occurring between the ages of 5 and 12. See text for details on the weights.
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Table B.8: Robustness of RD Estimates to Assumptions About the Standard Errors
State
Not Birth Relative
Clustered Year Age
Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Applied 0.0078*** 0.0078*** 0.0078** 0.0078***
(0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0032) (0.0025)
Award for Any Reason 0.0055*** 0.0055*** 0.0055*** 0.0055***
(0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0015)
Award for Mental Impairment 0.0052*** 0.0052*** 0.0052*** 0.0052***
(0.0018) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0013)
Award for Physical Impairment 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0003) (0.0006)
Denied 0.0026 0.0026 0.0026 0.0026
(0.0024) (0.0021) (0.0025) (0.0019)
N 57,359
Notes: * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** indicates statistical significance at
the 5% level and *** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level. Data is from restricted-use
NHIS-SSA linked data and include birth cohorts 1978-1995. Each cell represents a separate
regression. All specifications use a bandwidth of 60 days. Robust standard errors are reported
in parenthesis and are clustered at the state. The mean of the individuals to the left of the cutoff
(the oldest in the classroom) is reported. Outcomes are defined as indicators for the SSI event
occurring between the ages of 5 and 12. See text for details about the various levels at which the
estimates are clustered.
153
Table B.9: Robustness of RD Estimates to Assumptions of Standard Errors, by Child Sex
State
Not Birth Relative
Clustered Year Age
Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Boys
Applied 0.0108** 0.0108** 0.0108** 0.0108***
(0.0054) (0.0042) (0.0043) (0.0038)
Award for Any Reason 0.0077*** 0.0077*** 0.0077*** 0.0077***
(0.0029) (0.0027) (0.0020) (0.0024)
Award for Mental Impairment 0.0072** 0.0072*** 0.0072*** 0.0072***
(0.0029) (0.0025) (0.0021) (0.0021)
Award for Physical Impairment 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002
(0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0007) (0.0010)
Denied 0.0026 0.0026 0.0026 0.0026
(0.0041) (0.0033) (0.0037) (0.0033)
N 28,952
Girls
Applied 0.0045* 0.0045 0.0045 0.0045
(0.0024) (0.0032) (0.0037) (0.0035)
Award for Any Reason 0.0031* 0.0031* 0.0031** 0.0031*
(0.0017) (0.0018) (0.0015) (0.0019)
Award for Mental Impairment 0.0031* 0.0031* 0.0031** 0.0031*
(0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0015) (0.0016)
Award for Physical Impairment -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000
(0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0007)
Denied 0.0026 0.0026 0.0026 0.0026
(0.0020) (0.0027) (0.0034) (0.0029)
N 28,407
Notes: * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** indicates statistical significance at
the 5% level and *** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level. Data is from restricted-use
NHIS-SSA linked data and include birth cohorts 1978-1995. Each cell represents a separate
regression. All specifications use a bandwidth of 60 days. Robust standard errors are reported
in parenthesis and are clustered at the state. The mean of the individuals to the left of the cutoff
(the oldest in the classroom) is reported. Outcomes are defined as indicators for the SSI event
occurring between the ages of 5 and 12. See text for details about the various levels at which the
estimates are clustered.
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Table B.10: RD Estimates of the Increase in Special Education Services at the School Cutoff
Date, Sample Includes Early Leavers
Boys and Girls Boys Girls
Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3)
Special Education 0.0300*** 0.0362*** 0.0249***
(0.0034) (0.0054) (0.0043)
Dep. Mean 0.11 0.15 0.09
N 259,787 127,439 132,348
Notes: * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** indicates statistical significance at
the 5% level and *** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level. Data come from the North
Carolina Department of Public Instruction, school years 2004-2014. The outcome of interest
is receipt of special education services between the ages of 5 and 12 (grade K-grade 6). All
October births are dropped due to the October 16 cutoff date. This sample is not restricted to
children who remained in the NC public school system for all years between grade 3 and grade
6, therefore, it includes children who may have been enrolled in special education had they not
left the system.
Table B.11: Two-sample Fuzzy RD Estimates of Special Education on SSI, Sample Includes
Early Leavers
Boys and Girls Boys Girls
Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3)
Award for Mental Impairment 0.2567*** 0.2983* 0.1767*
(0.0945) (0.1529) (0.1010)
Dep. Mean 0.0259 0.0331 0.0185
Award for Malleable Mental Impairment 0.1800*** 0.2099** 0.1245*
(0.0570) (0.0833) (0.0643)
Dep. Mean 0.0093 0.0129 0.0057
Notes: * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** indicates statistical significance
at the 5% level and *** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level. The two-sample fuzzy
RD estimate is calculated as the ratio of the reduced-form and first stage coefficients. Standard
errors were calculated using the delta method under the assumption of zero covariance between
the first-stage and reduced form estimates as in Dee and Evans (2003).
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C Chapter 3 Appendix
C.1 Figures
Figure C.1: Robustness of Estimates to Controls
(a) State and Federal EITC
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Date source: American Community Survey years 2001-2017.
Notes: Each column is a separate regression of equation (3.1) or (3.2). Standard errors are
clustered at the state level. Cumulative EITC is annualized across all years within the stated age
range (e.g. 0-5, 6-12, 13-18, 0-18). EITC is measured in thousands of 2013 real dollars.
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C.2 Tables
Table C.1: Summary Statistics, CPS Sample
Variable Mean Std. Dev
SSI Recipient 0.008 0.089
Number of Kids in Family 2.083 0.795
Cumulative Federal EITC ($1000) Annualized 1.728 1.570
Cumulative Federal and State EITC ($1000) Annualized 1.820 1.696
Contemporary Federal EITC ($1000) 2.605 2.003
Contemporary Federal and State EITC ($1000) 2.766 2.194
Medicaid Eligible to Age 18 0.432 0.495
Adult Disability 0.017 0.009
Adult Unemployment 0.046 0.016
Black 0.145 0.352
Hispanic 0.122 0.327
White 0.801 0.399
Female 0.485 0.500
Low Educated Mother 0.183 0.386
Single Mother 0.276 0.447
N 463,351
Data source: Current Population Survey 1975-2017.
Notes: Data include children born between 1952 and 2002 who were between the ages of 15 and
18 at the time of the survey and are classified as the child, stepchild, or grandchild of the head of
household.
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Table C.8: Estimates of Cumulative Maximum Federal & State EITC on SSI Award, Unweighted
Federal EITC State & Federal EITC
Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Cumulative EITC (0-18) -0.0056*** -0.0042***
(0.0004) (0.0004)
Cumulative EITC (0-5) -0.0004 -0.0007**
(0.0003) (0.0003)
Cumulative EITC (6-12) -0.0016*** -0.0009*
(0.0005) (0.0005)
Cumulative EITC (13-18) -0.0044*** -0.0028***
(0.0006) (0.0005)
Dep. Mean 0.0130 0.0130 0.0130 0.0130
N 1,892,085 1,892,085 1,892,085 1,892,085
State FE YES YES YES YES
Birth Year FE YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Age x Nkids FE YES YES YES YES
Date source: American Community Survey years 2001-2017.
Notes: Each column is a separate regression of equation (3.1) or (3.2). Heteroskedasticity robust
standard errors are clustered at the state level and reported in parentheses. Observations are at the
individual level. The specification includes the following controls: child gender, child race, the
fraction of the adult population unemployed, the fraction of the adult population on SSI, whether
the child has a single mother, and whether the child has a low educated mother. Cumulative EITC
is annualized across all years within the stated age range (e.g. 0-5, 6-12, 13-18, 0-18). EITC is
measured in thousands of 2013 real dollars. SSI is an indicator for the child reporting positive
income from the Supplemental Security Income program. * indicates statistical significance at
the 10% level, ** indicates statistical significance at the 5% level, and *** indicates statistical
significance at the 1% level.
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Table C.9: Difference-in-Differences and Maximum Credit Estimates of EITC on SSI Awards,
Unweighted
ARRA 2009 Contemporary Contemporary State
Diff-in-Diff Federal EITC & Federal EITC
Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3)
Treatment Coef. -0.0008* -0.0041*** -0.0029***
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003)
Dep. Mean 0.0130 0.0150 0.0150
N 1,503,112 2,114,608 2,114,608
State FE YES YES YES
Birth Year FE YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES
Nkids FE NO YES YES
Date source: American Community Survey years 2001-2017.
Notes: Each column is a separate regression of equations (3.3) and (3.4). Heteroskedasticity
robust standard errors are clustered at the state level and reported in parentheses. Observations
are at the individual level. The specification includes the following controls: child gender, child
race, the fraction of the adult population unemployed, the fraction of the adult population on
SSI, whether the child has a single mother, and whether the child has a low educated mother.
Contemporary EITC is measured in thousands of 2013 real dollars. SSI is an indicator for the
child reporting positive income from the Supplemental Security Income program. * indicates
statistical significance at the 10% level, ** indicates statistical significance at the 5% level, and
*** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level.
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